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Preface 
A FEW YEARS AGO, when I first began to put these materials to-
gether, I was convinced that I had come across another Progressive 
triumph. At the center of that triumph I placed the United States 
Bureau of Mines, an agency admittedly lacking coercive powers but 
nonetheless embodying a fresh, national, scientific, ongoing approach 
to the serious problems of mine safety. There is still some of that em-
phasis in this book, but I am now less convinced of the propriety of 
using the bureau, the Progressive period's unique solution to mine 
accidents and explosions, to exemplify a thoroughly modern institu-
tional response to industrial dislocation. My skepticism derives in part 
from an examination of mine safety in the states, perhaps the major 
theater of activity, where the same coal-mine operators who had 
pressed for a national bureau resisted their state legislatures and 
inspection services and finally, in their misplaced enthusiasm for uni-
form state legislation, opposed meaningful national reform. In short, 
if the coal-mining safety movement may be considered exemplary, 
then the Progressive period was characterized not by centralization 
and organization, but by the persistence of decentralization and dis-
organization. At the heart of this distended society was the Progressive 
political economy: a hydra of political federalism and competitive 
capitalism, each a form of decentralization, each feeding on the other, 
together responsible both for the tragedies in the mines and for the 
failure to find adequate solutions. 
This book is a blend of several approaches to history and varieties 
of historical writing. I have attempted to place the subject of coal-
mining safety in differing perspectives. Although the study focuses on 
the process of reform in a federal system, I have devoted some at-
tention to technology, bureaucracy, and those miner and operator at-
titudes which lie outside a traditional political scheme. In general, I 
have rejected narrative chronological history in favor of organization 
around subject areas and occupational groups. In the final chapter, I 
have tried to make my interpretative frameworks as obvious and ex-
plicit as possible. 
I am grateful to the State University of New York Research Faun-
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dation and to the Fredonia Foundation for summer grants in support 
of this study and to the helpful staffs of research libraries across the 
country. A special thanks goes to Stanley Brown of the Federal Rec-
ords Center at Suitland, Maryland, whose cooperation saved me many 
hours and frustrations. Mary Notaro, who typed the final manuscript, 
has my appreciation for her precision and tolerance of my errors. The 
dissertation from which this book has grown was written at the Uni-
versity of Illinois, Urbana, under Clark Spence, and was read by 
Frederic J aher and Thomas Krueger, who served on my dissertation 
committee. I have profited considerably from their observations and 
suggestions. Robert W. Harbeson of the Department of Economics at 
Illinois had a clear though indirect impact on this work through his 
course in competition and monopoly. K. Austin Kerr of Ohio State 
University read the completed study in full. I am thankful for his ex-
pertise in the history of mine safety and for a thoughtful overall cri-
tique. Marilee Sargent and Jerry Clore, friends since 1968, have never 
read this manuscript, but their influence upon it, and upon my life and 
world view, has been enormous. Dianne Bennett, my wife, has unself-
ishly given hundreds of hours and her talents in researching, writing, 
and editing to this project. She has spent her vacations in manuscript 
collections, her summers near research libraries. I often wonder, had 
our roles been reversed, if I would have been as willing to donate my 
time and energies. Her direct contributions to my work have decreased 
in recent years, and with this I am equally pleased, since it indicates 
that Dianne has found her own sources of fulfillment and happiness. 
Introduction 
IN NOVEMBER 1968 an explosion in the "safe" Number 9 mine 
of the Consolidation Coal Company at Farmington, West Virginia, 
killed seventy-eight miners and produced a brief but potent public 
outcry for new federal safety legislation. The prototype for that sce-
nario of disaster and reform belongs to the Progressive period. It began 
in December 1907, ten miles from Farmington at Monongah, West 
Virginia, where 361 miners died in an explosion in the "safe" Mo-
nongah 6 and 8 mines of the Fairmont Coal Company.1 Monongah, 
and a number of other major disasters occurring in the same month, 
put the coal-mining safety problem in proper perspective; it made 
it a public disgrace. It proved an important stimulus to reform in the 
states, where a limited coal-mining safety movement had been instru-
mental in fostering new legislation since 1905. More important, Mo-
nongah made national reform likely, for it now became possible for 
Joseph A. Holmes, chief of the Technologic Branch of the Geological 
Survey and protagonist in the extended drama to follow, to obtain a 
hearing for his idea of a national educational and scientific agency to 
deal with the problem of mine safety. By 1910 a coalition of interests, 
including miners, inspectors, coal and metal mine operators, con-
servationists, and bureaucrats, had created the United States Bureau 
of Mines. 
In one sense, the bureau was the cautious first step in the national 
politics of mine safety; it would be followed in the next few years by 
a major campaign for uniform state legislation (a form of nationaliza-
tion) and in the 1940s and 1950s by federal safety standards and in-
spection. In another sense, the bureau was the end product of rapid 
changes in the coal industry; the miners at Monongah were victims of 
economic growth, increasing competition, and changing technology. 
Production of bituminous coal approximately doubled every ten years 
beginning in 1840, with increases more gradual (excepting the war 
years) after 1910. Although the period from 1890 to 1920 was one 
of steady increase in demand for coal, competition, much of it inter-
regional, also grew in intensity. By 1900 more than twenty-five states 
mined coal, and Illinois, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Ohio, and West Vir-
1 
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ginia had emerged as the industry's major producers in the United 
States. Attempts to satisfy increasing industrial demands for coal 
created new mine-safety problems and exacerbated old ones. As the 
mines went deeper, they exposed potentially dangerous concentrations 
of explosive methane gas; as they became more mechanized (machines 
cut about 25 percent of the nation's coal in 1900 and 42 percent in 
I 9 IO), coal dust developed as a major health and safety hazard. 2 
Among the new hazards were electricity, now beginning to be widely 
deployed in coal mines; a system of payment for miners-mine-run-
which encouraged misuse of explosives since, under it, miners were 
paid for all the coal brought out, rather than for only the larger pieces; 
and the new immigrants, usually lacking in mining experience and 
English-language capabilities.3 
The matrix of institutions and processes which the Progressive pe-
riod brought to bear on mine safety confronted an exceedingly critical 
situation, but it was one for which there was substantial precedent and 
preparation. Accidents were reported in the United States as early as 
1825, with the first near-disaster in 1856 when four men were buried 
alive but ultimately rescued. Not until the Avondale disaster of 1869 
in the Pennsylvania anthracite territory did coal-mining safety attract 
sufficient attention to evoke legislative action, although miners had 
been attempting to secure safety legislation since before the Civil War.4 
The states legislated on numerous facets of coal-mining safety after 
1870, paying particular attention to ventilation and systems of mine 
inspection. All the legislation proved inadequate. Major disasters 
rocked Braidwood, Illinois, in 1883; Pocahontas, Virginia, in 1884; 
and the Frick Coal and Coke Company, Pittsburgh, in 1891. By 1890 
fourteen states had experienced at least one major explosion.5 A 
miner, recalling his youth in the coalfields of West Virginia, described 
the mood surrounding these tragedies: 
Not a week passed but what tragedy touched some home. When a 
housewife, intent upon her duties, chanced to glance through the win-
dow and see a group of miners bearing an improvised stretcher be-
tween them, she spread the alarm. In a twinkling women were on the 
porches, wiping hands on aprons, calling to one another. And before 
the grim-faced bearers of the groaning burden, carbide lamps still 
shooting flame from their foreheads, were halfway to the doctor's of-
fice, a multitude of folk trailed in their wake. Anxious, distrait women 
and children, uncertain of the fate of their loved ones, demanded to 
know the identity of the victim. When the dreaded news was revealed, 
the women gathered around their hysterical sister and offered com-
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fort. Presently they returned to their household duties, thankful that 
a merciful God had seen fit to once again spare husband, or son, or 
brother.6 
3 
The new century began inauspiciously with the Winter Quarters mine 
disaster in Schofield, Utah, which killed 201 persons. In 1906 seven-
teen major disasters killed a total of 235 miners; in 1907, eighteen 
killed 918 miners; in 1908, eleven killed 348; in 1909, nineteen killed 
498; and in 1910, when Congress created the bureau, nineteen major 
disasters killed 485 miners. The problem of industrial safety-in the 
nineteenth century a malingering illness to which occasional relief was 
administered-had by the twentieth century become an epidemic of 
crisis proportions, demanding immediate attention. 7 
During the Progressive years, the coal industry's particular version 
of this industrial crisis was approached on four distinct yet converg-
ing planes. Of the four, the most traditional and the least productive 
plane encompassed private activities related to mine safety and the 
attitudes paralleling or underlying those activities. Some coal-mining 
companies, usually the largest ones, undertook to improve conditions 
in their mines, installing safety equipment and training safety foremen 
and rescue personnel, even when not required by law to do so. They 
pursued safety activities through a variety of organizations, including 
local, state, and regional coal-operator associations, the American 
Mine Safety Association, and the National Safety Council. Yet oper-
ators more commonly were circumspect of even the innocuous ac-
tivities of these organizations, and if the reports of the state mine 
inspectors are reliable, a majority failed to keep their mines in mini-
mally satisfactory condition, frustrated enforcement of safety codes, 
and cooperated only under duress. Miners, for their part, brought to 
their work a set of safety attitudes and work habits which contributed 
to mine-safety problems. They often were guilty of inadequately tim-
bering their working places, of failing to undercut coal before shoot-
ing, and of riding illegally on mine cars. Many, particularly the recent 
immigrants, were ignorant of elementary mining techniques and un-
able to read mine-safety materials and signs or to understand oral in-
structions from working partners and supervisors. The claim of miner 
carelessness, although politicized to the point where it virtually be-
came a rationale for the failures of the entire mine-safety movement, 
appears to have had some basis in fact. In his organized role, as part 
of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), the miner played 
a more positive yet still ambivalent part in the safety movement. The 
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union was the primary advocate of new state mine-safety legislation 
and, unlike its constituency, an active proponent of enforcement 
through inspectors and the contract grievance procedure. The organi-
zation also participated, though less zealously, in the campaigns to 
create and fund the Bureau of Mines. Nonetheless, the UMWA re-
mained essentially committed to the goals of organization and mem-
bership, and with the possible exception of the years 1905-1910, 
safety remained a decidedly peripheral concern. A third group, the 
state mine inspectors, showed more consistent interest in the cause of 
safety. Most inspectors escaped dominance by capital or labor, worked 
to enforce and improve the laws, and, with the operators, were the 
major advocates of uniform state legislation. 
The three other planes of activity were political, each associated 
with a level of governmental activity-national, state, and interstate. 
At the national level, the primary political response of the Progres-
sive period to coal-mining safety was the Bureau of Mines, a re-
search- and education-oriented organization totally lacking in coercive 
capability. The bureau was in part a product of a campaign for na-
tional action which had its origin within the federal bureaucracy, in 
the work of Joseph A. Holmes. That campaign became public follow-
ing an incredible series of mine disasters in December 1907, and it 
was thereafter shaped and dominated by an active group of coal oper-
ators led by West Virginia's A. B. Fleming. Although the coal-mining 
safety issue was the major catalyst in the bureau's creation, there is 
some doubt whether it would have been established without the aid 
of western metal mine operators and their cooperation with coal in-
terests within the American Mining Congress. Placed beside the con-
sistent, aggressive, and well-organized political tactics of the business 
community, the contributions of scientists, engineers, inspectors, the 
UMWA, and a variety of humanitarian progressives and socialists seem 
sporadic and ineffectual. Once the Bureau of Mines had been estab-
lished, operators shifted their attention to support of Holmes as direc-
tor, and here, too, their efforts were eventually rewarded, though only 
after a protracted struggle with federal bureaucrats who were opposing 
Holmes and pressing their own candidate. 
Federal initiatives in mine safety, first under the United States Geo-
logical Survey, then under the Bureau of Mines, reflected the political 
origins of the mine-safety issue. The influence of the mine disaster, 
especially Monongah in 1907 and the Cherry, Illinois, mine fire in 
1909, was unmistakable in the policies and emphases of both agencies. 
The Geological Survey sought to isolate the cause of the mine ex-
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plosion and to counter the opposition of miners and operators to a 
theory of explosions based on coal-dust particles, and the bureau de-
voted an increasing proportion of its coal-mining safety energies to its 
popular rescue program using stations and movable cars. The bureau's 
conservative political origins and consequent lack of coercive au-
thority also were apparent in its reliance on a vigorous public relations 
program, aimed at miners, operators, and public officials, and in its 
search for productive cooperative relationships with state agencies 
and private organizations like the National Fire Protection Associa-
tion. But for coal-mining safety, perhaps the most significant aspect of 
the bureau's first decade was its gradual shift away from the coal in-
dustry in response to the political demands of western metal mine 
operators and away from safety as public interest in matters of safety 
diminished. 
Within individual states, the politics of mine safety followed an ex-
pected pattern: mine workers, usually backed by inspectors, consis-
tently advocated additions to and modifications of state legislation, 
while operators presented the greatest obstacle to reform. Under the 
consistent pressure of explosions and rising death and accident rates, 
state political systems responded with new legislation, most of it passed 
between 1905 and 1915. In several states, participants in the political 
process attempted with some success to replace confrontation with 
cooperation as a decision-making method, developing commissions of 
operators, miners, and interested public officials which worked to com-
promise differences and present lawmakers with legislation agreeable 
to all parties. This creative mechanism and the legislation it produced 
were, however, at the mercy of the enforcement process. Inspection 
staffs were consistently overworked, often of low quality, and oc-
casionally politicized beyond objectivity; and they seldom had the full 
cooperation of other elements in the safety equation. Miners, opera-
tors, mine officials, and coroners' juries all manifested a lack of com-
mitment to enforcement. 
The politics of coal-mining safety took place upon still a third po-
litical plane, this one interstate. Unwilling to countenance national 
safety legislation but aware of the inadequacies of a purely state sys-
tem, coal-mine operators in the American Mining Congress and in-
spectors in the Mine Inspectors' Institute of America (founded in 
1908) led a major industry movement toward uniform state legisla-
tion. This administrative device for equalizing the costs of safety was 
never effected, largely because operators and inspectors alike were un-
able to resolve their internal differences. 
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These public and private solutions brought to bear on the safety 
problem in the Progressive years proved to be no panacea, as Farm-
ington attests. In fact, the most recent study of coal-mine accidents 
concludes that "for the first quarter of the century it is difficult to ob-
serve any clearly marked course of improvement in the fatal acci-
dent rates of American coal mines . . . after the turn of the century 
little sustained improvement is visible." 8 The first two bureau chiefs, 
Joseph A. Holmes and Van H. Manning, proffered more favorable 
evaluations. In early I9I3 Holmes noted a "gratifying improvement 
in the situation"; six years later Manning claimed that the coal-mining 
safety movement had saved some s,ooo lives in less than ten years.9 
Acknowledging the inadequacies of any statistical method and the 
inaccuracies of all compilations for the I900 to I920 period, statistics 
indicate some improvement in the overall coal-mining safety situation 
after I906. From that date until I920, a period in which bituminous 
coal production increased by almost 66 percent, major disasters and 
the fatalities they produced declined.10 Between I906 and I9IO there 
were 84 major disasters and 2,492 resulting fatalities; from I9II to 
I9IS, 59 major disasters and I,7I8 fatalities; from I9I6 to I920, 45 
major disasters and 773 fatalities. 11 Thus the number of major disas-
ters was reduced by almost half in the last five-year period as com-
pared with the first, and the total number of fatalities in major disasters 
in I9I6-I92o was less than one-third of the I906-I9IO total. Al-
though yearly fatality totals (i.e., including those outside of major 
disasters) remained virtually the same over the fifteen-year period in 
question, the fatalities per million tons of coal produced decreased 
substantially. Figure I shows graphically the relationship between 
fatalities and production of coal from I 906 to I 920.12 
The coal-mining safety movement, therefore, had at least witnessed 
a reduction in the relative number of fatalities and a substantial de-
crease in the absolute number of major disasters and fatalities from 
these disasters. The failure or weakness of the movement in these 
years, however, is implicit in these claims, for coal-mining safety was 
explosion-, disaster-, and fatality-conscious. While progress was sub-
stantial in those areas related to disasters-explosives and gas and 
dust explosions-the much more pervasive although less dramatic 
problem of fatalities from falls of roof and coal and from the hazards 
of haulage and electricity was almost completely disregarded. As 
Table I indicates, more persons were killed in I920 than in I907 by 
falls of roof and coal, by haulage accidents, and by electricity.13 Be-
tween I906 and I9IO, gas and dust explosions accounted for only 
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FIGURE 1 
Fatality Rates per Million Tons of Coal Produced in 
Bituminous and Anthracite Mines, 1906-1920 
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18 percent of the fatalities in the coal mines, yet received much of the 
attention of safety experts; falls of roof and coal accounted for 44 
percent but were not studied, even after 1910. Moreover, although 
there were ten to fifteen nonfatal accidents for each fatal one, injuries 
aroused little public interest and thus were not the subject of serious 
professional concern.14 
Though the efforts of safety experts were somewhat misplaced and 
bureau efforts misguided, the essential sources of frustration lay else-
where. As an industrial problem and as the subject of reform efforts, 
coal-mining safety was deeply influenced by two systems operative at 
the turn of the century: economic competition and federalism. Each 
system was harmful enough by itself; together, they formed the nexus 
of a political economy which was not only responsible for many of 
the coal industry's safety problems but which also prevented or mili-
tated against the solutions of the Progressive period. These frame-
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TABLE 1 
Underground Fatalities at Bituminous Coal and Lignite Mines, 
by Principal Causes, 1906-1920 
Falls of 
roof and Gas or dust 
Year coal Haulage explosions Explosives Electricity 
1906 826 192 219 115 52 
1907 911 260 911 134 49 
1908 829 229 320 109 53 
1909 975 240 264 122 52 
1910 1,061 295 477 113 76 
1911 1,007 294 331 72 92 
1912 1,043 296 255 70 75 
1913 1,007 344 464 63 79 
1914 903 309 305 56 86 
1915 818 269 270 76 85 
1916 850 330 183 60 81 
1917 965 433 319 55 76 
1918 1,052 446 103 85 77 
1919 878 310 149 57 64 
1920 937 342 124 82 70 
works have little relevance to the anthracite industry, which largely 
explains why this study draws almost entirely on bituminous coal. The 
coals also had somewhat different physical properties. Because it 
burned cleanly, slowly, and steadily, anthracite coal was used pri-
marily as a household fuel. Bituminous coal, or soft coal, has had 
primarily industrial uses. Anthracite mines were usually deeper and 
more gaseous than bituminous mines in this period, and their thick, 
steeply pitching veins made propping more difficult than in bitumi-
nous mines. In general, more blasting was necessary to bring down the 
coal. On the other hand, anthracite carbon content was so high that 
its mines were not subject to coal-dust explosions. The safety prob-
lems in a number of areas, including haulage, fires, electricity, and 
explosives handling, were similar. 
From 1890 to the First World War, the coal industry resisted the 
considerable efforts of its operators to bring order to what was widely 
regarded, by government officials and mine workers as well as oper-
ators, as an excessively competitive industry. In most major coal 
markets east of the Mississippi, coals from several states were in 
competition. Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio coals moved by 
rail and lake steamer to the distribution and marketing centers of 
Chicago, Milwaukee, and Duluth-Superior, where they were com-
petitively priced with lower-grade coals produced in Illinois and Indi-
ana. Kentucky coals shipped north significantly influenced the market 
in every midwestern state from Ohio to Minnesota. The nation's two 
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largest producers after 1910, Pennsylvania and West Virginia, effec-
tively dominated the trade in the eastern tidewater, in select western 
markets like Cincinnati, and in one particular product market, coke. 
Seldom did Illinois and Indiana coals enter these or other eastern 
markets. This interstate competition reflected the wide availability of 
coal and the labor to mine it, the relatively low capital requirements 
for its development, and the ease with which one coal (or an alterna-
tive energy source) could be substituted for another. The result was a 
low-profit industry with chronic and growing excess capacity and an 
extremely low level of concentration. The bituminous coal industry 
had its large firms, but none had significant market power beyond the 
local marketing area.15 These conditions prompted this remark from 
operator attorney D. W. Kuhn: "Among the Falstaff army of indus-
tries of this country, too poor to fight, too cowardly or too virtuous to 
steal, the coal mining industry presents itself as one of the most be-
draggled members of these ragged recruits." 16 The military analogy 
also seemed appropriate to Pennsylvania's chief mine inspector, James 
Roderick. "The rapid growth of the industry," he said, "has prevented 
systematic development and today the operators constitute a great 
army of antagonistic elements and unorganized forces . . . they con-
tinue to indulge in a cut-throat war-fare." 17 
Paralleling this economic configuration was a political system in 
which social legislation-and that included safety legislation-was 
conceived to be the proper and virtually exclusive province of the 
states. This was not the view of a few strict constructionists or of con-
servative business reformers. Of the many proposals for some kind of 
national action on mine safety, few would have invested the national 
government with powers of inspection and enforcement, and they were 
carefully avoided by Congress and, with the exception of the UMW A, 
by affected interest groups. A national agency with coercive capability, 
a national inspection force, national mine-safety laws-all these were 
believed, by reformers and their opponents alike, to be outside the 
normal range of political options. Federalism and the resistance to 
national legislation which it implied functioned on several levels. It 
was an article of faith, a basic value, a belief so common and so widely 
accepted as to go unquestioned. It was also part ideology, in the 
sense that people continued to hold it dear long after it had proved 
to be of declining usefulness. Finally, federalism had become a func-
tional element in the economics of competition. As coal-mine opera-
tors competed for access to markets and for adequate supplies of 
railroad cars, they were also forced to compete in their state legislatures 
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by opposing safety and health measures which would add significantly 
to their production costs. 
The economics of competition was responsible for the poor safety 
performance of the coal industry in a variety of other ways. It insured 
the existence of numerous small firms which would resist enforcement 
of state codes and which could ill afford the latest in safety devices or 
who (and this is functionally identical) believed they could not af-
ford them. United States Steel's substantial reputation in safety was 
achieved in large, captive mines, isolated from the coal industry's 
competitive markets. Competitive conditions also encouraged division 
within the industry, destroying potentially helpful trade associations 
and seriously impeding the uniformity campaign. As coal operators 
sought to cut costs in this labor-intensive industry, they brought in 
cheap labor and lowered wages. The first action reduced the skill level 
of the labor force; the second placed considerable pressure on the 
miner to rush the mining process in order to earn a living wage. To 
the extent that the stereotype has some validity, the careless miner was 
less the product of pride, independence, and stubborn individualism 
than the victim of forces generated by the competitive structure of the 
coal industry. Competition also had a substantial impact on union ob-
jectives, since the logical UMW A response to a decentralized economic 
framework was its emphasis on mining rates. 
Together, economic and political decentralization produced the in-
effectual politics of coal-mining safety. In the states, operators, even 
under great public pressure, resisted legislation which would place 
their states (and firms) at a competitive disadvantage. Aware that de-
mands for reform in the states could not be effectively resisted, opera-
tors attempted to transcend this menacing situation and to shift the 
locus of reform activity into national and interstate politics. This ef-
fort, which in its broad outlines was approved by every coal-mining 
interest group, centered around the Bureau of Mines and uniform 
state legislation. The bureau was in part an attempt to arrive, through 
science, at a body of reasonable and widely acceptable knowledge 
which, if applied uniformly in the states, would at least affect the en-
tire industry and prejudice no single group of operators. The move-
ment for uniformity was a more direct attempt to equalize the burdens 
of safety legislation, to achieve the benefits of a centralized politics 
without centralizing the political system. This idealistic solution was at 
once the great hope and the great failure of the Progressive coal-mining 
safety movement. 
CHAPTER 
1 
Business, Bureaucracy, and 
National Reform 
CoNCERN FOR the hazards of coal mining far antedates the Pro-
gressive period, but reform interest in coal-mining safety before 1900 
was limited almost entirely to the states, finding an outlet in state (and 
occasionally county) mine-safety legislation. The states continued to 
legislate on the subject after 1900, but the new context of the legis-
lation and some procedural innovation did not mask the fundamen-
tally traditional quality of state politics and political alignments. What 
was new from 1900 to 1920 was the involvement of the federal gov-
ernment in coal-mining safety through the United States Geological 
Survey and the United States Bureau of Mines. This admittedly cir-
cumscribed and limited federal interest was the product of several 
historical factors, usually operating concurrently but to some extent 
chronologically separable. Before December 1907 only a few persons 
in the federal bureaucracy showed interest in mine safety outside of 
the federal territories, but that bureaucratic interest was sufficient to 
validate the claim that the reform movement began within the bureau-
cracy.1 A series of explosions of monumental proportions occurring in 
December 1907 brought the problem of coal-mining safety national 
attention, producing an urgent demand for solutions to the scientific 
problems basic to coal-mining hazards. At this point the nation's press 
-newspapers and magazines-demanded national action, and the 
issue very rapidly became politically popular, making it difficult for 
politicians to oppose rigidly new legislation. At the same time, groups 
with vested interests in mine safety or in the political accoutrements 
of national mine safety (i.e., a bureau, research facilities) added their 
support to the movement. Miners, coal and metal mine operators, in-
spectors, conservationists, scientists-each group contributed some-
11 
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thing to the political compromise which finally produced the Bureau 
of Mines. Of these groups, the mine operators exerted the most influ-
ence within the political process, and the bureau, in spite of its origins 
and nurture in the federal bureaucracy, can properly be considered a 
business reform. 
Federal lawmakers were aware of mine-safety problems as early as 
I885, when Henry George, testifying before the Senate, said of coal 
miners, "They are constantly in danger; never out of danger; they do 
not know at what time a piece of 'horse flag' may fall and crush them 
to death." In general, however, this investigation of the relationships 
between capital and labor, insofar as it dealt with coal mining, empha-
sized the methods by which the miners were paid and their living con-
ditions.2 Another investigation into capital and labor in the mining 
industry, made in I900 by the United States Industrial Commission, 
solicited testimony from operators and miners on all aspects of the 
industry, but references to safety were not many and tended to de-
emphasize the need for legislation. One operator, for example, testi-
fied that he did not know "any class of labor that is better protected 
than that engaged in the mining industry, so far as legislation is con-
cerned."3 The most consistent call of those testifying was for uniform 
mine-safety legislation-similar laws in all major coal-mining states. 
David Ross, secretary of the Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics, said 
operators and mine workers alike would benefit from uniform mine 
legislation. George W. Schluederberg, an operator from Pittsburgh, 
supported uniform legislation on the grounds that it would place all 
operators on a competitive basis. John Mitchell, president of the 
United Mine Workers, favored uniform legislation as a way of strength-
ening laws in states where he saw them as inadequate. This general 
demand for uniform mine legislation was noted in the review of evi-
dence by the commission, but the commissioners' report also stated 
that the safety laws of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania were 
said to be good and inspection thorough.4 
There were nineteenth-century precedents for national safety leg-
islation. After I852 the federal government operated a steamboat-
inspection service at an annual cost by I900 of almost $soo,ooo; 
Congress appropriated funds for lighthouse stations and for rescue 
work incident to these stations; and after I908, federal law required 
safety appliances on common carriers. 5 The national government be-
came directly involved in legislating for mines in I 89 I with the en-
actment of safety legislation for mines in the territories.6 In I900 the 
I 89 I act was amended to include sections requiring, when practicable, 
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the watering down of coal dust or the removal of the dust if water 
were not available and shot-firing by designated miners with the men 
out of the mine. The law as it was signed by the president on June 30, 
1902, applied only to mines in the Indian Territory employing twenty 
or more miners. The legislative process here and the reports appended 
to the bill show that at least some members of the national legislature 
had knowledge not only of the general safety problem in coal mines 
but also of specific safety problems-ventilation and coal dust. 7 
These federal reports and legislation were obvious precedents for 
federal involvement in the mining-safety area, but the years from 1900 
to 1907 witnessed no public outcry for safer mines. Indicative of press 
indifference toward mining deaths is a telephone conversation between 
a reporter and a coroner's deputy overheard by Crystal Eastman while 
she was doing research for the Pittsburgh Survey in 1907: 
Reporter: [ ]. 
Coroner's Deputy: "No, we haven't got anything for you today, Jim. 
-Well,-hold on.-There's a man killed by a fall of slate out at 
Thorn's Run. You don't want that, do you?" 
Reporter: [ ] . 
Coroner's Deputy: "That's what I thought. No, there ain't anything 
else. So long."s 
The United Mine Workers Journal commented on the problem of 
public apathy in 1900: 
One astounding and alarming feature in connection with the increased 
number of mine catastrophes in this country is the apparent indif-
ference upon the part of those directly affected and the public in gen-
eral, their apathy seeming resignation and tendency to look upon such 
terrible cyclones of death as coming in the regular course of human 
events, being purely accidental, and, therefore, not preventable. The 
daily press simply records the event in a matter-of-fact manner, and, 
after expressing the usual formal sympathy, dismisses the subject en-
tirely without any appeal for better conditions, an investigation or 
other manifestation of interest, and the public ... are disposed to look 
upon this as a visitation from God upon those whose lot it is to enter 
the dark and gloomy caverns of the earth in search of her treasures, 
and the whole affair is dropped from view.9 
Writing in the Century Magazine, Jay Hambridge commented that 
even in the mining communities, "A death by violence is noted to-day, 
but to-morrow it is a fact remote, and is recalled by association of idea 
with some other incident." 10 
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The Journal, the official organ of the United Mine Workers of 
America, was an exception to the general apathy toward mine acci-
dents, but even the Journal's interest in the question was subdued until 
1905, when a large Alabama disaster early in the year brought to its 
pages an increased sense of urgency and a flood of suggestions, letters, 
studies, editorials, and legislative news dealing with coal-mining safety. 
Although the daily press reported coal-mining accidents, before 1907 
neither it nor the national magazines took an editorial position on the 
subject or suggested federal action as a solution to the problem. There 
were several possible reasons for this inaction. First and most im-
portant was the nature of death in the industry, with most deaths oc-
curring from causes other than explosions, and about half resulting 
from unnewsworthy falls of roof and coal which killed one or two 
miners at a time. In 1906, for example, the year before coal-mining 
accidents became a national political issue, there were 1,504 under-
ground fatalities in bituminous coal and lignite mines, but only 219 
of these were attributable to explosions. And of the seventeen official 
disasters (five or more deaths) in that year, none resulted in more than 
thirty-five deaths.11 In I 906 a coal-mine explosion resulting in thirty-
five deaths was news, but its shock value was rapidly diminishing and 
it could hardly be expected to produce a call for action on the na-
tional political scene. 
Second, coal mining was not easily recognizable as the most danger-
ous of occupations, and other accident-prone occupations vied with 
coal mining for attention. Interstate railroading was a natural sub-
ject for national safety legislation. Railroad accidents were common, 
visually spectacular, and they directly affected the middle class which 
traveled by train. Hence, railroad rather than mine accidents received 
most of the national publicity. Collier's, for example, ran a two-page 
picture spread dealing with twenty-four railroad accidents which had 
killed 188 persons in a thirty-day period in 1907.12 Of all the muck-
raking magazines, B. 0. Flower's Arena may have been the most ef-
fective in dealing with railroads and the issue of regulation, but in all 
of 1907 and 1908, the Arena ran only one article on industrial acci-
dents of any kind, and that one was on railroads. Other national 
magazines, such as World's Work, the Republican Outlook, and 
Leslie's Illustrated Weekly, dealt with the railroad issue, attempting 
to find the element responsible for industrial accidents. Review of Re-
views, Scientific Monthly, and Nation, none of which were muckraking 
journals, also looked at the problem.13 In general, this magazine cov-
erage of industrial accidents contributed to an accident-prevention 
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climate and put the problem of industrial accidents squarely before 
the public. 
On December 6, 1907, a blown-out shot touched off the most disas-
trous mine explosion in the history of mining in the Western Hemi-
sphere. Three hundred and sixty-one men lost their lives that day in 
Monongah mines 6 and 8 of the Fairmont Coal Company, Fairmont, 
West Virginia. Thirteen days later, 239 died at the Darr mine in Jacobs 
Creek, Pennsylvania. 
One opinion of the cause of the Monongah explosion was voiced by 
James Sinnot of Chatham, Illinois, in a song entitled "The Monongah 
Disaster": 
Oh, Monongah! Oh, Monongah! 
Where 400 lives were sacrificed 
By your gassy mines blown up. 
Someone has been neglectful 
Or in their duty sure did fail 
And thus we read of neglect, indeed, 
At those mines of Monongah. 
Let us ask of West Virginia, 
Is it right to kill wholesale? 
And if she has got mining laws, 
If so, why did they fail? 
If your laws are not good, 
Have them repealed, you should. 
Make ones that will not fail; 
Don't encore, we do implore, 
Such scenes as Monongah. 
To read of such a horror, 
Forget we never will. 
You have got no right from God or man 
Thus human beings to kill. 
It shows you've been neglectful 
For your miners' lives to care, 
And thus we read of graft and greed 
At those mines of Monongah. 
A committee of the West Virginia legislature, established earlier in 
the year in response to previous explosions, disagreed with Sinnot, 
concluding from its testimony that the Monongah mines were well 
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equipped and modem, and that the company controlling the Monon-
gah mines had an almost unsurpassed reputation for safety.15 R. D. 
Nuzum wrote to A. B. Fleming, former governor of West Virginia 
and owner of the Fairmont Coal Company: "I can hardly believe that 
such a disaster could come upon a mine so well looked after as are the 
mines of the Fairmont Coal Company, but am forced at the last to 
credit the account." 16 The United Mine Workers Journal challenged 
this opinion, charging that faulty mine inspection was responsible for 
the explosion. The Monongah mines, said the Journal, were operated 
without two openings, contrary to West Virginia law, and neither in 
those mines nor in the Naomi mine was ventilation consistent with 
state requirements. "Chief Mine Inspector (J. W.) Paul of West Vir-
ginia," continued the Journal, "has held the office for nearly two de-
cades. . . . His administration of his office is marked by one long 
bloody trail of human slaughter, caused by negligence, inefficiency, by 
wanton nullification of every mining law in the state." 17 
This opinion of the Journal aside, many thought the Monongah 
mines to be well equipped for safety and concluded that if the Monon-
gah mines blew up, so could any mine. Moreover, explosions had oc-
curred and were to occur in other mines with reputations for safety, 
with a cumulative effect significant for mine-safety reform. If the 
safest mines could explode, then the normal channels of accident pre-
vention, state legislation and inspection, were simply insufficient. The 
West Virginia committee report said this explosion of a reputedly safe 
mine was illustrative of the limits of scientific knowledge: "It was 
conceded that this explosion was a dust explosion, yet no one has been 
able to give all the elements that may be present to create a dust ex-
plosion. This reference to the Monongah mines and to the conditions 
that were thought to exist there at that time are especially made for 
the purpose of impressing upon the legislature the fact that the legis-
lature cannot reach the cause or provide a remedy which will prevent 
future explosions, until that cause is known. This must be the result of 
future study and experiment." 18 The Monongah disaster and others, 
because they occurred in mining properties considered safe, cast 
doubt on the safety of all coal mines and therefore were a direct stimu-
lus to federal scientific research in coal-mining safety. 
The national magazines were surprisingly slow to treat the mine ex-
plosions editorially. Leslie's Weekly, which according to historian 
Louis Filler gave the "accident issue enough momentum and drama 
to make it national," had nothing on its December 19, 1907, editorial 
page and carried only a picture story of the Monongah disaster in its 
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December 26 issue. Again on January 2, 1908, Leslie's carried a pic-
ture story on coal-mine explosions, but it had no suggestions for solv-
ing the problem. Collier's reported the "wholesale slaughters in coal 
mines" but launched no campaign for reform and did not mention 
coal-mining safety again for some time. It remained for Edgar Allen 
Forbes of World's Work to begin suggesting in the national press some 
answers to the coal-mining safety problem. In the February 1908 is-
sue in an article entitled "The Human Toll of the Coal Pit," Forbes 
presented his thesis that the causes of accidents were similar worldwide 
and thus what had worked in Europe to prevent coal-mining accidents 
would work here. Forbes listed eight specific techniques designed to 
reduce accidents (including, for example, the use of shot-firers) ; in 
the process he attacked miner ignorance and inefficient inspection, "the 
weakest link in the chain." Forbes concluded that the best solution 
was the proposed national bureau of mines, which would function as 
a clearinghouse for information.19 
In contrast to the national magazines, the nation's newspapers re-
sponded immediately with demands for federal investigative action. 
The Pittsburgh Chronicle, in a December 23, 1907, editorial, called 
for investigation by government commission. The Washington (D.C.) 
Star, while noting that the federal government had no direct jurisdic-
tion over the matter, since the mines were exclusively under state con-
trol, emphasized the necessity of an immediate and thorough probing 
of the causes and circumstances of recent catastrophes. The Detroit 
Free Press pointed out the need to exploit European expertise in gas, 
dust, and explosives. The Herald-Transcript of Peoria, Illinois, suc-
cinctly stated in its December 23 issue: "If the Federal Government 
has any jurisdiction in the matter it should lose no time in acting." 20 
There is not much evidence here to assign the press a major histori-
cal role in the coal-mining safety movement. The national press neither 
created the issue of coal-mining safety nor uncovered previously un-
known information about coal-mining accidents. It did not present 
solutions until the accident situation was so critical that editorial com-
ment could not be avoided. Muckraking in the sense of interpretive 
and investigative reporting simply was not present in the coalfields. 
The press would have its influence on public opinion, of course, but 
fundamentally the press, like the general public, was the follower of 
events. 
The government bureaucracy played a similarly limited but more 
dynamic role in the early reform process. After 1904 the Technologic 
Branch of the United States Geological Survey, under the direction 
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of Joseph A. Holmes, formerly of the North Carolina Survey, had 
supervision of the federal government's limited efforts in coal-mining 
safety. In July 1907 the secretary of the interior, James R. Garfield, 
had transferred supervision of the coal-mining inspectors in the terri-
tories (New Mexico and Indian) to the Geological Survey, suggesting 
in his order that the survey undertake investigations relating to the 
nature and extent of mine accidents, particularly those resulting from 
explosions. The goal, he said, was accident prevention, "without undue 
hardship to the operators." 21 
At the time of the Monongah and Darr tragedies, the Geological 
Survey was in the third year of an ad hoc study of the causes of mine ex-
plosions, financed from a budget item in the appropriation for the 
investigation of faults which had been stretched to cover the preven-
tion of fuel wastes.22 Just why the survey became involved in 1906 
and who the prime movers were at that time is unclear. Holmes later 
claimed that as early as 1905 he had recommended that investigations 
be made into the causes of mine explosions.23 The director of the Geo-
logical Survey, George Otis Smith, indicated his interest in this area 
to the secretary of the interior and a key member of Congress in the 
early months of 1906, but at that point, a month before the enormous 
Courrieres explosion in France, Smith hardly viewed coal-mining 
safety as a high-priority item. His report to the secretary of the interior 
suggested that investigations into coal gas and coal-dust explosions 
could be conducted "in connection with this fuel work without any 
large additional cost." The United States, he said, was the only major 
country not then conducting such tests.24 
Holmes personally investigated the Monongah situation, arriving in 
the Fairmont region sometime before December 24, 1907. Although 
his presence was noted in the local papers, he was not yet well known 
in the coal-mining safety field and was, in fact, confused with J. W. 
Holland, director of the museum of the Carnegie Institute.25 With ex-
plosives engineer Clarence Hall of the Technologic Branch (who had 
arrived soon after the explosion), Holmes did what he could in Fair-
mont, which was next to nothing since the branch possessed no mine-
rescue equipment. The visit of federal experts was, in fact, greeted 
with some hostility. One coal-mining executive wrote to Fleming from 
Washington, D.C.: "I saw Mr. Hall, the Government expert, the day 
he left here, and as you probably know by this time, he is an expert 
on explosives, but knows little or nothing about mines, or the practical 
problems of mining." 26 Nonetheless, Holmes's journey to the site of 
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the Monongah disaster was important for coal-mining safety, if only 
because it emphasized the futility of operating without funds. 
One would logically expect that the major force behind the demand 
for federal appropriations for mine safety would be the miners and 
their organizations-particularly the UMWA and the American Fed-
eration of Labor. This does not, however, appear to have been the 
case. Although the United Mine Workers Journal was aware of the 
possibility of federal scientific work in the area as early as 1905, this 
voice of the miners never spoke out for safety appropriations. The 
president of the United Mine Workers, John Mitchell, made a point 
of communicating his sympathies for an appropriation to Joseph G. 
Cannon, Speaker of the House of Representatives, 27 but organized 
labor in general seems to have waited until the safety work of the 
Geological Survey had proved beneficial. 
The appropriations were obtained from Congress because they had 
the support of important segments of the mining management com-
munity. The most influential group was the one most directly affected 
by the Monongah disaster: the West Virginia mine operators. With 
mine operators from Pennsylvania and officials of the Geological 
Survey, they met in Washington, D.C., on January 8, 1908. The chair-
man of this gathering, operator William N. Page of West Virginia, as-
serted the need to determine the causes of explosions and to avoid 
them. For these ends, the participation of federal and state govern-
ments was essential. "A single individual can accomplish nothing," 
said Page. "We stand to-day in the position of a sick man, and we have 
the Legislature and Congress as doctors. They want to prescribe medi-
cine when they have not diagnosed the disease." In three official reso-
lutions, those present echoed these sentiments, resolving first that they 
would support appropriations for research into the causes of mine 
disasters, second that the causes of disasters were unknown, and third 
"that the United States Government should take the necessary steps 
to determine the causes before any attempt is made to apply legisla-
tive remedies." 28 The key is in this third resolution: the mine operators 
present feared ill-advised, hurried, and, they felt, possibly destructive, 
state legislation. Less than a month before the meeting, Page had 
written to Fleming on the problem of explosions in coal mines, ex-
pressing his interest in correct solutions and his fears of "undigested" 
legislation.29 G. H. Caperton, secretary to the group of West Virginia 
mine operators which later met in Washington, was even more pointed 
in his views: "It appears that the Governor in his call for a special 
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meeting of the Legislature will incorperate [sic] further mining laws 
in his call. Our committee feels there is to [sic] much law now, making 
the matter of mining a burden and that no further laws could be en-
acted to help out the situation." 30 Another of Fleming's friends, Mc-
Kinley, feared "radical legislation" in most coal-mining states and 
particularly in Ohio, where he anticipated new legislation would be 
"drastic and burdensome if not almost prohibitive." 31 To say the atti-
tude of McKinley, Caperton, and Page was typical of coal operators of 
this day would be pure conjecture, but the logic of economics would 
indicate that this fear of state legislation was widespread. The market 
for coal was virtually national, with firms from West Virginia to Illinois 
competing for volume. Costly safety legislation in any one state prom-
ised to put operators in that state at a competitive disadvantage. Be-
cause of a number of factors-location and accessibility of the coal 
seams, transportation costs, limited union influence, and low labor 
costs-the West Virginia operators usually were able to undersell 
others in the central competitive field; it is, therefore, more difficult 
to make this case for West Virginia operators than for others. No 
doubt the operators held a somewhat more subjective view of their 
competitive situation in the industry, and safety legislation, from their 
viewpoint, may have been menacing. Operators cautious of such leg-
islation naturally favored federal scientific investigations, the results 
of which, they felt, would filter down to the states, leaving the compet-
itive situation intact. 
One of Holmes's strongest supporters in his campaign for funds was 
A. B. Fleming. The former governor of West Virginia favored national 
government research on mine waste and mine-accident prevention 
and, at Holmes's request, appeared in Washington and testified on the 
urgency of mine-accident work before the House Committee on Mines 
and Mining.32 A publication of Fleming's Fairmont Coal Company 
recommended that Congress establish a bureau of investigation and 
information to assist in the study of the conditions under which ex-
plosions occur.33 Perhaps the best indication of Fleming's attitude lies 
in his answer to McKinley's fears of the upcoming attempts to legislate 
for safe mines in the states. Fleming said, "I think the operators should 
be willing [sic] to a number of changes which will make the mines 
safer." 34 Fleming, evidently, had had enough of explosions; he was to 
be Holmes's resolute ally. 
Holmes had begun a strong campaign for safety appropriations for 
the survey in November 1907, before the Monongah and Darr disas-
ters, and had quickly acquired an unexpected supporter in the nor-
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mally conservative Pennsylvania Congressman William Dalzell, an 
influential member of the Appropriations Committee. Dalzell had op-
posed Holmes in the past but at this time, said Holmes, had volun-
teered to cooperate "in getting through a separate bill placing the 
Geological Survey on a permanent basis so that no part of its appro-
priation could be subject to a 'point of order' or be misunderstood or 
restricted in its application to special areas." 35 In the Senate, Holmes 
secured support from James A. Hemenway of Indiana and Philander 
C. Knox of Pennsylvania. It was Knox who replied to those senators 
who viewed federal mine investigation in the states as an invasion of 
states' rights with, "Is the protection of human life beyond our juris-
diction?"36 
Although opposition to the mine-safety section of the appropriations 
bill was limited, by the time the bill emerged from a House-Senate 
conference in May 1908, its language was, as Holmes had feared, re-
strictive. The bill did not specifically authorize safety investigations 
into causes of accidents other than mine explosions; nor did it allow 
the survey latitude to engage in mining research except from the per-
spective of safety. Oscar W. Underwood, senator from Alabama (a 
state whose coal resources were just beginning to be developed) and 
supporter of a separate bureau of mines, believed the language of the 
report too narrow to allow full investigations. James A. Tawney, 
chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and a member of 
the conference committee which had emasculated the bill, openly con-
firmed Underwood's fears. He said the conference committee had in-
tentionally eliminated appropriations for investigations outside the 
cause of mine explosions, appropriations "that would give the Geo-
logical Survey an opportunity to create a permanent organization to 
go into the business and methods of mining for the purpose of im-
proving efficiency in mining." Tawney based his opposition to broader 
appropriations on two beliefs: first, that the cause of mine explosions 
could be quickly ascertained, and thus coal-mine explosions (and 
presumably coal-mining safety as a whole) did not present a long-
range, much less continuous, research problem. Second, Tawney, like 
others in Congress, feared that permanent mine-safety appropriations 
for the survey would result in a useless addition to the national bureau-
cracy. Tawney was also influential in reducing the amount of ap-
propriations under the bill from the survey's estimate of $18o,ooo per 
year, and the original bill's provision of $195,000, to $150,000. The 
next year, when the appropriation came before the Congress for re-
newal, another attempt by Tawney to reduce funding was foiled by 
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a group of Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania congressmen. In this leg-
islative process, the party issue was raised for one of the few times in 
all the debates on mining safety, when Congressman John G. McHenry 
of Benton, Pennsylvania, charged that Republicans alone were fight-
ing the increased appropriations.37 
Opposition to Geological Survey appropriations for mine safety 
should not be overestimated. Outside of Congress it was almost non-
existent, and inside it was carried on by a few politicians in influential 
positions, notably Appropriations chairman Tawney. In general, op-
position was extremely limited, partly because of the emotional power 
of the issue following the December 1907 disasters and partly because 
of the resolute work of Holmes and the American Mining Congress, 
an operator organization which supported appropriations through its 
Committee on the Prevention of Mine Accidents. Securing funds for 
mining-safety investigations was little trouble for Holmes and the Geo-
logical Survey; they had overall support from coal mine operators, 
metal mine operators (in the American Mining Congress), strong 
backing from individual operators of authority like A. B. Fleming, 
no opposition and at times limited support from organized labor, and 
the strength of public opinion enraged by explosions and backed by 
the national press. On the other hand, fears of bureaucracy, naive con-
ceptions of the mine-safety problem, and a financial squeeze which 
arrived on the heels of the 1907 panic were together sufficient to cir-
cumscribe the powers and activities of the survey in mine safety; as 
a result, the survey's potential was limited. Federal involvement, 
moreover, came slowly and only after incredible numbers of men had 
died in coal mines. And when federal monies were appropriated by 
Congress they were hardly adequate to the task. Nonetheless, because 
of Courrieres, Monongah, Darr, and a host of smaller mine explosions 
and fires, the American public had become concerned and its political 
system had begun to respond. If federal scientific involvement had not 
yet been made a permanent solution, in the form of a national depart-
ment or bureau of mines with statutory authority in the mine-safety 
field, an important step had been taken by Congress in the temporary 
funding of the mine-safety work of the Geological Survey. 
Except for a brief period following the November 1909 Cherry 
mine fire, after the spring of 1908 an outraged public played a re-
duced role in creating the Bureau of Mines. The issue moved into 
congressional committees and hearing rooms and into the hands of 
lobbyists for various interest groups. Of particular importance was the 
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alliance of mutual convenience between coal operators and western 
metal mine operators, functioning through the American Mining Con-
gress. As for the bureaucrats, Holmes remained the consummate poli-
tician and the foremost advocate within the federal government of the 
need for a more extensive mining bureaucracy. Oddly enough, some 
of the most important opposition to the establishment of a new bureau 
also came from within the bureaucracy, the product of internal squab-
bles in the Geological Survey. Otherwise, opposition to the proposal 
for a bureau or department was limited but strategically placed in 
Congress, operating on an ideology which stressed the invasion of 
state police powers by the federal government and the dangers of an 
enlarged federal bureaucracy. Opponents were never numerically 
strong in Congress and had no lobbies in Washington. By May 1910, 
two and one-half years after Monongah and more than four years 
after Courrieres, the various reform forces had coalesced to create the 
United States Bureau of Mines. 
By the twentieth century the bureau as a governmental unit was a 
time-honored solution to problems requiring national scientific ex-
pertise, the roots of the bureau concept antedating the Civil War. The 
idea began to mature after 1875 with the creation of the United States 
Entomological Commission in the Department of the Interior and 
the Bureau of Animal Industry in the Department of Agriculture. Each 
of these units had one characteristic of the ideal bureau: their center 
of interest was a problem, not a scientific discipline. The Entomolog-
ical Commission was established to study the locust, the Bureau of 
Animal Industry to study cattle diseases. Mine accidents (coal-mining 
safety in particular and mine safety in general) presented an ideally 
constructed problem for the problem-solving mechanism of the bureau. 
As mine-safety work had been developed in the United States Geo-
logical Survey up to 1908, however, it lacked other characteristics of 
the ideal bureau, including the stability to focus on a given line of in-
vestigations over a period of years, and the flexibility to shift resources 
when problems changed. Before 1908 the Technologic Branch car-
ried on mine-safety work only sparingly, using monies appropriated 
for fuel testing and in the process stretching its statutory power to the 
limit. After May 1908 mine-safety work had funds of its own, but only 
for one year at a time, and the wording of the appropriation measure 
limited the Technologic Branch to investigating explosions. Stability 
and flexibility thus were not part of the operative framework of the 
Technologic Branch. From 1908 to 1910, Holmes, acting, in the words 
of historian A. Hunter Dupree, in the tradition of the "ideal bureau 
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chief," sought to rectify these deficiencies.38 He fought for an organic 
act of Congress which would create a bureau of mines governed by a 
flexible grant of power. 
A department or bureau of mines was hardly a new idea in 1908. 
Efforts to create one began in I 865 and were a regular feature of the 
political scene. Of the major attempts, one was rebuffed in 1881, 
another in 1898, and from 1900 to 1907 a number of bills calling for 
a department or bureau of mines were presented in the House and 
the Senate. With few exceptions, these bills did not mention mine 
safety, much less coal-mining safety; their purpose was to promote 
and encourage mining and metallurgy, to aid in the development of 
the nation's mineral resources. They failed to become law largely be-
cause they were supported only by limited groups outside of Con-
gress, particularly western mining interests. Bureaucratic pretensions, 
however, also played a part. Charles D. Walcott, for many years direc-
tor of the Geological Survey, was particularly jealous of his agency's 
jurisdiction. In support of one measure which would have created a 
division of mines and mining within the Geological Survey, Walcott 
charged advocates of a separate department with having "lost sight 
of the fact that an existing organization, the Geological Survey, in-
cludes among its duties many that could be done by such a depart-
ment."39 
Support for a bureau of mines became widespread in late 1907 and 
early 1908, both without and within the Sixtieth Congress. Some one 
thousand newspapers around the country called for some form of 
federal action to prevent mine accidents.40 These newspapers reflected 
the strong support for the concept of a bureau among every major 
group with interest in the subject-miners, operators, conservationists, 
scientists. In congressional hearings, operators were virtually unani-
mous in support of a bureau of mines. G. W. Traer of the Illinois Coal 
Operators' Association spoke for a committee of coal operators which 
was unanimously in favor of a bureau. W. W. Keefer, representing 
the Pittsburgh operators at the hearings, emphasized the coal-dust 
problem, noting: "We are free to confess that we are unable to agree 
with other people as to any of the causes and conditions that have 
brought about these horrible explosions; we would like to be advised; 
I believe everybody has the same general view of the problem." A 
well-known coal-mine operator, S. A. Taylor of Pennsylvania, saw 
the handling of dust and explosions as basic to the bureau issue. "These 
are the things," he said, "that this bureau ought to take up and analyze 
and disseminate the results broadcast among the mining industry."41 
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As in the struggle for appropriations for the Technologic Branch, 
Holmes's strongest ally in his quest for a bureau of mines was operator 
A. B. Fleming, who worked throughout 1908 and 1909 to secure pas-
sage of the bureau bill. Fleming corresponded regularly with Senator 
Nathan Scott of West Virginia in a successful effort to secure his sup-
port for the bureau. Holmes provided Fleming with information to 
use in writing Scott and other members of Congress and invited the 
former governor to the 1908 House hearings, where he proved to be 
one of Holmes's most important witnesses. Before the Committee on 
Mines and Mining, Fleming acknowledged that neither the largest 
operators nor the states could afford to carry on the kind of scientific 
investigations requisite to safe mining.42 
The operators held back only when their interests were directly, 
and they thought adversely, affected by a bureau bill. Such was the 
case with Congressman John G. McHenry's proposal, which not only 
empowered its projected bureau to investigate the causes and effects 
of all accidents in coal mines but also provided for a tax of one cent 
per ton on all coal mined in the United States, to be collected from 
owners and operators and to be used to alleviate the suffering of the 
families of those killed or injured in mine accidents. It empowered the 
bureau to examine the books of any coal company to ascertain com-
pliance with this provision. Although the McHenry bill enjoyed con-
siderable popularity among miners, their representative in Congress, 
William B. Wilson of Pennsylvania, opposed the bill because he felt 
it might jeopardize the campaign for a bureau by encouraging operator 
resistance.43 There was considerable logic in Wilson's position, for 
most coal operators balked at the hint of federal interference with 
mining operations in the McHenry bill. "The work of the bureau," 
said operator Traer, "should not have anything to do with the exten-
sion and supervision of practical mining operations."44 
The most influential organization of operators and their only 
national organization lobbied hard for a bureau of mines but cared 
little for coal-mining safety and not much more for safety in the metal 
mines. Originally called the International Mining Congress, the 
American Mining Congress (AMC) held its first annual meeting in 
Denver in I 897, drawing its constituency from operators, owners, 
prospectors, and miners from states west of the Missouri River and 
from Mexico. Although miners were allowed membership under the 
constitution, in practice the organization was dominated by mine op-
erators and its policies reflected this dominance. Its charter paid lip 
service to nonmetallic mineral resources (i.e., coal), but in reality 
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the organization was a sectional one dedicated in general to the de-
velopment of western metal mining and metallurgy and their allied 
industries and specifically to the creation of a department of mines and 
mining. For the first ten years of the organization's existence, this 
particular goal was singularly unrelated to safety. Spokesmen for the 
AMC emphasized how a bureau might aid in the production and dis-
covery of rare minerals, such as uranium, tungsten, and gold.45 J. H. 
Richards, long-time president of the organization, captured the es-
sence of this view in his address to the 1904 convention: 
We therefore affirm that if a Department of Mines and Mining could 
broaden the markets for the products of our mines by intelligent in-
vestigation and official action; if it could diffuse among prospectors 
and miners in practical form the scientific information which would 
be so useful to them; if it could afford them cheap and perfectly re-
liable facilities for classifying and assaying the infinite variety of 
ores found in our extensive mineral districts; if through a revised, 
simplified and uniform system of mining laws and a judicious control 
of mining corporations in the interests of the working miner, the in-
vestor and the general public, it could lessen that element of friction 
and speculation which to-day in the opinion of so many condemns 
mining both as an occupation and an investment- ... then it must 
be apparent to all that such accomplishment would create a new atmo-
sphere and a new hope, not only throughout the mining world, but 
that the salutary effects would react in the commercial and industrial 
world, and that every railroad office, every bank, every factory and 
every farm would feel the stimulus and reap the benefit.46 
This was the language of business, of investment, of progress and 
development in the mining industry. Not until 1906 would the first 
paper on mine safety be delivered at the annual meeting.47 
By 1909 the American Mining Congress had been transformed in 
several important ways. It had become, through sheer necessity, an 
advocate of safer mines, with its own committee, staffed with some 
influential coal men, to deal with prevention of mine accidents, and 
its lobbying had begun to reflect this conversion. AMC leaders ap-
proaching the interior secretaries, Garfield and Richard Ballinger, now 
at least mentioned mine safety. As of 1910 the AMC nominally and 
superficially accepted the safety issue and was using it for its own pur-
poses. In a related transformation, the AMC had tried to broaden its 
appeal and bring eastern coal operators into the organization. Recog-
nition of this need came in 1905, and by 1908 the annual meeting took 
place, symbolically, in Pittsburgh. Finally, the congress had changed 
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its goals. Old demands for a department of mines and mining, usually 
emphasizing the desire for equality with agriculture, were gone; in 
their place was the demand for a simple bureau of mines. It was not 
easy for an organization which had previously feared that its industry 
would be "pigeon-holed in a bureau" to forsake its departmental 
dreams. In 1907, however, Richards officially pronounced an end to 
those dreams when he asked the annual meeting to be satisfied with 
a bureau.48 
The AMC exercised its influence through a strong lobbying effort 
headed by the congress secretary, James Callbreath. Callbreath 
handled political correspondence, testified at the 1908 House hear-
ings, and worked at getting such important mining men as A. B. Flem-
ing interested in the work of the AMC. When the Committee on 
Federal Legislation, appointed following the 1909 annual meeting, 
was debilitated by the death of its chairman, it was Callbreath who 
went to Washington to fill the void.49 He was also informally in charge 
of a committee of three set up in 1904 to guide through Congress a bill 
creating a department of mines and mining. 50 This committee main-
tained communication with key senators and congressmen and 
national party leaders and called on the major parties to write the de-
mand for a department of mines into their national platforms for the 
1908 elections. Representatives of the AMC at one time or another 
talked or corresponded with Presidents Roosevelt and Taft and their 
interior secretaries, Garfield and Ballinger; all four were in favor of 
establishing a bureau of mines. 51 Congress president Richards re-
ported a discussion with Roosevelt sometime in late 1906 or early 
1907: "He is a very strong character, and is like a steel trap. He said: 
'What do you mining men want?' I said: 'We want results; we don't 
care what you name it.' He said: 'I will recommend a Bureau of 
Mines in my next message. I have a part of it outlined already. Will 
that suit you?' I said: 'That is all we ask. Good-bye, Mr. Roosevelt.' 
Quick work by a quick man, and that is the way we expect that bill 
to pass, or else they will hear from us in Washington again." 52 If 
Richards was too optimistic, it is nonetheless clear that the American 
Mining Congress could command the attention of the highest public 
officials. 
UMW A support for a bureau of mines, unlike that of the American 
Mining Congress, was based almost entirely on the desire for safer 
mines. The extent of labor's interest in a bureau is, however, open to 
question. William B. Wilson delivered the following speech on the 
floor of the House in April 1908: 
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Tell me in martial measures of the Charge of the Light Brigade; point 
with patriotic pride to the farmers who fought with the soldiers at 
Concord and Bunker Hill; repeat to me the story of the mighty con-
flict between the Blue and the Gray, when the "flower of American 
youth yielded up their last full measure of devotion" in defense of 
their respective flags, and my blood will thrill with patriotic enthusiasm 
and tingle through my veins in sympathetic response. Yet, with all my 
admiration for the heroes of the battlefield and their wonderful 
achievements in support of the rights of man, it does not equal my love, 
it can not measure my devotion to those sturdy sons of toil who, 
uninfluenced by the enthusiasm of numbers, without hope of present 
reward or future glory, deliberately enter the dark and dangerous 
caverns of the mines to carry relief to their suffering fellow-men or 
perish in the attempt. It is for the benefit of men of this character that 
I appeal to you to establish and equip a bureau of mines and mining. 
(applause) 53 
As public relations, Wilson's address is explicable; as proof of labor's 
emotional attachment to mine safety as it relates to a bureau of 
mines, it is inadequate, for there is little in the labor sources to con-
firm this enthusiasm. Far from exercising a leadership role in the 
national politics of mine safety, the mine-workers union was a cau-
tious follower. The organization did little more than go through the 
motions. The United Mine Workers Journal had shown interest in a 
federal department as early as 1902, but it soon dropped the subject 
(which was not, at the time, connected with safety) and did not resur-
rect it for about five years. The national organization of the UMWA did 
not evince interest in a federal department or bureau until 1907, when 
action began from the top, with the union's National Executive Board 
recommending establishment of a bureau at its June 25 meeting. Even 
here, the union assumed a passive role, for the board took action only 
after Holmes had appeared before it that same day and explained the 
major goals of the mine-safety investigations of the Geological Sur-
vey. Six months later the National Convention confirmed the board's 
action by a unanimous rising vote. 54 
The UMWA's political apathy emerged from a recognition of the 
strength of business in the national politics of mine safety and from a 
general awareness that any institution emerging from these politics 
would fall well short of the union's standard. The radical McHenry 
measure was the clear favorite of the miners, the choice of the national 
convention, John Mitchell, and John Walker, president of the Illinois 
UMWA and a spokesman for the miners at the 1908 hearings.55 But 
even William Wilson refrained from supporting the measure in Con-
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gress, and with the McHenry bureau out of reach, the mine workers 
apparently lost some of their enthusiasm for the project, content to 
work at keeping the proposed bureau in the Interior Department and 
out of the Department of Commerce and Labor.56 Labor's political 
diffidence in this area might also be the product of reasonable sus-
picions about placing safety regulation in the hands of mining engi-
neers whose national organization, the American Institute of Mining 
Engineers (AIME) was traditionally hostile to organized labor and 
social reform. The UMWA apparently had no Washington lobby until 
March 1910, when its president, Thomas Lewis, appointed a com-
mittee of three to look after national legislative matters. On May 14, 
1910, two members of that committee received a hearing with Presi-
dent Taft along with other miners, operators, and politicians. The bu-
reau bill, already passed by Congress, was signed by the president two 
days later. 57 
The state of the nation's natural resources was a common concern 
of the age, and politicians, mine operators, labor leaders, and others 
envisioned the Bureau of Mines in part as a conservation agency. On 
the floor of the House, the proposed bureau was defended for the im-
pact it would have on use and allocation of resources. Congressman 
Burton French of Idaho spoke of the bureau's potential for eliminat-
ing coal waste caused by burning and poor production techniques, and 
a fellow westerner, Congressman William Englebright, emphasized 
the need to protect the coal supply of the United States for future use. 58 
During the hearings, a Pittsburgh operator boldly suggested that the 
problem of explosions would be incidental to the bureau's operations: 
"It will have many other functions, one of which, I understand, will 
be to look after the waste of the mineral resources of the United States, 
not only of coal, but of all the other mineral resources. We have only 
recently awakened to the fact that the country has almost impoverished 
itself as to its timber supply, and now every force and influence of the 
Government is being brought into play to see what can be done." 59 
Occasionally, the natural resource aspect of conservation was directly 
related to the safety issue: unsafe mining techniques were attacked as 
wasteful of natural resources as well as lives. The two varieties of con-
servation-human and natural resource-were linked especially 
closely in the case of the mine fire, a deadly and costly phenomenon. 
Here the Cherry mine fire may have been a direct influence. The Ameri-
can Association for the Advancement of Science, one of several scien-
tific groups to participate in the campaign for a bureau, separated the 
conservation themes but employed them both. Holmes, himself a con-
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servationist, was also an intimate friend of Gifford Pinchot, a man of 
considerable influence within conservation circles. Holmes often used 
Pinchot's contacts to obtain endorsements for the bureau from con-
servation organizations like the National Irrigation Congress and the 
Trans-Mississippi Commercial Congress. 60 
In addition to the pleas for conservation of human life and natural 
resources, a bureau of mines was urged upon the Congress because it 
would encourage uniformity of state legislation. 61 Attempting to ease 
the fears of constitutional conservatives, Congressman George A. 
Bartlett of Tonopah, Nevada, spoke to this point: "There is not a sin-
gle provision upon which to hang a fear of Federal usurpation of the 
rights of the States. . . . the purpose of this act is to aid and assist in 
bringing about, by investigation and suggestion, a uniformity of State 
legislation that will lessen the terrible loss of life incident to mining, 
and to further aid in the development of the vast mineral resources of 
the country." 62 Operators and union chiefs also recognized uniformity 
(and its counterpart, standardization) as a valid objective, and the 
organization established precisely to pursue uniformity of state legis-
lation, the Mine Inspectors' Institute of America, came out in support 
of a bureau of mines. The political influence of the inspectors, how-
ever, was limited by the small size of their organization, which pre-
vented the institute from employing a federallobby.63 
Unlike the bureau's proponents, the opponents had no organized 
public support and no lobbies. Nonetheless, each time bureau bills 
received serious consideration, in 1908, 1909, and even 1910, there 
was some kind of opposition. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the 
creation of a bureau of mines in the early months of 1908 was lack of 
support from the survey's director, George Otis Smith. Two contem-
poraries made this charge. Gifford Pinchot wrote in his diary on De-
cember 9, 1907, two days after the Monongah disaster: "G. 0. Smith 
wanted to talk about Bu Mines wh. he opposes." 64 During hearings 
early the next year, Congressman Albert Douglas of Ohio implied that 
Smith had little interest in a bureau of mines and instead wanted the 
Technologic Branch of the survey to continue to handle mine-safety 
investigations. "The Geological Survey," he said, "is going after this 
work and trying to get it to develop their own importance." 65 Smith 
left some indirect evidence of his opposition in the form of three 
memoranda dealing with new possibilities for mine-safety work. A 
bureau of mines was not even mentioned, much less advocated. In one 
memorandum, Smith specifically suggested that the investigations 
could be conducted in connection with the fuel work of the Techno-
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logic Branch.66 When, in 1907, Holmes began his campaign for a 
bureau by attending mining conferences and other meetings in an at-
tempt to build a base of support for the legislation, Smith wrote Holmes 
requesting that he "refrain absolutely from taking any further part 
whatsoever in recommending through resolution or otherwise, the es-
tablishment of a Department of Mines or Bureau of Mines except as 
you may be authorized or instructed by me." 67 Whatever the basis for 
his attitude, be it personal or political, Smith did not want Congress 
to create a bureau of mines, and his reluctance to work for the bill 
may have been sufficient to route the first session of the Sixtieth Con-
gress in the direction of additional appropriations for the Geological 
Survey.68 
Smith had some support in Congress, however unintentional, from 
a small but determined coterie of conservatives, led by James Tawney, 
which viewed a new bureau of mines as a symbol of that deadly enemy 
bureaucracy. Tawney feared that the United States was "unconsciously 
drifting toward a highly organized, bureaucratic form of Federal Gov-
ernment."69 James Slayden of San Antonio echoed Smith's views: "I 
object to the creation of any more bureaus of the Government. If this 
work is important enough to have it done, then, sir, it might well be 
delegated to the Geological Survey, an important bureau in the De-
partment of the Interior .... it means a multiplying of officials; it 
means tremendous increase of expense .... This proposed bureau will 
duplicate work being done by the Geological Survey . . . particularly 
there should not be a multiplication of high-priced officials whose ser-
vices are not required by the public service or in the interest of hu-
manity."70 In the Senate, this viewpoint was defended by Alexander 
Clay of Georgia, Moses Clapp of Minnesota, and Jacob Gallinger of 
New Hampshire. Idaho Senator Weldon B. Heyburn agreed the bill 
would accomplish "only an expensive addenda to the administration 
of the law," but he would not oppose it. "It is," he said, "one of those 
fads that take positions of public importance at intervals and the only 
way to meet them is the manner in which Tom Sawyer appeased the 
eat's curiosity for pain killer." 71 
Concern for the traditional role of the states in mine inspection and 
disaster investigation was common to bureau proponents and oppo-
nents. States' rights was here not a reactionary doctrine but a consensus 
view. Senator Nathan B. Scott of Wheeling, West Virginia, one of 
the hardest workers for a bureau of mines, said: "I do not want to 
see the General Government do more than it properly can do, than 
the States themselves. The foundation of our Government is local self-
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govemment." 72 Representing the Technologic Branch of the survey 
at the 1908 meeting of the Mine Inspectors' Institute, engineer Clar-
ence Hall emphasized that the federal government did not intend to 
make inspections or regulations or otherwise interfere with the rights 
of the states. Holmes and Smith agreed, as did congressional advocates 
of the bureau who assured their colleagues that the bill did not involve 
an infringement upon the police powers of the states and that any at-
tempt to invest the federal government with power to control mines 
within the states would be unconstitutional and unjustifiable. During 
the House hearings, John Walker of the mine workers had suggested 
federal legislation and enforcement as solutions to some of the mine-
safety problems, but his ideas were atypical. Advocates of federal in-
spection and investigation were few. The preponderant view was that 
expressed in all the major bills, even those which failed to become 
law. Certainly H.R. 20883, the major subject of consideration in both 
the first and second sessions of the Sixtieth Congress and the bill 
passed by the House in 1908 and 1909, contained nothing to indicate 
that the bureau would have powers of inspection or of investigation of 
mine accidents. 73 
A Senate report favorable to H.R. 20883 nonetheless stated that 
"many advocates for a department or bureau of mines mention the 
need for Federal inspection of mines." 74 Unnecessarily alarmed, 
Senator Henry Teller of Colorado objected to consideration of the 
bill and it was held until the next session, which began in late 1908. 
Teller later claimed that the bill would mean "an absolute interference 
with the mining operations of this country, particularly with the min-
ing of precious metals . . . we do not need any man to come from 
Washington out there to tell us how to develop our mines, or, in the 
words of the bill, how to 'promote and develop the mining industries 
of the United States, to make a diligent investigation of the method 
of mining, the safety of miners,' and so forth." 75 Like Tawney in 1908, 
Teller objected to a bill which went beyond the immediate goal of 
coal-mining safety. And, like Tawney in 1908, Teller in 1909 was 
forced to use blatantly deceptive arguments to bolster his opposition to 
the bill. Ignoring the American Mining Congress, Tawney had argued 
that there was no demand for this legislation from the precious-metal 
mining states. Teller also considerably overstated the case when he 
said: "I deny that there is any demand among the miners of this coun-
try for this kind of legislation." Both men were in small minorities; 
both wielded great power in their committees. In their separate ways 
they succeeded in delaying for two years the passage of a bill which 
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was opposed by so few persons or groups that Senator Francis G. 
Newlands of Nevada could say: "I have never yet, to my knowledge, 
received any communication in opposition to the organization of a 
bureau of mines." 76 
When the second session of the Sixtieth Congress opened, H.R. 
20883 remained in Senator Charles Dick's Committee on Mines and 
Mining, and as Holmes put it, "senatorial 'courtesy' and senatorial 
inertia [allowed] one determined old man to prevent important legis-
lation." "In this case," Holmes continued, "Senator Teller (of Colo-
rado) seems to be the barrier. Whether we can get the bill passed in 
spite of his opposition I am unable to say." 77 Lobby pressures were 
sufficient to get the bill out of committee, but it reached the floor of 
the Senate very late in the session and was "talked to death in the 
final hours of the Senate." 78 "The American House of Lords," said 
the United Mine Workers Journal, "is fast becoming an exact counter-
part of the English House of Lords." 79 
Important new conditions greeted the introduction by congressman 
and coal operator George Huff of Greensburg, Pennsylvania, of H.R. 
13915, to establish a bureau of mines in the Department of the In-
terior, on December 10, 1909. First, Teller had retired from the 
Senate. Second, a new climate for the bureau had been created by the 
Cherry, Illinois, mine fire of November 13, 1909, and the publica-
tion, in early 1910, of Crystal Eastman's book Work-Accidents and the 
Law. The latter, while not intended to be an expose of coal-mining 
safety conditions in the bituminous coalfields of western Pennsylvania, 
was precisely that. 80 The intensity of feeling invoked by the Cherry 
disaster is revealed in an exchange between socialists Adolph Germer 
and Eugene Debs. Germer, who was in Cherry soon after the fire, wrote 
Debs that "every indication pointed to the flagrant neglect of the 
lives of these men. With the least equipment for dealing with perils of 
this kind, the lives of these miners could have been saved." Germer 
condemned the coroner, the state's attorney, and the company. Over 
300 lives, he said, "have been snuffed out through capitalist greed." 
Debs replied: "Note what you say about the Cherry disaster. It was 
undoubtedly murder in the first degree. My blood boils when I think 
of it and my heart bleeds for the widows and orphans." 81 Senator Dick 
brought the matter home to the Senate in a denunciation of the re-
strictive provisions of existing national mine-safety legislation: 
Nothing better illustrates the inadequacy of the investigations al-
ready authorized by Congress through the Geological Survey than this 
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experience at the Cherry Mine. The experts of the Geological Survey 
went to this mine on delayed telegraphic notice, on the supposition 
that it was probably a mine explosion. As a matter of fact, it was not 
an explosion, but a mine fire, and under the wording of the appropria-
tion, which limits the investigations to "mine explosions," they had no 
right to go, and after they arrived at the Cherry Mine, under a similar 
strict interpretation of the act, they had no right to remain or to aid 
in the rescue work, nor have the experts of the Government, under 
existing law, any right to aid the mining industry in any of the ways 
mentioned above looking to the prevention of mine fires, better sys-
tems of mine signals, and better methods of mine rescue work.s2 
Coupled with the impact of the Cherry fire and the influence of 
Eastman's work was a willingness on the part of the Sixty-first Con-
gress to amend the bill to suit its critics. Dick's Senate Committee on 
Mines and Mining added a section explicitly disavowing any intent to 
grant the bureau powers of inspection or supervision.83 In doing so, 
however, the committee inadvertently eliminated federal inspection not 
only in the states but also in the territories, where federal personnel 
had been inspecting mines since I 89 I. When this defect was cor-
rected, the bill was complete. Thomas H. Carter of Montana, who had 
previously opposed the measure on constitutional grounds, now ar-
gued in favor of the bill as a way to achieve uniformity in mining-
safety legislation. Another former critic, Jacob Gallinger of Concord, 
New Hampshire, also spoke for the bill. With opposition virtually 
eliminated, the Huff bill passed the Senate on May 2, I9IO, and was 
signed into law by President Taft on May I6, I9IO. "Colonel Huff," 
said the United Mine Workers Journal, "regards the passage of this 
bill as the crowning effort of his congressional career." 84 
The permanent directorship of the new Bureau of Mines lay vacant 
from July I, when the act went into effect, until early September, when 
President Taft selected Holmes to fill the post. Behind the unusually 
long delay was politics, altogether not a promising beginning for a 
new bureau but revealing of the nature of the decision-making process 
and of the intense interest which even a minor appointment could in-
voke. It would be all too easy to interpret Holmes's appointment as 
a victory for various establishment elements-the coal-mine opera-
tors, in particular. The appointment was that, to be sure; but that may 
not be the most important lesson to be learned from it. In fact, the 
history of the appointment indicates the high degree of influence ex-
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ercised by the existing government bureaucracy and the extent to which 
corporate interests could not manipulate the political process. 
Holmes was apparently in an ideal position to become the first di-
rector of the bureau. It had, after all, been established to save lives, 
conserve natural resources, and contribute to the development of the 
nation's mineral resources, and in all three areas Holmes had consid-
erable experience and had demonstrated dedication. Born in 1859, he 
was graduated from Cornell with a Bachelor of Science degree in agri-
culture in I 8 8 I. After graduation, Holmes was appointed professor of 
geology and natural history at the University of North Carolina, where 
he actively and successfully campaigned for the establishment of a 
state geological survey. When the legislature created the North Caro-
lina Geological Survey in 1891, Holmes became its director as state 
geologist and continued to reside at the University of North Carolina 
for a dozen more years. During this period Holmes agitated for good 
roads in North Carolina and acquired a national reputation as a roads 
expert. More important for his future career, Holmes conducted a 
broad examination of North Carolina's mineral resources and was able 
to bring domestic and foreign capital into the state for development 
of mines, forests, fisheries, and water-power resources.85 
In 1903 Holmes became chief of the Department of Mines and 
Metallurgy of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition at Saint Louis, and 
from this time on his strongest ties were federal ones. At the exposition 
Holmes concentrated on demonstrating fuel economies and was so 
successful that Congress in 1905 authorized an investigation into fuels 
and building materials under the United States Geological Survey at 
Saint Louis and Washington, D.C. Responsible for this investigation 
as geologist in charge of fuel investigation for the survey, Holmes and 
his department investigated the relative values of coal, lignites, oil, 
and other fuels, work that led to the employment of more economic 
and efficient methods of purchase and use. Because of these efforts, 
Holmes attained a national reputation for conservation, later validated 
by his activities in promotion of coal-leasing legislation and by his se-
lection in 1908 as one of the four secretaries of the National Conserva-
tion Commission, a governmental agency.86 Holmes became expert in 
charge of the Technologic Branch of the Geological Survey when it 
was created by the secretary of the interior in 1907 (absorbing the 
work of the fuel division) and continued in that capacity until his 
appointment as bureau director. The step from the Technologic 
Branch to the bureau was a natural one, for the branch was to con-
36 Coal-Mining Safety in the Progressive Period 
stitute the basis of the bureau. Personnel, equipment, and investiga-
tions of the Technologic Branch would all transfer to the new agency. 
Holmes also had the support of key interest groups, with particular 
strength among eastern coal operators. Four days after the bill creat-
ing the bureau was signed, a group of coal operators met in Washing-
ton and united in a request to the president that Holmes be placed in 
charge of the bureau. In mid-summer, A. B. Fleming led another dele-
gation of Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania operators to Washington to 
press Holmes's candidacy. One West Virginia operator, appreciative 
of Holmes's services to the industry following the Monongah disaster, 
wrote: "We, who through our great disaster in 1907, came in contact 
with Doctor J. A. Holmes, ... know that he is, by disposition, theo-
retical knowledge and experience, thoroughly qualified for this 
position." 87 Holmes also had the endorsements of the American As-
sociation of State Geologists and the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science. Although the American Mining Congress 
did not endorse Holmes, this appears to have been a matter of policy 
rather than a sign of disfavor. Holmes's work at the bureau was later 
loudly applauded by the western mining industry.88 Taft, too, was 
ultimately to acknowledge all this. Having made the appointment, he 
wrote to his secretary of the interior: "The truth is that in searching 
for a competent man I do not find any one whom I am willing to ap-
point and take the responsibility of turning down a man who comes to 
me recommended so highly by both the labor organizations and the 
mine owners and superintendents." 89 Possessed of great energy and 
enthusiasm for his work, Holmes corresponded regularly with govern-
mental officials, friends, and acquaintances and attended conferences 
and conventions of many organizations of which he was a member 
and many of which he was not. He often used his private funds to 
supplement the state's appropriations for geological investigations 
while with the survey in North Carolina, and it was there that he vol-
untarily reduced his own salary, already low, so that he could increase 
that of his assistant. Gifford Pinchot described Holmes as "one of the 
best men I ever ran across." 90 
With such strong qualifications and support, why was the appoint-
ment ever in doubt? For one thing, Holmes's candidacy was caught up 
in a backlash against the cult of the expert and progressive ideas of 
efficiency which captured both miners and inspectors and filled the col-
umns of the United Mine Workers Journal. This backlash was prem-
ised in part on a lack of appreciation for the conclusions of the new 
science of mine safety and in part on a reasonable desire to avoid what 
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until then had been common practice-the dictation of mining pro-
cedures by those who had little knowledge of what went on inside 
a coal mine. Although it never explicitly came out for or against 
Holmes, the Journal clearly favored a "practical" coal-mining man, 
a miner or perhaps a mining engineer, for head of the new bureau. The 
explosions in 1907 and 1908 brought Journal hostility to a peak. 
"Long-haired theorists" in charge of coal-mine investigations were 
denounced; the need, said the Journal, was for "some good, level-
headed practical coal miners in charge." Both experimental work and 
rescue work of the Technologic Branch were criticized; not enough 
money was being spent "in a practical effort to get at the cause of all 
our suffering." The "long-haired college professor," with his "multi-
tude of theories and a molehill of practical knowledge," also was 
subject to attack.91 Joining in the criticism was Andrew Roy, at age 
seventy-four a candidate for the bureau directorship in 1908, who said 
he "would regret to see any of the so called experts appointed. . . . 
They are good at writing well rounded periods, but so far as subtar-
ranean [sic] knowledge and experience goes they are sadly lacking." 92 
Although some of the scientific ignorance upon which these attitudes 
were based had vanished by 1910, the Journal held firm and asked 
for a practical, competent coal miner as head of the bureau so that "it 
may not be made a farce in the hands of some professional expert." 93 
A number of the state delegations of the Mine Inspectors' Institute-
particularly Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana-were dominated by practical 
mining men and so had similar views. Of the mining journals, only 
Mines and Minerals had some sympathy with the demands for a prac-
tical miner; and that journal found Holmes satisfactory, acknowl-
edging that to select either a coal- or metal-mining engineer would 
alienate the other group. 94 
The anti-expert attitude not only detracted from Holmes's candi-
dacy but it also furthered that of David Ross of Illinois. According to 
the Journal, Ross, then secretary of the Illinois Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, a former UMWA organizer, and an active member of the Illinois 
Miners' Protective Association, "still has a very warm side for the 
boys with whom he once toiled 'down in a coal mine underneath the 
ground.' " 95 The Ross candidacy still might never have developed into 
a serious challenge to Holmes had not the nation's mine inspectors 
split on the director issue. Officially eschewing participation in the ap-
pointment controversy because the "candidates are being urged for 
endorsement by their respective friends" and because the Mine In-
spectors' Institute of America did not want to "participate in acri-
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monious debate which may defeat the good purposes and efficiency 
of the organization," in reality the inspectors chose not to participate 
because they could not agree. While most of the inspectors favored 
Holmes, a significant minority from Illinois felt Ross was better suited 
to their purposes and views. An attempt by the Illinois delegation to 
put through the convention a resolution in favor of Ross was defeated 
by a combination Pennsylvania and West Virginia delegation led by 
John Laing, chief mine inspector of West Virginia.96 
Inspector disaffection with Holmes had its origins in a less than 
perfect relationship between the Illinois inspectors and the Techno-
logic Branch of the Geological Survey, the source of conflict evidently 
lying in either disappointment with the rescue work of the survey or 
in jealousy between state and federal investigators. 97 Possibly some 
inspectors (and some operators) feared that the bureau under Holmes 
would undertake functions they felt properly belonged to the states. 
Holmes, at least, did his best to discourage such talk, emphasizing in 
a letter to John Mitchell that there would be no friction with state 
authorities if he were director of the bureau. "The only part of the act 
establishing the Bureau of Mines for which I am responsible," wrote 
Holmes, "is the section which provides that the employees of this 
Bureau shall have nothing to do with the inspection of mines in any 
state." To the states and private corporations, he emphasized, should 
belong the "burden of inspection and other local problems." 98 Holmes 
was also unpopular with the more radical mine inspectors for his op-
position to popular election of inspectors. Here at least he had the 
support of Laing, the product of the political influence of the West 
Virginia operators. David Ross supported the elective concept and for 
Laing and others, his candidacy evoked fears of labor control of mine 
inspection. The mine inspectors of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and the 
majority of western states, wrote Laing, "are labor agitators and their 
sole desire seemed to be to so regulate the work of the Mine Inspectors 
Institute ... that it would be controled [sic] absolutely by politics 
under the direct supervision of the labor organizations." 99 Perhaps for 
this reason Laing spent a week in Washington pressing the Holmes 
candidacy. The Fleming-Laing coalition must have had some impact, 
for by the middle of August, Ross was no longer being seriously con-
sidered for the directorship. 
The most critical opposition to Holmes came from within the Taft 
bureaucracy. Prompted by George Otis Smith, head of the Geological 
Survey, the administration was worried about Holmes's past (and thus 
future) loyalty to his superiors in the government. The origins of this 
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problem can be traced to 1907 when Holmes, as expert in charge of 
the Technologic Branch of the survey, was beginning his campaign for 
a bureau of mines. Smith objected in writing to the principle of Holmes 
influencing legislation in which he (Holmes, although really Smith) 
was directly concerned; and Holmes, after claiming that he was un-
accustomed to occupying a subordinate position, continued to lobby 
assiduously for a bureau of mines. In 1910 Smith found that Holmes 
was serving as a member of the Committee on Resolutions of the 
American Mining Congress. The Geological Survey director, who had 
prohibited that particular kind of service, then concluded "that at best 
the Technologic Branch has tendered the Director of the Survey only 
the most perfunctory allegiance. Your methods both of administration 
and of influencing public opinion are directly opposed to the policy 
now in force, . . . and any further direct violations of my orders or 
indirect regard of my expressed wishes will be made the subject of 
immediate reference to the Secretary of the Interior with recommen-
dation." 100 James Garfield, former interior secretary and a great ad-
mirer of Holmes, felt Smith "had not treated Holmes well. He has 
been jealous of Holmes' influence and work." 101 When Coal and Coke 
Operator learned that Smith, as the bureau's acting director, had as-
signed Holmes to subordinate duties, it accused Smith of "profes-
sional jealousy" and called him a "mediocre official." 102 Motivated by 
professional jealousy or not, Smith apparently felt that the new bureau 
should in some way be subordinated to the survey. "The Geological 
Survey," noted the Engineering and Mining Journal, "evidently desires 
the Bureau of Mines to be a tail to its kite." 103 Smith, of course, saw 
Holmes as the culprit and resented both his lobbying efforts and his 
conception of the proper role of the Technologic Branch and, indeed, 
his whole concept of administration. Holmes wanted to push the 
branch rapidly in several very different directions. Smith felt the 
branch, and the new Bureau of Mines, should concentrate on mine 
safety and postpone metallurgical and mineral investigations until ap-
propriations were larger. "The danger which threatens the new Bu-
reau," said Smith in July I9IO, "is the same which has hampered the 
Technologic Branch of the Geological Survey, namely, the tendency 
to take up new lines of investigations before results are fully attained 
along other lines earlier undertaken." Smith also charged Holmes with 
failure to keep sufficient control of those working under him.104 
For Smith this was serious business. He had tried, and failed, to 
prevent Congress from establishing a bureau of mines. Now, to pro-
tect the prerogatives of the survey and his personal influence and 
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status, he was prepared not only to oppose Holmes but to present his 
own candidate. His choice fell upon Edward W. Parker, since I89I 
a loyal survey employee and in I9IO the survey's chief statistician. In 
recent years, Parker and Smith had worked closely together in in-
stituting survey reforms in accounting and business methods. Although 
Parker had done some scholarly research and writing on coal mining, 
his knowledge of mine safety and his ability to run a bureau were 
suspect quantities. This deterred Smith not at all. While claiming that 
the impetus for Parker's candidacy came from other officials at the 
survey, Smith inaugurated a mail campaign in Parker's behalf, re-
questing support from influential mining men across the country.105 
This ambitious bureaucratic venture into appointment politics was 
to fail, not because Parker was unattractive to major interest groups-
Laing and Fleming and presumably other operators would have toler-
ated his appointment-but because events beyond Smith's control 
would soon make the chief statistician unacceptable to the adminis-
tration. On July 2 Parker was accused by A. J. Chipman, a retired 
survey receiving clerk, of having expropriated a small quantity of pub-
lic funds-specifically, of having attended his father's funeral at public 
expense. Under normal circumstances, the brief investigation which 
followed would have been sufficient to clear Parker. But with the 
Ballinger-Pinchot affair already in the public eye, the administration 
could ill afford to press a candidate even slightly tainted by scandal. 
Guilty or innocent, Parker was a political liability in I9IO. Parker ap-
parently failed to persuade Taft to the contrary in a disastrous mid-
July interview with the president. Faced with the Chipman accusation, 
Smith reconciled himself to working with Holmes.106 
Sometime between July IS and August IS, the administration found 
itself with no respectable candidate except Holmes. Still he was not 
appointed. Again, Holmes's reputation for insubordination came back 
to haunt him. At issue this time was Holmes's relationship to Richard 
Ballinger, interior secretary. Holmes was a Democrat, a Roosevelt 
appointee, and a close friend of Gifford Pinchot, James R. Garfield, 
and F. H. Newell, all of whom testified against Ballinger during the 
Ballinger-Pinchot hearings in the early months of I9IO. The Wash-
ington press speculated that Ballinger was opposing Holmes's appoint-
ment because Holmes had played a part in the campaign against him.107 
Whatever his personal and professional inclinations, Holmes had not 
contributed to the anti-Ballinger campaign, perhaps knowing that any 
involvement here would crush his chances of appointment to the direc-
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torship. But the rumors themselves did damage, no doubt contributing 
to Ballinger's and Taft's impression of Holmes as a difficult man to 
control. 
Holmes did his best, before and after his appointment, to assure the 
administration of his loyalty. In late July, when articles appeared at-
tributing the appointment delay to Holmes's disloyalty to Ballinger and 
Taft, he spoke several times with Donald Carr, Ballinger's secretary 
in Washington, D.C., attempting to convince Carr, and through him 
Ballinger, that he neither was responsible for the articles nor liked 
their content. When, on the day of the appointment, the New York 
Herald again claimed that Holmes was antagonistic to Ballinger, 
Holmes saw Carr and expressed regrets. Holmes, wrote Carr, "has 
reiterated several times the statement that he is not one of our ene-
mies." 108 Three days later Holmes wrote to Ballinger, assuring the 
secretary that "in the discharge of the duties assigned me as Director 
of the Bureau of Mines, I shall have no higher aim than to properly 
carry out the purpose of Congress in establishing the Bureau, as that 
purpose shall be interpreted by the Secretary of the Interior, and to 
cooperate loyally with my associates in this and other bureaus in en-
deavoring to carry out the policies and plans of the Department and of 
the Administration." 109 Through John Mitchell, who had the ear of the 
president, Holmes attempted to allay these and other suspicions about 
his loyalty. Ballinger had misunderstood his purposes and actions; he 
would have no friction with the secretary. "The reports you referred 
to concerning my excessive activity in legislative matters and tendency 
to insubordination," Holmes wrote, "are alike based on an exagger-
ated misinterpretation of the facts and are without any basis." 110 
On this key point of loyalty the administration was ultimately 
reassured. Taft's interview with Holmes in August dealt almost en-
tirely with the subject of Holmes's loyalty to Ballinger. Taft was 
prompt in assuring Ballinger that "he promises the utmost loyalty to 
you." Referring, evidently, to Holmes's legislative activities under 
Smith, Taft added: "I think we can make his activity an asset of use-
fulness in the administration." 111 Ballinger wrote Taft following the 
appointment: 
My greatest concern has been that I feared Mr. Holmes was thor-
oughly inoculated with the idea of bureaucratic ascendency, and he 
bears the reputation of intermeddling in legislation beyond the control 
of his superiors. 
I am pleased to note in your letter that he has agreed to subject him-
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self to authority and to work with loyalty to the head of the Depart-
ment. I shall endeavor on my part to make it easy for him to keep his 
promises.112 
Ballinger did not oppose Holmes, and the final obstacle to his appoint-
ment was removed. 113 
If, in view of his difficulties with Smith and his association with the 
opponents of Ballinger, Holmes was himself a liability, the alternatives 
-Ross and Parker-had more serious deficiencies. Ross had support 
only from limited groups of miners and mine inspectors; Parker, whose 
base of support was narrower but similar in kind to that of Holmes, 
had no experience as a bureau chief and alleged fraud marred his 
background and left the administration, already suffering a crisis in 
the Department of the Interior, open to criticism at a time when it 
could ill afford it. When he heard of the appointment of the first direc-
tor for the new Bureau of Mines, Senator Nathan B. Scott of West 
Virginia wrote to Taft: "Glad you named Dr. Holmes for head of new 
Bureau of Mines. Now make some good political appointments that 
will help. You have been entirely to [sic] good." 114 In the end, Taft 
did not act politically in the usual meaning of the word. Holmes was 
the most popular of all the candidates, the best qualified, the most ex-
perienced; he had succeeded in convincing Taft that his loyalty to the 
administration was not a matter of serious question. Holmes was a 
risk, but a risk Taft in good conscience could hardly afford not to take. 
CHAPTER 
2 
Technology and Politics in 
the Federal Bureaucracy 
THE SAFETY work of the federal government was born in the 
explosion at Monongah and the fire at Cherry, and the Technologic 
Branch and the Bureau of Mines were in significant ways reflections of 
these crisis origins. Due to public apathy and insufficient funds, a num-
ber of important coal-mining safety questions received inadequate at-
tention from the branch and the bureau. Falls of roof and coal, 
recognized by government officials as the number one killer in the 
industry, were virtually ignored; by fiscal 1915 roof support was being 
investigated only through a limited cooperative agreement with the 
state of Illinois. Not until the 1940s would roof-bolting provide an 
adequate technological solution.1 Early federal safety investigations 
also largely ignored the problems of haulage, hoisting, drilling and 
cutting machinery, conveyors, and electricity.2 Instead, the bureau in-
herited from the Technologic Branch an excessive emphasis on ex-
plosions, explosives, and rescue. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 
1909, the first two categories each absorbed about 40 percent of the 
expenditures of the Technologic Branch; the third took the remainder.3 
In each of these areas, moreover, the activities of the federal govern-
ment provoked a surprising amount of controversy. 
As it moved into coal-mining safety, the Technologic Branch stepped 
into a scientific dispute-with immense practical implications-that 
had been simmering for over a century and boiling for two decades. 
The great coal-dust debate had its origins early in the nineteenth cen-
tury. A possible relationship between coal dust and mine explosions 
was first suggested in England in I 803 and mentioned by Michael 
Faraday and Sir Charles Lyell in 1835 and A. duSouich in I855.4 By 
the I88os the controversy focused on the question of whether coal 
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dust could, by itself and without the presence of methane gas, explode 
and propagate an explosion. The debate had centered on the Continent 
and evoked no special concern in the United States until the Poca-
hontas mine in the Flat Top region of Virginia exploded in March 
I884. This mine was reputedly free of methane; therefore, when the 
explosion occurred, the mine superintendent claimed it was caused by 
fine coal dust. A request by the owners of the mine produced an in-
vestigation by the American Institute of Mining Engineers, which con-
cluded that "the explosion was due mainly to dust. . . . we have 
obtained no direct proof of any past occurrence of firedamp [an ex-
plosive mixture of methane and air] sufficient of itself to account for 
even a slight explosion, and are forced to believe that the explosion 
was due either to dust alone or to dust quickened by an admixture of 
firedamp too slight for detection by ordinary means." 5 Apparently, 
this was the first time in the history of American coal mining that the 
coal-dust theory was offered as an explanation for a mine explosion. 6 
The general point of view in I884, however, was not that of the 
AIME committee but of E. S. Hutchinson, an Englishman who held 
that dust, by itself and without firedamp, was not explosive. Hutchin-
son arrived at his conclusion through the back door, arguing that "if 
the coal-dust theory be true to the extent insisted upon by its most 
strenuous advocates, every such local occurrence [a blown-out or over-
charged shot] in a mine of this description [dry and dusty] should be 
followed by the more or less complete wreck of the colliery." 7 (A 
blown-out shot occurs when the force of the explosive is not absorbed 
by the coal but instead is channeled back out the charged hole. The re-
sult-a burst of flame from the hole-may ignite gas or dust in the 
mine atmosphere.) Europeans continued to investigate the problem 
during the I 89os, and they disagreed with Hutchinson. British tests 
from I890 to I893 indicated that coal dust alone could cause explo-
sions. The French said coal dust could only intensify an explosion, 
not be a major agent. Among American engineers, the continental 
investigations produced some spirited discussions, particularly at the 
I 894 convention of the AIME, but no commitment to coal dust as an ex-
planation for explosions. From I 89 5 to I 908, in fact, the Transactions 
of the AIME contain nothing specific on coal-dust explosions. This 
silence was notable at a time when the danger of coal-dust explosions 
was rapidly· increasing in the United States due to a series of changes 
in the coal-mining industry. The rapidly rising demand for coal placed 
a premium on production and encouraged carelessness; recently in-
troduced machinery for undercutting the coal stirred up more dust 
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than hand-mining methods; and greater use after 1898 of the mine-
run system of payment for coal increased the likelihood of blown-out 
shots, as miners ceased to be concerned with bringing out large pieces 
of coal and began to employ more explosives. 8 
Like the scientists and engineers, operators were divided. Fleming 
and fellow West Virginia operator Justus Collins took the coal-dust 
theory more seriously than most, and Fleming was, in fact, privately 
praised by Holmes for his efforts to prevent dust explosions in his 
mines in 1909.9 Other operators were hostile. "Between you and I and 
the gatepost," wrote William N. Page, "I think our Chief Mine In-
spector is a crank on the subject of dust." 10 Seven years earlier Page 
had discounted the possibility that an explosion in his Red Ash Col-
liery in West Virginia had been caused by coal dust. Coal dust, said 
Page, "must necessarily play an important part in all explosions, 
when the gas is once ignited, by adding to the forces involved." 11 A 
Pennsylvania operator asserted flatly that without a gas explosion, "the 
coal dust is not likely to take fire. Don't see how it can take fire." 12 It 
was partly this division and confusion over the facts of mine safety 
which encouraged operators to tum to the federal government in 1908. 
The nation's operators, of course, had no monopoly on confusion, 
ignorance, or error. The organ of the United Mine Workers went a 
step beyond the operators and mixed in an element of conspiracy, 
charging, in effect, that the whole coal-dust theory was an operator 
fabrication designed to draw attention away from the real problem: 
ventilation. The Journal said: "The 'dust explosion' may be ranked 
with Bro. Jasper's dogma that the 'sun do move.' It is a safe propo-
sition that where there is no gas in a mine 'dust explosions' do not 
occur, and that theory is convenient to befog coroner's juries and dull 
the sword of justice ... this 'dust explosion' theory was not invented 
until after prosecutions for disobedience of the mining law were be-
gun."13 The Journal's attitude was modified slightly in 1905, when its 
editors admitted the existence of some unknown factor and the need 
for a scientific investigation. It was obvious even at this time that the 
Journal did not expect scientific research to vindicate the coal-dust 
theory advocates.14 One of the most influential mining men in the 
country, former Ohio inspector Andrew Roy, supported the oppo-
nents of the coal-dust theory when he concluded in his serialized and 
influential book that the coal-dust theory had been "thoughtlessly 
accepted.'' 15 
The theory received a tragic stimulus in March 1906, when an ex-
plosion in a mine at Courrieres, France, killed 1,230 miners, almost 
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four times the largest number killed in a coal-mine explosion in the 
United States to the present day. The mine had been free of methane 
or firedamp up to the time of the explosion. The Courrieres disaster, 
said French mine-safety expert J. Taffanel, "has demonstrated in an 
indisputable manner the reality of the coal-dust danger." 16 American 
miners remained unconvinced, and less than a month after the ex-
plosion in the similarly gas-free Monongah mine, the Journal pub-
lished several letters from miners who refused to accept the coal-dust 
theory. Perhaps buoyed by its readers, the Journal continued to look 
at the coal-dust theory as an operator facade, just as it continued to 
trust in Andrew RoyY Opposition to the coal-dust theory was closely 
related to the instinctive working-class dislike of "experts"-scientific 
men without practical knowledge of mining conditions. Future presi-
dent of the mine workers' union T. L. Lewis spoke for thousands of 
miners: "We have some coal experts running over the country pro-
ceeding to tell practical miners about the dangers surrounding [coal 
dust]. I haven't very much respect for them and I tell them as quickly 
as I am telling you. They theorize about what the dangers are and how 
we should protect ourselves .... I believe if more was left to ourselves 
we would be a great deal better off." 18 
Faced with this kind of opposition from a major segment of its 
audience, it is remarkable that the Technologic Branch made any 
progress in convincing miners, operators, inspectors, and state legis-
lators that coal dust was dangerous in and of itself. Fortunately, 
Holmes was a master at getting mileage out of limited funds. Out 
of the first year's appropriations for mine explosions, Holmes took 
$3,750, or almost 20 percent, and imported three experts in the coal-
mining safety field-Victor Watteyne, inspector general of mines, 
Belgium; Carl Meissner, councilor for mines, Germany; and Arthur 
Desborough, H. M. inspector of explosives, England. Their itinerary 
was arranged to put them in contact with large numbers of coal opera-
tors, heads of state operators' associations, and officers of the United 
Mine Workers. After two months in the United States, the foreign ex-
perts prepared a widely publicized report which foreshadowed almost 
every important facet of the survey's work in coal-mining safety, from 
permissibility of explosives to (with great emphasis) the explosiveness 
of coal dust. 19 The foreign safety experts played a critical role in Amer-
ican coal-mining safety. At a time when the federal government was 
only entering the field, Watteyne, Meissner, and Desborough could 
speak with authority from years of experience. They influenced oper-
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ators and miners as well as the direction of the survey's own investi-
gative work. 20 
Once the government scientists had cleared up the confusion in their 
own minds and published their results, Holmes and his men did enjoy 
some success in propagating the coal-dust gospel. A. B. Fleming began 
to employ practices designed to eliminate the danger of coal-dust ex-
plosions; the Juanita Coal and Coke Company of Bowie, Colorado, 
warned its employees of the dangers of coal dust and took precau-
tions. Doubtless other companies did the same, for as early as I907, 
the states were beginning to recognize the coal-dust theory in their 
coal-mining safety legislation, requiring that coal companies take ac-
tion to reduce their dust accumulations.21 By far the most opposition 
to the concept of coal-dust explosions came from the influential United 
Mine Workers Journal, yet even here the scientific and educational 
efforts of the Technologic Branch began to have impact. Although 
the Journal did not in the next few years acknowledge its error, it did 
refrain from objecting to the coal-dust theory, and on December 24, 
I908, it signaled the end of its resistance with an article which stated 
that tests by the federal station at Pittsburgh had proved that coal dust 
in certain stages of dryness and fineness would explode in the presence 
of an open light or an electric spark.22 This was an auspicious begin-
ning for the Technologic Branch. 
After I 9 I o bureau scientists focused their investigations on solu-
tions to the coal-dust problem, arriving about I9I4 at the conclusion 
that rock dusting and watering (by spraying with steam, for example) 
were effective and complementary preventive measures. For limiting 
explosions, once they occurred, the bureau suggested use of Taffanel 
barriers, named after their French inventor. The barriers amounted to 
a series of shelves placed high in the mine, loaded with incombustible 
rock dust which, when blown down by the advance air wave of an 
explosion, would cool the flame and prevent the explosion from 
spreading through the mine.23 To encourage operators to install rock-
dusting equipment and rock-dust barriers, the bureau undertook tests 
to determine the cost of commercial rock dusting, and, although the 
process was shown to be significantly cheaper than watering, operators 
were not receptive. First tried on a large scale in a Colorado mine in 
I9II, introduction of rock-dusting processes to other American mines 
was slow.24 The bureau could only cajole and reason, and such meth-
ods proved inadequate; the nation's operators would not act on avail-
able scientific and technological information. 
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The second leg of the federal effort to eliminate mine explosions-
the development and distribution of a list of permissible explosives 
-also met with a lukewarm reception from miners and operators. 
The idea of "safety" explosives-explosives with shorter and cooler 
flames-was nothing new to the coal-mining industry, having been 
applied in Europe for some time before being introduced into the 
United States in 1901. The essence of the problem was one of labeling. 
By 1908 numerous manufacturers of explosives were calling their 
products "safety explosives," appellations which more often than not 
misrepresented the products and encouraged in the user a misplaced 
sense of trust. George Otis Smith thought proper labeling was of vital 
importance to the miner, and in 1908 he suggested federal legislation 
to regulate the manufacture, use, and sale of explosives.25 Holmes, too, 
was impressed by the urgency of the problem, especially the need to 
provide miners with information regarding the quality of explosives 
and the quantity of explosives necessary for safe use under different 
mining conditions.26 Under Holmes, the Technologic Branch con-
ducted research on explosives, established safety standards, tested ex-
plosives submitted by manufacturers, and succeeded in persuading 
manufacturers to develop newer, safer explosives. Explosives testing 
began almost immediately after passage of the 1908 appropriation act, 
and by May 1909 the Technologic Branch had published its first list 
of "permissibles." 27 Opposition to the new explosives was particularly 
strong among miners, usually because of some impact, direct or in-
direct, which the safety explosives had on miner compensation. Since 
miners often had to pay for the explosives they used, they were sensi-
tive to the higher costs of permissibles. In 1909, for example, the op-
position of Ohio miners to a piece of legislation which would have 
prohibited the use of the traditional black powder was based primarily 
on the anticipated higher cost of substitute explosives. Miners in Penn-
sylvania's District 5 staged a major strike when they calculated that 
the safety explosives which the operators had chosen would reduce 
earnings by shattering the coal unnecessarily.28 For whatever reason, 
permissibles did not exactly sweep the field, and as late as 1922 they 
accounted for only I 8 percent of the explosives in use. Experience did 
not bear out one optimistic prediction that the mere existence of a 
permissible list would have a "moral effect" almost as great as statu-
tory law.29 
The federal government carried out training, investigation, and res-
cue functions through its mine-safety stations. The first station was 
established in 1908 at Urbana, Illinois, and by I9II there were twelve 
TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS 49 
-six stationary and six mobile-all in coal-mining areas. The mobile 
stations were maintained in railroad cars, which moved from one 
mining camp to another within fixed districts, training miners in first 
aid and rescue techniques, providing general instruction about mine 
safety, and, if necessary, participating in actual rescue work. From 
the beginning, the training and investigation functions were primary, 
although by June 1914 the bureau had rescued approximately one 
hundred trapped miners. The stations were under J. W. Paul, recently 
acquired from the state of West Virginia, where he had been chief 
mine inspector.30 In 1910 Holmes, convinced of the importance of the 
program, sent Paul and Carl Scholz, consulting mining engineer, to 
five European countries to inspect their facilities to determine how to 
equip the cars and stations; in 1913 the bureau director recommended 
that all the stations be converted to cars (the miners who were not 
close to the stations were not coming, he said) and concluded: "I 
know of no other investment the Government could make that would 
do as much as this for safety in mining and good citizenship among the 
2,ooo,ooo men in this industry." 31 
As a group, miners and operators received these services gratefully. 
Operators, particularly, could see no reason to resist free training for 
their employees; Oklahoma operators even agreed to furnish free room, 
light, heat, and rent if the government would send one of its cars. As 
long as the Technologic Branch and the bureau asserted no legal right 
to investigate mine disasters and their causes, they faced little oppo-
sition from operators in this area, either.32 And when money savings 
were involved, operators could be generous in their thanks. A Gebo, 
Wyoming, operator wrote in reference to the bureau's rescue work 
following a January 1917 mine fire: "I am not proficient enough in the 
use of the language to express my own feelings towards the Bureau of 
Mines. All of the equipment we had installed under your regulations 
had to be used. Without this apparatus we quite likely would have had 
to seal up the entire mine tight." 33 Bureau records contain hundreds 
of requests from operators and local and district unions that govern-
ment rescue cars visit their mines. 
The generally favorable response to the bureau training program 
was in part the result of the efforts of W. D. Ryan. A former operator, 
Ryan resigned in 1913 from the presidency of the Southwestern In-
terstate Coal Operators' Association and traveled the nation for the 
bureau as its mine safety commissioner, attending miners' conventions 
and first-aid meets and calling informal gatherings in an effort to stimu-
late miner and operator interest in first aid and rescue. Much of Ryan's 
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energy was directed toward institutionalizing interest in the form of 
meets and contests, and in this and in simply arousing interest, he was 
remarkably successful. Ryan arranged for first-aid and rescue organi-
zations in Arkansas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Iowa, and other states. 34 
Favorable evaluations of Ryan's work came from Holmes, who appre-
ciated Ryan's ability to secure information from the miner's viewpoint, 
and from Ryan himself, who in 1916 wrote with pride of the escalating 
interest in his work. Despite his operator origins, Ryan established 
close relationships with miners' unions in the Southwest and Midwest, 
and to him must go much of the credit for whatever success the bureau 
first-aid and rescue programs enjoyed in these coal-mining regions.35 
Nonetheless, this program did not escape its share of criticism. Fed-
eral rescuers were scored for their lack of courage, for excessive in-
terest in saving property rather than lives, and for arriving when 
everyone was dead.36 The Cherry mine fire focused the attacks of 
critics. The United Mine Workers led the foray, charging that survey 
priorities were at fault and that more attention should be paid to pre-
venting disasters than to rescue efforts. Criticism of priorities was 
mixed with the Journal's anti-expert attitude here, too. The Geological 
Survey, charged the Journal, "seemed to be getting further away from 
a solution of this matter, rather than closer to it. There was a whole 
army of experts at the terrible affair at Cherry, Illinois .... They had 
all the necessary appliances for rescue work, and yet not a single life 
was saved from the burning mine." 37 The Journal had told only part 
of the story. In fact, the Geological Survey team from Urbana was 
notified late of the Cherry disaster and the Pittsburgh rescue station 
learned of it only through the newspapers. Outlook magazine con-
cluded that the real lesson of Cherry was the need for all companies 
to have a rescue corps at their mines; it also suggested that officers of 
mining companies be required to telegraph at once the appropriate 
government rescue stations and be held responsible for failure to do 
so.38 Along the same lines, James Callbreath, secretary of the Ameri-
can Mining Congress, used the failures of the Geological Survey at 
Cherry to support his bid for a bureau of mines, insisting that the 
reason the survey was not notified immediately of the Cherry disaster 
was that few people associated the survey with rescue work. A bureau 
of mines, said Callbreath, was the only solution: "The saving of the 
lives of miners is not a task for geology, but for eminent scientific 
mining engineers." 39 Finally, the survey gained knowledge of its op-
position from the criticism it faced after Cherry. Holmes knew that his 
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men on the rescue cars would encounter negativism from miners who 
"will not care very much about theories." 40 
Federal progress in coal-mining safety faced two major political 
challenges after 1910. The first came from Congress, whose initial 
enthusiasm for the work of the Bureau of Mines was now tempered. 
From 19II through 1913, the bureau was hard-pressed to maintain 
even a no-growth budget. All forms of bureau work-safety, conser-
vation, mineral development-were affected by congresses which, 
while not hostile to the bureau, neither viewed it as comparable to the 
Department of Agriculture nor saw the research needs of mine opera-
tors as comparable to those of farmers. The second challenge was the 
more serious, for it had the strong support of Holmes and his succes-
sor as director, Van H. Manning. Under their leadership, the bureau 
shook free of the strong influence of Monongah and Cherry and con-
centrated its energies increasingly on western metals and conservation. 
In the process, coal-mining safety became only another aspect of the 
bureau's work; no longer was it the bureau's raison d'etre. 
The roadblocks to adequate funding lay not in the executive branch, 
where both Taft and Wilson favored mine-safety investigations, but 
in congresses which were no longer much interested in mining or 
mining safety. "Membership on the Agriculture Committee," said the 
Pittsburgh Gazette Times, "is considered one of the honors, while the 
Committee on Mines and Mining goes begging for a chairman or for 
membership." 41 A Seattle attorney, Maurice D. Leehey, compared 
congressional attitude toward the mining industry and agriculture: the 
1914 appropriations for the Bureau of Mines, wrote Leehey, "just 
equaled the amount appropriated by Congress for investigations in 
the treatment of hog cholera. In other words, the entire mining industry 
received the same consideration as one single disease affecting one 
farm product." 42 Thomas J. Walsh, then chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee on Mines and Mining, replied: "Your comparison of the ap-
propriation made for the support of the Bureau of Mines with the 
liberality exhibited by Congress touching hog cholera, illustrates 
strongly the niggardliness and indifference with which the mining 
industry is treated by Congress." But even Walsh found it difficult to 
keep informed of the work of the bureau as other demands on his time 
became more numerous and compelling.43 
Because of a Taft campaign for economy and efficiency and a re-
cession in 1913, the bureau had the greatest difficulty with Congress 
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in its early years. Total bureau appropriations fell slightly from fiscal 
year I 9 I I to fiscal I 9 I 2, in spite of assistance from a UMW A legislative 
committee and from Secretary Ballinger, who supported an increase 
in appropriations for new rescue cars and stations. Without it, Bal-
linger concluded, "the progress of the work will be seriously handi-
capped."44 In the bureau's First Annual Report Holmes noted 
ominously that funds available for investigations of the causes of acci-
dents and explosions "instead of increasing, in accord with the experi-
ence of other bureaus, are actually less to-day than they were for the 
technologic work under the Geological Survey three years ago." 45 In 
fiscal I 9 I 3, these investigative funds were actually reduced, from 
$347,000 to $327,000. While total bureau funding doubled from I9II 
to I9I7, when the bureau became a million-dollar organization, ap-
propriations for scientific investigations of the causes of mining ac-
cidents increased only slightly in that same period, with the entire 
increase ~oming in funding for decentralized investigations at mining 
experiment stations in metal mining areas. Funding for scientific work 
in coal-mining safety did not increase over the entire ten-year period 
from I9IO to I920. Although the research needs of the mining industry 
were often compared with those of agriculture, in actual funding min-
ing was a distant second. For fiscal I 9 I 3, the federal government spent 
almost $28,ooo,ooo on agriculture and only $I,967,000 on mining, 
though mines produced almost half the yearly value of agricultural 
products. In I 9 I 2 there were fifty federal agricultural experiment 
stations; mining had fewer than ten.46 That same year, appropriations 
for operating the bureau's mine-rescue cars were exhausted by March 
I, 1913, and Holmes's attempt to secure an emergency deficiency ap-
propriation from Congress failed. Operation of the cars had to be dis-
continued temporarily. 
Appropriation difficulties delayed investigations of roof falls, im-
provement of rescue equipment, and examination of fuel and mineral 
waste. Construction of an experimental mine for the bureau took 
three years when, according to Holmes, it could have been done in 
one with adequate funding. Because it was primarily an educational 
institution, the bureau suffered greatly when its educational efforts 
were hamstrung by appropriation deficiencies. In I 9 I 2 the bureau's 
publication funds were cut to 40 percent of their I9II level, and in 
1914 the secretary of the interior, Franklin K. Lane, had to come to 
the rescue of the bureau when Congress threatened to eliminate all 
funds for attendance of bureau employees at association, institute, and 
society meetings. Lane effectively argued that miners could be most 
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readily interested in safety problems through in-person lectures and 
demonstrations at appropriate meetings, and that an absolute pro-
hibition of attendance at such meetings would cripple the educational 
work of the bureau. Financial problems endangered the progress of 
the Technologic Branch and the bureau with mine inspectors and 
owners and shook the confidence of the miners in the good faith of 
the national government. By 1914 Holmes was forced to conclude 
that "the claim frequently set forth of late by the miners, mine owners, 
and inspectors that the entire mine-safety movement is being held 
back by the lagging of the Government's investigations is unfortu-
nately a true and reasonable claim." 47 
Always the political activist, Holmes took up where he had left off 
with the Geological Survey. He worked hard to counter congressional 
negativism, courting members of Congress and particularly the mem-
bers of the committees on Mines and Mining. In addition to ordinary 
persuasive techniques, Holmes and Manning offered entertainment in 
the form of the mine-safety demonstration. Yet even Holmes's con-
siderable abilities in public relations and politics proved ineffectual. 
The First National Mine Safety Demonstration, held in Pittsburgh in 
October 19II, attracted the president but apparently only one con-
gressman, George White of Ohio, and by early 1912 Holmes had 
managed to get only two members of the House Committee on Mines 
and Mining-White and William B. Wilson-to the Pittsburgh ex-
periment station to see the explosion work carried on there.48 The 
forces inducing congressional apathy toward mining and coal mining 
were simply too strong to be countered from within the bureaucracy. 
Except for 1913, when 233 died at Dawson, New Mexico, and 181 
at Eccles, West Virginia, there were no disasters like Monongah in the 
decade after 1910, and the general public and the media, inured to 
small mine disasters, were no longer pressing for reform. The coal-
mine operators might have conquered this indifference with effective 
lobbying, but they were unable to develop an organization which 
could speak with authority for the entire coal industry.49 
Their failure left the field to the American Mining Congress, tra-
ditionally and still essentially representative of western metal-mining 
interests. Working with Holmes, these interests were responsible for 
the Foster Act of 1913, which clarified and replaced the 1910 legis-
lation creating the bureau, and the Kern-Foster Act of 1915, which 
extended the experimentation, rescue, and educational programs of 
the bureau from coal mining into metal mining. Along with World 
War I, this legislation considerably reduced the bureau's concentration 
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in coal-mining safety. Proponents of the Foster bill were unanimous in 
their claims that its enactment would not extend the scope of the work 
of the Bureau of Mines; its function was only to state that scope more 
clearly, in accordance with the original intent of Congress. 5° But sup-
porters of the bill also realized that clarification of the 1910 act would 
result in major changes in the bureau. Appearing before the Senate 
Committee on Mines and Mining, a circumspect Holmes emphasized 
the need to move the bureau into two areas: metal-mining safety and 
conservation (more precisely, the prevention of waste in mining oper-
ations). On the first point, Holmes was careful not to threaten metal 
mine operators: "We have had ... in the coal mining regions recom-
mendations by various people who are interested purely in safety that 
we should submit to the State legislatures recommendations compel-
ling operators to do certain things in behalf of safety which would be 
practically impossible for the operators to do, because it involves so 
large an increase in expenditures that there are no possibilities in the 
industry that would enable them to do these things. I mention this 
simply to show that the question of economy and efficiency in mining 
must be considered along with the question of safety; as otherwise we 
might recommend absolutely impossible things." 51 
In his goals for the bureau and in his cautious approach, Holmes 
had the support of John Mitchell. In a letter which Holmes called 
the "most important recent contribution to the mining situation in the 
United States," Mitchell wrote Martin Foster, head of the House Com-
mittee on Mines and Mining: 
As one of the advocates of the establishment of the Bureau of 
Mines, I have watched with interest the good beginning it has made; 
but I have noted with regret the inadequacy of its facilities for taking 
up even the matter of coal mine accidents in a manner commensurate 
with the urgency and importance of that subject; also the omission 
from its work of investigations looking to the general up-building of 
the industry .... 
If I may be permitted to speak for the coal miners, I can express 
for them the desire that whatever may be done in behalf of their 
safety should also be done in behalf of the safety and welfare of the 
men who work in the quarries, metallurgical plants, and the metal 
mines, where the loss of life and health is but little, if any, less than 
in the coal mines. If I may be permitted to speak for all classes of 
miners, I will say for them that they are unwilling to have the work 
of this Bureau limited to endeavors in behalf of their own safety and 
welfare; but desire its extension with a view to the upbuilding of the 
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industry of which they are but a part. The men who labor underground, 
with all its attendant hazards, no less than other classes of our citi-
zens, have at heart the permanent welfare of this country. They, more 
clearly than any one else, realize the deplorable extent to which the 
gas, coal and other essential resources of this country are being 
wasted. And they believe that the first move to be made in deter-
mining a feasible plan for solving the difficult problem of reducing 
this waste, is to provide for a thorough investigation into the facts of 
the situation by the Bureau of Mines, and a publication of the results. 52 
Mitchell's letter is of interest for several reasons. There is some ques-
tion, especially in light of his close relationship with the National 
Civic Federation (NCF), whether Mitchell could speak with any au-
thority for the nation's coal miners. In fact, the statement is a good 
example, not of the rhetoric of the United Mine Workers, but of the 
NCF's attempts to paper over the differences between capital and labor. 
Finally, the statement begins with safety but concludes by emphasizing 
industrial development and conservation, hardly the priorities of coal 
and metal miners. 
There is no evidence that the United Mine Workers supported the 
Foster legislation. Rather, its genesis was corporate and sectional. By 
far the most active proponents of the Foster bill were western metal-
mining interests, anxious to see the Bureau of Mines invest an in-
creasing portion of its time and energy in the western metals industry. 
James Callbreath of the American Mining Congress summarized the 
general feelings of this group when he suggested that appropriations 
for the Bureau of Mines were totally inadequate. It was, he said, "a 
case of 'All for the white man and none for the nigger.' " 53 Although 
western metal mine operators agreed with the need for more attention 
to metal-mining safety and waste, their basic needs were more utili-
tarian. They wanted the bureau to move rapidly into the metallurgical 
treatment of low-grade ores. 54 
Mining engineers, apprehensive that their own careers and status 
would be directly affected by competition in commercial work from 
the federal government, were the bill's most serious opponents. One 
engineer wrote that he did not think it "likely that the bureau em-
ployees will ever be able, in the casual study they will necessarily have 
to make of different metallurgical and mining questions, to attain the 
expert knowledge of these questions possessed by the engineers who 
have devoted years to their study." 55 The Engineering and Mining 
Journal, organ of the Mining and Metallurgical Society, denounced 
federal work in metallurgical testing, and the president of that society, 
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J. Parker Channing, wrote to Foster in opposition to his bill. "Broadly 
speaking," said Channing, "I believe that the Bureau of Mines should 
not be permitted, either directly or indirectly, to go into commercial 
work, that it should devote itself to looking out for the health and 
safety of persons employed in that industry." 56 Engineering oppo-
sition to the legislation was often phrased in terms of the impact the 
bureau's enlarged activities would have on private enterprise. 
Broad enough for all its advocates, the Foster bill became law in 
February 1913. Its logical successor was the Kern-Foster Act, also 
symbolic of the influence of western metal mine operators in bureau 
policy and indicative of the position of coal-mining safety in the dy-
namics of the bureau at this time. Approved in March 1915, it called 
for the establishment and maintenance in unnamed mining regions of 
ten mining experiment stations and seven mining safety stations (mov-
able or stationary) and represented the consolidation of hundreds of 
requests from all parts of the nation for experiment and rescue sta-
tions. Although the bill's strongest support came from the metal-min-
ing industry, which felt that the bill would go far toward redressing 
the imbalance in the bureau toward coal mining, passage of Kern-
Foster also was favored by the United Mine Workers, the American 
Federation of Labor (AF of L) and the American Association of State 
Geologists. A committee of the UMWA and the AF of L was particularly 
helpful, and William Green was active on the bill's behalf. Holmes 
used all his influence in behalf of a bill he felt was, "other than the 
establishment of the Bureau itself, . . . the most important mining 
legislation proposed for some time." 57 The year before, lack of funds 
for the mine rescue cars had forced the bureau to discontinue opera-
tion of some cars, and Holmes anticipated that passage of Kern-Foster 
would place the program on firmer foundations. Although Kern-Foster 
did not itself provide funds for the new stations, the act required that 
three of the mining safety and mining experiment stations be estab-
lished in the current year. Writing to state geologists and others from 
Fort Bayard, New Mexico, where he was undergoing treatment for 
tuberculosis, Holmes promised experiment or rescue stations to par-
ticular states, apparently in return for political support. Holmes fully 
admitted that he was not authorized to do so, but he promised stations 
to cities in Montana, Minnesota, and Kansas, and to the University of 
Alabama. When Holmes died soon after passage of the act, Van H. 
Manning, acting director, did not know all the states in which Holmes 
had proposed to locate the stations. He wrote to the president of the 
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Association of State Geologists, F. W. DeWolf of Urbana, that the 
secretary of the interior had already turned down one location "which 
had been rather definitely promised by Doctor Holmes." 58 Clearly 
Holmes was willing to go to some lengths to assure passage of the 
Kern-Foster bill. 
These events brought early changes in bureau priorities. By 1913 
the old survey problems of coal-mining safety and fuel use, while still 
significant, were joined by a third of equal status: safety (and "ef-
ficiency," to use Holmes's euphemism) in metal-mining operations. 
The years 1914 and 19I5 witnessed the beginnings of a decline of 
health and safety problems in the bureau's priorities and a commensu-
rate increase in interest in a variety of areas, including smelter smoke, 
the production of radium, and the manufacture of gasoline, benzol, 
and toluol from petroleum. The work of the bureau's Petroleum Di-
vision was becoming increasingly important, as had that of the Metal-
lurgical Division, which made only limited safety investigations. The 
trend away from coal-mining safety is illustrated, too, by the bureau's 
cooperative agreements (which were essentially cost-sharing ar-
rangements) . In fiscal I 9 I 6, only one of nine official cooperative 
agreements involved coal-mining safety; most dealt with metal-mining 
safety. 59 By the end of fiscal I9I9, all but one of the seven mine-rescue 
cars and all but four of the ten mine-experiment stations authorized 
by the Kern-Foster Act had gone into service. Nearly all the new 
cars and stations served metal-mining areas, and no safety work was 
done at any of the experiment stations. The act itself is important as 
an indication of the status of coal-mining safety at the time of its 
passage; its implementation-largely in the metal-mining areas-is a 
reflection of the powerful competition of metal-mining safety and 
technology for bureau funds in the second decade of the century. 60 
World War I accelerated this relative decline in interest in coal-
mining safety. In the long run the war, by encouraging a national, 
collective response to problem-solving, may also have encouraged 
national action in health and safety; in the short run, however, the 
effect was to promote development of the Bureau of Mines in areas 
totally divorced from mining and mine safety. Bureau resources de-
voted to coal-mining safety remained fixed; those in other fields grew 
rapidly. Specifically, the bureau became deeply involved in investiga-
tions of the use of gases in warfare, production of nitrates and new 
alloys, conservation of fuel, and the possibilities of developing do-
mestic supplies of metals such as nickel and manganese. Another war-
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related deterrent to safety investigations was the shortage of engineers 
for field investigations. Although the war involved the bureau in ex-
plosives regulation, the goal was national security, not safer mines.61 
In his five years with the bureau, Joseph A. Holmes had succeeded 
in removing the inhibitions of the 1910 organic act and in implement-
ing the new Foster legislation. The bureau continued, however, to be 
restricted in another sense; with the exception of a short period during 
the World War, it remained an educational agency without regulatory 
powers of any kind, legal or administrative. "Hence," said the bureau's 
second director, Van H. Manning, "as the bureau can not forbid nor 
compel, it recommends and advises. It appeals to reason, not to fear. 
Its campaign for greater safety is essentially a campaign of educa-
tion."62 As an educational institution, the bureau developed and used 
a number of teaching and publicity techniques. It published Circulars 
for miners and Bulletins and Technical Papers for operators and pro-
fessionals in the mining-safety field; it held national mine-safety dem-
onstrations and, in conjunction with other public and private agencies, 
sponsored first-aid and rescue meets around the country; its repre-
sentatives spoke at meetings of miners, inspectors, engineers, and 
operators; in its most public and widely known activity, the bureau, 
through its stationary and movable cars and stations, tried to reach 
miners and operators to instruct them in the proper techniques and 
equipment of rescue and first aid. 
Mine safety was not always the most newsworthy of topics, and 
good national publicity was difficult to obtain. The Illinois Mine Res-
cue Commission, for example, was known to have paid for coverage. 63 
In this setting, the national mine-safety demonstration became vital to 
the bureau's educational effort. The idea appears to have come from 
H. M. Wilson, engineer-in-charge of the Bureau of Mines Experiment 
Station at Pittsburgh; after conferences with congressmen, senators, 
union officials, and state mine inspectors, the First National Mine 
Safety Demonstration was held in October 1911 and was attended by 
President William Taft and thousands of miners. The demonstration 
included a first-aid exhibit, a general demonstration of various means 
of making mines safe, and, perhaps most important, was the occasion 
for the first public use of the now famous slogan "Safety-First," de-
veloped several years earlier for the Illinois Steel Company. 64 The 
bureau held another national exposition in 1913, took part in the 
preparation and conduct of a National Safety-First Exposition in 
February 1916, and sponsored hundreds of mine-rescue and first-aid 
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contests in the years from 1910 to 1920. Creating as well as reflecting 
the current concern with industrial safety, the bureau's educational 
efforts led a national safety figure to term the agency "a pioneer of 
concerted training in first aid in the industrial world." 65 
Of the three types of bureau publications, perhaps the most im-
portant were the Circulars, distributed free to some 13,000 mine of-
ficials-fire bosses, shot-firers, superintendents. Roughly equivalent to 
the Farmers' Bulletins issued by the Department of Agriculture, the 
Circulars were simply written so that these officials, who seldom had 
more education than the miners working under them, could grasp es-
sential new knowledge in mine safety and pass it on to their subordi-
nates. In fiscal year 1912 the bureau distributed more than soo,ooo 
total publications, including about 352,000 Circulars.66 While gen-
erally well received, bureau publications were sometimes denounced 
for persistence in advocating a coal-dust theory of mine explosions and 
for overemphasizing the control a miner had over his own safety. One 
particularly virulent Indiana miner, T. James, suggested that the ad-
vice offered in Miners' Circular No. II, if followed, "would be un-
doubtedly the best step yet taken in the evolution of the mining 
industry from a slaughter house to an under-ground paradise, were 
it not for the fact that the men it directly appeals to, (the miner and 
the foreman) are undoubtedly unable to follow it." Referring to 
statistics presented in the Circular, James believed: "Ye Gods! Just 
look how magnaimous [sic] the management must be. Not one life 
lost ... by any fault of the owners." 67 Perhaps in response to these 
and similar comments, Holmes established a policy of sending the 
Circulars to leading mining men for suggestions and comments. John 
Mitchell, John White (when president of the UMWA), and William 
Green were among those who offered advice. 68 
For its rescue and first-aid program, the bureau had expectations 
that went beyond education of miners. In theory, at least, this work 
was only pump-priming; private businesses would see the obvious 
benefits in maintaining their own equipment and instructors and in 
training their own miners. Holmes, Manning, Ryan, George Rice (the 
bureau's chief mining engineer), and some coal operators accepted 
versions of the theory, which was first stated publicly in the 1912 
Annual Report of the director. By 1918 the formula had been refined 
by Holmes and Manning so that it now called for each mining opera-
tion to maintain at least I o percent of its employees in rescue and first 
aid, with a station at the mine or managed cooperatively with ad-
jacent mines.69 Although the idea of a self-liquidating federal program 
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has the ring of ideology, government and business backing for the 
concept stemmed from a pragmatic base. While Holmes may have felt 
strongly that private industry could do the job more efficiently, his 
strongest statements on the subject came during appropriation hear-
ings in 1912, 1913, and 1914, when the bureau was locked in budget-
ary struggles with Congress. In 1913, for example, Holmes told the 
Appropriations Committee: "I am doing everything, and the other 
officials of the bureau are doing everything they can, to unload this 
work as rapidly as we can upon the state and the private operators." 70 
In short, the pump-priming theory was essentially a response to short-
term fiscal necessity, enunciated to prove groundless congressional 
fears of burgeoning spending in a new government bureau by showing 
that a good deal of the financing was temporary.71 Holmes was also 
flexible enough to see the advantages of a rescue system financed by 
the states rather than the private sector, a system that promised to be 
operationally inferior but more consistent with bureau financial limi-
tations. Manning and a number of operators, on the other hand, 
supported pump-priming and an eventual all-private system on the 
grounds that adequate rescue service required the involvement of in-
dividual operators. The nature of rescue work lent some credence to 
this view, for one of the greatest liabilities of a federal or state system, 
even one using movable cars, was the delay involved in reaching a 
disaster. Illinois operator A. J. Moorshead, president of the Madison 
Coal Corporation, wrote: "We have believed that the very best work 
can only be accomplished by every mine being organized in such a way 
that it can take care of itself." 72 
Private participation was not lacking. The Cottrell report of 1915, 
a major in-house attempt to assess bureau progress in a number of 
areas, was laudatory of bureau gains in this field: "Whereas there was 
not a single mine rescue station or car in the United States when the 
bureau adopted these means of training and rescue," said the report, 
"mining companies have now established 76 mine rescue stations at 
which there are 1200 sets of artificial breathing apparatus besides the 
auxiliary equipment for fire fighting." 73 While this would seem to 
indicate substantial progress, the self-professed bureau goal-10 per-
cent of mine employees well trained in first aid and mine rescue-was 
not approached even in the largest (and generally most progressive) 
coal mines. A 1916 bureau survey of the nation's coal companies em-
ploying more than two hundred persons reveals that only in exceptional 
cases did the total number of mine-rescue and first-aid personnel em-
ployed at a particular company reach 10 percent, and more commonly 
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TABLE 2 
Number of Rescue and First-Aid Personnel and Medical 
Facilities in Private Coal-Mining Companies of More 
Than Two Hundred Employees, by State, in 1916 
Number of mines Mine-rescue First-aid 
With men men Surgeons 
hospital per 1,000 per 1,000 per 1,000 
State Total service employees employees employees 
Alabama 8 5 13 26 4 
Colorado 5 5 44 41 5 
Illinois 30 18 17 21 2 
Iowa 1 0 17 0 0 
Indiana 4 1 12 9 2 
Kentucky 10 4 14 36 4 
Maryland 2 1 0 7 1 
Montana 2 1 29 43 3 
Oklahoma 2 2 5 2 5 
Ohio 7 4 3 3 2 
Pennsylvania anthracite 34 33 14 32 1 
Pennsylvania bituminous 43 29 8 28 2 
Tennessee 2 0 6 19 6 
Texas 3 3 0 0 2 
Virginia 5 5 5 6 2 
Washington 4 3 24 46 3 
West Virginia 23 16 4 7 4 
Wyoming 6 6 31 42 3 
5 percent or less of the employees had such training. Private facilities 
were particularly sparse in Illinois where the state was heavily in-
volved. (See Tables 2 and 3.) 74 
By the time Manning took control of the bureau, the theory and 
practice of state action in coal-mine safety education had severely 
undermined the possibilities of a strong private system. The challenge 
was led by Illinois, which had previous difficulties with the bureau 
over rescue services and which by I9I4 had three of its own rescue 
cars. "In Illinois," said Holmes, "the fact that the State is doing this 
work on so extensive a scale appears to have discouraged private min-
ing companies in that State from doing it." 75 When Holmes made this 
statement in I9I4, few Illinois coal-mining companies maintained 
private rescue cars. After I 9 I 7 the profit motive would enter the pic-
ture in the form of an insurance group called the Associated Com-
panies, and private action would receive a strong stimulus.76 The 
bureau was partially responsible for stimulating the birth and growth 
of state systems. Its staff prepared the legislation creating the Illinois 
system and helped operators and the state of Tennessee work out a 
cooperative rescue station agreement for the Jellico field in I 9 I 3. The 
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TABLE 3 
Number of Rescue and First-Aid Personnel and Medical Facilities 
in Private Coal-Mining Companies of More Than Two Hundred Employees, 
by Size of Company, in 1916 
Number of mines Mine-rescue First-aid 
Size of company With men men Surgeons 
by number of hospital per 100 per 100 per 100 
employees Total service employees employees employees 
200-225 13 8 13 41 6 
226-300 42 31 14 22 4 
301-325 3 3 4 55 2 
326-350 6 3 22 26 3 
351-400 15 8 8 17 4 
401-450 6 5 12 16 3 
451-500 13 8 18 27 3 
501-550 8 5 8 49 3 
551-600 9 5 12 12 2 
601-650 7 5 6 20 2 
651-750 15 12 10 21 1 
751-850 5 4 15 21 1 
851-950 4 3 16 34 3 
951-1,000 1 0 12 0 1 
1,001-2,000 24 19 13 19 2 
2,001-3,000 7 6 12 23 1 
3,001-4,000 3 3 3 19 0 
4,001-5,000 4 2 9 29 3 
5,001-10,000 3 3 10 13 0 
10,001-15,000 2 2 17 30 0 
15,001-20,000 No companies in this size category. 
20,001-up 1 1 22 56 
ubiquitous W. D. Ryan worked closely with operators and miners 
in a successful effort to obtain funds from the Kansas legislature and 
governor for a mine-rescue station in Pittsburg, Kansas. When George 
Rice strongly objected to these bureau activities on the grounds that 
they militated against private systems, Manning could only reply: "It 
seems to me that the only way in which these stations can be organized 
and maintained is by law, until the operators have been educated and 
will give their support to the cause without duress." 77 
The mine-rescue cars and stations were the most public aspect of 
the bureau's work to contemporaries, and their importance was stressed 
by the bureau directors, but beyond these essentially educational ef-
forts, the bureau had other functions, practical and scientific, which 
deserve mention. In the practical realm, the bureau was a testing 
agency, essentially conducting two types of tests. First, it examined 
samples of coal dust and mine gas received from mining companies, 
providing technical data for company engineers and an occasional 
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recommendation if the dust proved particularly dangerous. Second, 
the bureau, having established noncompulsory standards for coal-
mining safety products, tested explosives, motors, switches, portable 
electric lamps, storage battery locomotives, mine-lamp cords, flash 
lamps, flame safety lamps, gas detectors, and coal-cutting apparatus 
to determine if particular products conformed to its standards. The 
bureau also contributed to future coal-mining safety through scientific 
investigations. Particularly consequential were its ventures into rock-
dusting and its investigations of explosives, the latter continued from 
the Technologic Branch.78 
The bureau was aided in its work by effective internal administration 
--characterized by efficient organization and a high level of staff con-
tinuity and employee morale-and by a network of cooperative re-
lationships with public and private organizations outside the bureau. 
Although a number of these cooperative relationships were productive 
of little more than administrative friction, others were important to the 
coal-mining safety effort. As a group, they are indicative of Holmes's 
and Manning's attempts to employ all available resources in the safety 
movement and of the bureau's need to compensate for its statutory 
deficiencies. 
The Bureau of Mines was organized around five divisions: Admin-
istrative, Mining, Mechanical, Chemical, and Mineral Technology. 
Head of the Administrative Division was Holmes, with his assistant 
director Van H. Manning. Head of the Mining Division, under which 
most of the mine-accident work was done, was George S. Rice, chief 
mining engineer. Explosives and mine gases were analyzed in the 
Chemical Division, supervised by chief chemist G. A. Hulett. Coal-dust 
explosion investigations were carried on at the bureau's Pittsburgh 
Station under the direction (through most of the period) of H. M. 
Wilson. Wilson's efforts and the mine-rescue and first-aid work of 
J. W. Paul (until 1915) came under Rice and constituted the major 
portion of the activities of the Mining Division. There were a few ef-
forts to change the structure of the bureau. A 1915 report suggested 
reorganization according to mineral products (i.e., coal-mining di-
vision, metal-mining division), but it was vetoed by Rice, who claimed 
the result would be inefficient, since there were so many similarities 
between coal mining and metal mining in terms of gases, ventilation, 
timbering, and explosives. Rice also objected to a suggestion made in 
another report by chief chemist F. G. Cottrell (later, briefly director 
of the bureau), that all the safety work of the bureau be handled by 
one man designated as safety engineer. Perhaps Rice resisted the pro-
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posal because it would have meant an increase in the influence of 
H. M. Wilson and a decrease in his own responsibilities. Whatever 
the reason, the bureau was not reorganized internally either by mineral 
or by problem (e.g., safety), and it does not appear to have suffered 
for maintaining its original organization. 79 
Holmes, and later Manning, maintained close supervision of the 
various bureau divisions, and perhaps this personal approach was re-
sponsible for what Cottrell termed "the rather striking spirit of per-
sonal loyalty throughout the Bureau." 80 Bureau records reveal only one 
major conflict between bureau personnel in the ten years after 1910, 
and that was handled effectively by Holmes. 81 The small turnover in 
high bureau positions is also indicative of the harmony produced by 
Holmes's leadership. Manning and Rice, for example, were with the 
bureau until at least 1920; the ambitious H. M. Wilson stayed until 
1915; F. G. Cottrell and 0. P. Hood joined the bureau in 1912 and 
remained through 1920. 
Of the cooperative relationships, those of a legal nature were en-
tirely with state agencies. In 1914 the bureau entered into an agree-
ment with the Utah Industrial Commission whereby the two parties 
jointly employed a mining engineer and Utah furnished clerical assis-
tance, office space, supplies, and assistants. Not until 1919, however, 
did this cooperative agreement involve coal-mining safety investiga-
tions. By then bureau cooperative agreements with states and state 
institutions numbered eighteen, most of them with universities. Eight 
of these dealt with mine safety, and three-Utah, Colorado, and Illi-
nois agreements-made provision for coal-mining safety work of 
some kind. One-an agreement between the bureau and the Colorado 
School of Mines to sponsor a Holmes Chair of Safety and Efficiency 
Engineering-was one of many tributes to the bureau's first perma-
nent director.82 The most potentially significant of the legal state-
bureau agreements was that with the Illinois State Geological Survey 
and the Mining Engineering Department of the University of Illinois. 
Initiated under the Technologic Branch of the survey to provide a com-
prehensive examination of coal-mining conditions in Illinois in regard 
to waste and safety, in 1914 the bureau allocated $7,800 and Illinois 
state $9,500 to this work. Although this particular agreement was re-
newed in regular three-year periods throughout the decade, there was 
general disappointment on the part of participants with its accom-
plishments and its direction. Illinois's objections centered on the ten-
dency of the cooperative project to overemphasize conservation and 
efficiency at the expense of safety. George Rice saw few of the investi-
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gations under this cooperative agreement as productive, and Manning 
was also dissatisfied. 88 
Unlike its attitude toward relationships with the states, the bureau 
tended to be suspicious of the safety work of other government agen-
cies. 84 With the exception of its agreement with the Public Health 
Service and its willingness to cooperate with other governmental agen-
cies in national safety expositions, bureau prerogatives in the safety 
area were carefully upheld. While the origin of this defensive attitude 
is not clear, in 1913 the problem became acute, at least to bureau per-
sonnel, when a rather minor matter created a large disturbance. At 
that time the United States Weather Bureau, without consulting the 
Bureau of Mines and operating under the assumption that the mine 
operators in a Pennsylvania region should be informed of sudden 
changes in barometric pressure in order to prevent dust explosions, 
began sending out "miners' forecasts." Enraged, Holmes wrote to the 
chief of the Weather Bureau: "If ... this is a general policy entered 
into by the Weather Bureau in all coal mining States, it is simply a 
more emphatic illustration of an unfortunate practice in parts of Gov-
ernment work, of each bureau proceeding with plans of its own with-
out exhibiting any spirit of cooperation with other bureaus interested 
in or conducting kindred investigations." 85 The Weather Bureau even-
tually stopped issuing the forecasts, but as late as 1916 one bureau 
official recalled the incident and used it as a warning "against getting 
mixed up in any way with other Government bureaus or depart-
ments."86 
The threat of a possible new government agency, rather than the 
actions of an existing one, provided an even greater challenge for the 
bureau. Here the chain of events began in 1913, when the first bill 
calling for the creation of a bureau of labor safety was introduced in 
the House of Representatives. The idea was to coordinate the govern-
ment's safety work under one bureau and move it to the Department 
of Labor. Holmes's reaction was predictable. The Lewis bill, he tele-
grammed Robert N. Page of the House, "will cripple the work the 
Bureau Mines by taking away all its safety work." 87 "This sort of 
duplication," Holmes wrote to Foster, "is at the present time the 
curse of the Government service; and there are several bureaus in the 
Government service that are pushing their work with an absolute dis-
regard as to whether or not the field is already occupied by other 
bureaus." 88 In 1914 Holmes was successful in attaching to the relevant 
bills for a bureau of labor safety an amendment protecting the safety 
work of the Bureau of Mines from transfer to any new bureau, and in 
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1916, when the subject again threatened the Bureau of Mines, Mann-
ing secured the defeat of another bill through mobilization of coal and 
metal mine operators, the United Mine Workers, state geologists, and 
other interested parties. 89 
More important to the bureau's coal-mining safety program than 
cooperative relationships with other federal agencies were those with 
private organizations, though present here, too, were problems of 
jurisdiction. The process by which such relationships evolved is clearly 
illustrated in the case of the National Fire Protection Association 
(NFPA). Correspondence between the NFPA and the bureau was initi-
ated as early as 19I1, the year H. M. Wilson of the bureau addressed 
the NFPA annual convention on the subject of mine fires. During 1912 
R. Y. Williams, engineer in charge of bureau work at Urbana, Illinois, 
developed a plan for cooperative investigations between the bureau 
and the NFPA. George S. Rice, for one, was suspicious: "I hesitate to 
express my opinion," he wrote to H. M. Wilson, "not knowing what 
led up to it, and to what extent the Bureau might or might not be limited 
or hampered in its work, or on the other hand, assisted." 90 At the time 
of the May 1912 annual meeting of the NFPA, a Committee on Mine 
Fires was in existence, including Wilson and Williams in its member-
ship. The committee report for that year was essentially an attempt to 
delineate the respective functions of the Bureau of Mines and the NFPA 
as they concerned prevention of mine fires; the committee decided, 
for example, that while the bureau should collect, tabulate, and pub-
lish statistical data on mine accidents, the NFP A should make rec-
ommendations as to the nature of the inquiry and the type of data 
desired. The bureau was assigned fire-fighting methods, the committee 
was to consider the size and construction of water pipes and the rela-
tive efficiency of various pumps, nozzles, and fire extinguishers. In 
later years, the NFP A published a newsletter in which the public was 
informed of bureau publications relating to mine-fire prevention.91 
The NFPA was a fire-safety organization. One small facet of its busi-
ness was mine fires, and only in that one area did it come into contact 
with the Bureau of Mines. As an organization of mining engineers, the 
American Institute of Mining Engineers was concerned with almost 
every technical facet of mine safety, and its relationship to the bureau 
was correspondingly more broad, complex, and, ultimately, more dis-
appointing than was that of the NFPA. Cooperation began in 1913, 
when Holmes, in response to the request of AIME's president, Charles 
F. Rand, provided the institute with a list of possible members for a 
proposed Institute Committee on Coal and Coke. Soon the mine-
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safety functions of this committee were transferred to special Advisory 
Committees on Mine Explosions, Mine Supports, Mine Ventilation, 
Mine Fires, and Explosives, which were staffed by the AIME at the re-
quest of the bureau sometime in I9I4. Optimistic about the setup but 
concerned about the small number of coal-mining men on important 
AIME committees, Holmes pressed the knowledgeable H. M. Chance 
into service on the AIME Committee on Mine Explosions, an area in 
which he was anxious to get the benefit of disinterested outside criti-
cism.92 The chairman of each advisory committee was also the chair-
man of a subcommittee to facilitate cooperation with the bureau. 
Holmes anticipated that the advisory committees would submit reports 
on their work to the bureau for possible publication. Nothing came of 
these plans. Spread throughout the country, committee members 
could seldom meet personally. When Manning took over for Holmes 
in I 9 I 5 he wrote to William L. Saunders, president of the AIME: "I 
am frank to say that the Bureau of Mines has not, since these com-
mittees were appointed a year ago, called upon them for advice and 
assistance; but this is a condition which, with your help, I propose to 
remedy in the future." 93 Manning was no more successful than 
Holmes, and in March 19I6 Rice sent Manning a memorandum which 
opened with this evaluation of the AIME advisory committees: "As far 
as I know these committees have never taken any action." Rice felt 
that the situation could be improved if each committee were to have as 
secretary someone who was a member of both the AIME and the bureau, 
but there is no indication that Rice had any success in making these 
committees workable by the end of the decade. 94 
The attempt at cooperation with the American Institute of Electri-
cal Engineers (AlEE) on the problem of electricity in mining was 
equally unproductive. Holmes had first suggested a three-way coopera-
tive mechanism (bureau, AlEE, and AIME) for electricity in mining in 
early I9I4. Everyone seemed to agree on the concept, but a year later 
no cooperation had been initiated and there had been no joint meet-
ings. Three years after the original attempts to cooperate, Manning was 
still looking for such a relationship and was not even aware that the 
AlEE had a Committee on Electricity in Mining, even though its chair-
man was a bureau employee. 95 
Frustrating in a different way were the bureau's cooperative rela-
tionships with organizations in the testing field. Here the bureau had 
traditionally done its own work, as in the testing of explosives and 
motors. The American Society for Testing Materials maintained a 
committee (including several bureau officials) which advised the bu-
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reau on testing procedures. In 1914, however, the National Council 
for Industrial Safety, a major safety organization with a mine-safety 
section, said products, to meet its standards, would be sent for testing 
to either the bureau or Underwriters' Laboratories, a private testing 
organization. Holmes considered this to be unnecessary duplication 
and "likely to develop conflicting results and other unnecessary com-
plications."96 Within six months the problem had been solved to the 
bureau's satisfaction: a few products, most of them in the line of fire 
prevention, would be tested by Underwriters' Laboratories, which 
would include in its permissible lists all those devices which the bureau 
had tested; all other products would be tested by the bureau, which 
would publish a comprehensive list of all approved mining products, 
no matter where the testing took place and which would, in effect, pass 
on all tests made anywhere in the country on mine products. Difficul-
ties were overcome with relative ease in this cooperative area. 97 
Unique for its cooperative relationships was the mine-rescue and 
first-aid field, where federal, state, and private agencies joined with 
the Bureau of Mines to develop what by the end of the decade was 
a good system. The Illinois Mine Rescue Station Commission, estab-
lished in 1910 following the Cherry disaster, consisted of representa-
tives from the bureau and the Department of Mining of the University 
of Illinois, as well as state mine inspectors, coal miners, and mine op-
erators. When, in 1915, a statewide Illinois Mine Safety Association 
was created through the work of W. D. Ryan, the bureau was repre-
sented along with operators, miners, and the rescue commission. 98 An 
effective rescue and first-aid program also required cooperative rela-
tionships with private organizations and federal agencies. The federal 
Public Health Service provided medical and surgical employees for 
the mine-rescue cars operated by the bureau, and through the Inter-
state Commerce Commission the cars had free access to the rails. A 
private organization, the American Red Cross, in addition to its regu-
lar sponsorship of first-aid and rescue meets, in 1913 created a sub-
committee on mines as part of its National First Aid Committee. Under 
the chairmanship of Van H. Manning, the subcommittee served as 
liaison to the bureau. The American Medical Association (AMA), the 
first organization to suggest that each bureau rescue car carry a sur-
geon, was particularly important for its work on the problem of resus-
citation of persons overcome by mine gases. The bureau and the AMA 
made separate inquiries into this subject and in 1912 a cooperative 
Committee on Resuscitation was formed at the urging of Holmes, who 
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valued the opinions and counsel of the AMA and cultivated a close re-
lationship with the organization. 99 
The mine-rescue and first-aid arena was also the fertile ground in 
which the first national organization devoted solely to mine safety-
the American Mine Safety Association ( AMSA )-took root. The AMSA 
grew out of the first National Mine Rescue and First Aid Conference, 
called by Holmes and attended, in September 1912, by operators, 
miners, surgeons, inspectors, and heads of safety and inspection de-
partments. According to its constitution and in practice, the AMSA was 
aimed almost entirely at the mine-rescue and first-aid field, its stand-
ing committees including Rescue Apparatus, Rescue Operations, First 
Aid Methods, First Aid Training and Contests, and Hospitals and 
Training Stations. Perhaps the most time-consuming of all its activities 
was the sponsorship of first-aid and rescue contests in all parts of the 
nation, usually in conjunction with organizations like the Kentucky 
State Mining Institute, the YMCA, the National Conservation Expo-
sition, the American Red Cross, and the Appalachian Coal Operators' 
Association. Membership in the organization was open to individuals 
and organizations of all kinds, but coal operators dominated its pro-
ceedings. 100 
In spite of its relatively short, three-year duration, the AMSA's re-
lationship to the bureau was particularly close. This was partly due to 
Holmes's interest in rescue work and first aid, but more importantly 
to H. M. Wilson, concurrently the first chairman of the AMSA and 
the engineer in charge of the bureau's Experiment Station in Pitts-
burgh. Wilson's dual position made cooperation with the bureau par-
ticularly easy and pr~ductive and was the beginning of his emergence 
as a figure of some stature in the mine-safety movement.101 
While the bureau and the United Mine Workers coexisted comfort-
ably, efforts to institutionalize an informal consulting relationship were 
not very fruitful. One attempt took place at Holmes's initiative in 
1912; another grew out of a meeting of federal officials and union 
leaders in January 1914, called by Franklin Lane, interior secretary, 
and designed to provide discussion of ways to improve safety condi-
tions in coal mines and of "what more active part the miners can be 
induced to take in this movement." This effort, too, was apparently 
unsatisfactory, for in 1917 another advisory committee was created, 
this time at the urging of W. D. Ryan, who had managed to convince 
the Executive Board of the UMW A of the need for a new commitment 
to cooperation. 102 
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"I have fought persistently, and I trust successfully," Holmes wrote 
in late 1914 to one of the bureau's most persistent critics, "to keep 
the work of the Bureau of Mines entirely free from the influence of 
politics and all kinds of organizations." 103 Exactly what Holmes meant 
by this remark is not clear. Certainly he and Manning succeeded in 
preventing the bureau from becoming so closely tied to labor or man-
agement as to lose its credibility; the bureau had lost no powers to a 
bureau of labor safety; and it had continued to function as an objective 
scientific agency. In another sense, however, the essence of the Bureau 
of Mines in its first decade was political. Holmes and Manning went 
naturally to the political well to obtain for their bureau a broader grant 
of authority and funds for new and old bureau projects. In this process, 
the cause of coal-mining safety was promoted only indirectly, as the 
strength of the bureau grew; the new act of 1913 was both a reflection 
and a foreshadowing of the new energies and directions of the bureau 
in metal-mining safety, precious metal investigations, and conserva-
tion, and most of the funds appropriated under the 1915 Kern-Foster 
legislation went to the We~t and the metal mines, not to the coal mines. 
Bureau chiefs took the possibility of a bureau of labor safety as a 
serious political challenge, which it was. And in all these struggles, the 
bureau depended on the political support and influence of its friends 
on the outside-the United Mine Workers, the Association of State 
Geologists, the American Mining Congress, and the influential coal-
mine operators. At times this support was purchased in the most ele-
mental ways-by promising specific benefits in return for votes. 
The ideal bureau, according to Hunter Dupree, although it might 
begin as a research institution, soon branches into two directions, 
on the one hand furnishing routine services related to its problem and, 
on the other, becoming involved in regulation. In its first decade the 
bureau fulfilled only the first of these ideal characteristics, obtaining 
regulatory powers only fleetingly during the World War and then in 
an area basically divorced from coal-mining safety or even mining 
safety. The lack of regulatory powers turned the bureau into an educa-
tional institution dependent on its ability to influence operators, min-
ers, and others who could take action to promote safety.104 
Another consequence of this powerless condition was the develop-
ment by the bureau of a series of cooperative relationships, formal and 
informal, with state and federal governmental bodies and private or-
ganizations. With some exceptions these relationships were fruitful, 
not only in extending the political base of the bureau but in spreading 
the gospel of mine safety. These cooperative relationships also exem-
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plify a broad principle governing the bureau's work in coal-mining 
safety during these years: the emphasis, almost without exception, 
was on process rather than content, on communication of knowledge 
rather than knowledge itself, and on communicating solutions to prob-
lems rather than problem solving in a scientific way. The bureau's re-
search was primary only in the sense that it had to come first; it was 
secondary in the sense that all the bureau's scientific investigations 
were meaningless unless miners, operators, inspectors, engineers, fore-
men, and the states acted upon them. Thus this period of ferment in 
education was also one in which the bureau was intensely conscious 
of the importance of effective communication and the methods by 
which it could be facilitated. This emphasis had its parallel in the 
bureaucracy, for Manning was not a scientist and Holmes was not a 
great one. Both were administrators and facilitators, and Holmes, 
particularly, was nothing less than a bureaucratic entrepreneur. 
CHAPTER 
3 
Legislation and Enforcement 
in the States 
CoAL-MINING SAFETY seemed to fit neatly into the American 
constitutional system. State courts and the United States Supreme 
Court had recognized early that health and safety were proper func-
tions of the state police power, and most of the coal-producing states 
enacted some kind of coal-mining safety legislation in the 1870s. Ma-
jor revisions took place in the I88os in Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
and West Virginia. Legislative activity slowed considerably in the 
1890s, perhaps because of the depression; of the major coal-mining 
states, only Pennsylvania undertook a major revision of its laws in 
that decade. As of I900, Pennsylvania and Illinois had detailed coal-
mining statutes, generally recognized as the best in the nation. West 
Virginia's code was vague and brief, the worst of the lot, while Ohio's 
statutes occupied a middle ground. Before 1900, when explosions and 
disasters had threatened this comfortable legislative edifice, the states 
had responded with additional legislation and new enforcement mea-
sures. As mine-safety problems worsened during the first decade of 
the twentieth century, the basic solution appeared to remain the same: 
the states continued to shoulder the burden, considerably modernizing 
their legislation from 1905 through 1915. An emphasis on continuity, 
however, masks important changes in approach. In several states, the 
political decision-making structure was modified. Whereas nineteenth-
century coal-mining safety laws had been the product of an operator-
miner struggle within the legislature, twentieth-century legislation was 
usually developed by a commission of operators, miners, and other 
officials. Only when the interest groups agreed was the legislation 
transmitted to the regular political channels. More important, the Pro-
gressive years were witness to an attempt to nationalize the federal 
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system, first through the Bureau of Mines, which was designed, in part, 
to bring rationality and uniformity to state legislation, and then 
through a related campaign for uniform state coal-mining safety legis-
lation. Ultimately this effort to upgrade state safety legislation without 
essentially modifying the federal system proved a dismal failure, and 
had it succeeded, there is some doubt that the expected additions to 
state safety codes would have had much impact on mining safety. The 
obstacles to full enforcement were substantial. 
As of r 900, the peculiar West Virginia combination of powerful 
operators and virtually nonexistent unions had left the state with a 
rudimentary mine-safety law, consisting largely of provisions too basic 
to be omitted. Operators were required to provide maps of their mines, 
but no provision was made for securing maps if operators failed to 
furnish them voluntarily. They were to furnish a minimum amount 
of air per minute per person working in the mine, but the law con-
tained few instructions on how to get that air efficiently to the miners 
below. Operators had to employ fire bosses and water coal dust only 
if a mine generated gas in dangerous quantities. West Virginia law re-
quired each operator to employ a mining boss (foreman), but his 
legal responsibility was not clear and his duties were defined impre-
cisely. He was, for example, required to "examine every working place 
in the mine as often as practicable," a provision so vague as to allow 
him to establish his own priorities, even if they were inconsistent with 
safety.1 "West Virginia," wrote the United Mine Workers Journal fol-
lowing the March 1900 Red Ash explosion, "is noted in the mining 
world for her insufficiency of proper laws for the insurance and pro-
tection of her miners." 2 
This evaluation had little impact among West Virginia lawmakers, 
who consistently frustrated efforts to improve the law. Led by Gover-
nor G. W. Atkinson ("it is but the natural course of mining events 
that men should be injured and killed by accidents"),3 state senators 
and representatives defeated a bill which would have made the mine 
boss the agent of the operator, thereby shifting legal responsibility; 
another bill which would have provided for examination of state in-
spectors, mine managers, mine examiners, and hoisting engineers; a 
third bill which would have made neglectful operators guilty of a 
felony and subject to large fines; and a fourth calling for a license tax 
on the mining of coal, partial proceeds to be used for inspection ser-
vices and miners' hospitals.4 This negativism is understandable in 
light of a general hostility to legislation among coal operators and, 
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more surprisingly, West Virginia inspectors. In I900 West Virginia 
operators were surveyed with regard to their views on legislation. Of 
I I 8 operators reporting, only thirteen recommended more legislation, 
and fifty-two were "adverse to legislation." Of the thirteen favorable 
respondents, not one suggested changes in ventilation requirements. 
Operators favored state examination of mine bosses and fire bosses by 
a two-to-one margin, but for some reason this did not come within 
their definition of "legislation."5 
Led by chief inspector James Paul, West Virginia inspectors even 
opposed technical examinations for mine and fire bosses. Paul sug-
gested that such examinations would make it impossible for miners 
to fill the positions; District I inspector I. M. Kelley raised the expert 
bugaboo, charging that under a similar Pennsylvania law, bosses "are 
more competent to explain why a certain accident happens than to 
foresee and prevent the accident." 6 Although Kelley, Paul, and other 
inspectors made occasional suggestions for new legislation in their re-
ports, until about I905 they were generally satisfied with the West 
Virginia legal code and convinced that the major mine-safety problem 
lay with the miners. Referring to the reluctance of miners to get out 
from under dangerous roofs, Paul noted: "Such accidents are little 
short of deliberate suicide. No legislation can reach such cases as 
this." 7 
By I905 sentiment was building toward a major revision of the 
law. Responding to a series of relatively small mine disasters in West 
Virginia and the I906 Courrieres explosion, Paul dropped his opposi-
tion to legislation and took an activist role. To counter the problem 
of miner inexperience, he was now ready to request legislation pro-
viding for state examination of mine and fire bosses. In addition, he 
called for employment of shot-firers and more inspectors and requested 
that inspectors be given authority to close a mine operating outside 
the law and to require use of safety lamps in dangerous mines. Recog-
nizing the difficulty of developing legislation satisfactory to both op-
erators and miners "since the parties concerned desire absolvence from 
any responsibility," Paul asked the governor to appoint a commission 
of expert mine men-operators and miners-to review conditions and 
draft a bill for presentation to the legislature.8 The governor took his 
suggestion sometime in I906, and the result was the passage in Febru-
ary I907 of a substantial revision of West Virginia's mine-safety laws, 
unfortunately weakened by the elimination of several amendments. 
The new law brought some precision to the duties of mine manage-
ment. The mine foreman or his assistant was now charged with in-
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structing inexperienced miners until they were familiar with dangers, 
and with measuring air currents twice each month at inlet and outlet. 
In another provision designed to deal with the problems of inexperience 
and carelessness, the mine foreman or assistant was required to visit 
and examine every working place in the mine at least every other day. 
The act contained a weak statement requiring watering and prevention 
of dust accumulations "as far as practicable," required that the mine 
should be worked exclusively by locked safety lamps when explosive 
gas was present in dangerous quantities, and increased ventilation re-
quirements. Although the district inspectors could not close mines on 
their own authority, they could now appeal to the chief inspector to 
do so, and they could now also demand that more air be pumped into 
a mine.9 Interestingly, the idea of examination for mine employees, 
popular with operators and advocated by the chief inspector, was in 
the Mining Commission Report but was not included in the final leg-
islation. A provision authorizing the district mine inspector to "pre-
scribe the condition under which such solid shooting may be done" 
was an improvement in the old law but considerably weaker than the 
bill's original provision virtually prohibiting shooting off the solid. 
Amendments to restrict shot-firing were also soundly defeated.10 
Less than a month before this legislation was passed, an explosion 
at Stuart, West Virginia, killed eighty-four men, and another at Thom-
as, West Virginia, killed twenty-five. On February 4, 1907, two days 
after the Thomas explosion, the House and Senate passed a Joint 
Resolution providing for a legislative committee to investigate both 
the Stuart mine disaster and the state Bureau of Mine Inspection and 
to determine what measures might be taken to prevent future disasters 
and to insure more stringent enforcement of the mining laws. In a 
message requesting the investigation, Governor William M. 0. Daw-
son cited certain illegal characteristics of the Stuart operation in Fayette 
County and stressed the possibility that the Bureau of Mine Inspec-
tion might have been "inefficient or derelict in its duty." 11 The com-
mittee spent well over a year investigating mine safety in West 
Virginia. It made six trips to different parts of the state, securing testi-
mony on the Thomas, Whipples, Stuart, and Monongah mine explo-
sions. The absence of a completed report placed Dawson in a difficult 
position in early 1908. Monongah and other disasters, said the gover-
nor in his annual message, had given this state "a bad eminence in this 
regard." Without the committee's report he felt "some embarrassment 
in referring to additional legislation" but suggested that shooting off 
the solid might be prohibited and mine officials certified. To complete 
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the picture of confusion, he offered the hackneyed suggestion that en-
forcement of existing law, rather than new law, was the real need. Al-
though he had not yet received the report of the joint investigative 
committee, Dawson was already setting up a barrier against new leg-
islation. "Any unreasonable burden placed upon our coal industry," 
he said, "would result in shutting down our mines or a part of them, 
or reduce the wages of miners and other workmen." 12 In the mean-
time, Paul was pursuing his new activist posture. To the extra session 
of the I908 legislature he presented a list of sixty-three proposed 
amendments to the mining law, including a number which would 
have increased the enforcement powers of the inspectors. Paul's dis-
trict inspectors were also becoming increasingly aggressive in their 
demands for additional legislation. 
With the publication of the report of the investigative committee, 
this series of events rapidly came to a conclusion. The committee had 
appropriately focused on the explosion problem and the coal-dust 
phenomenon. It had arrived at the reasonable conclusion that a major 
cause of explosions was the ignition of coal dust by blown-out shots, 
the latter the result of excessive amounts of solid-shooting by miners. 
At this point, however, the committee lost touch with the issue. In-
stead of suggesting any number of possible remedies, as Pennsylvania 
and Ohio inspectors had done after similar investigations at Monon-
gah, the committee decided that new legislation was no answer. "These 
evils," read the final report, "cannot be corrected by statutory law but 
must be accomplished by and through the vigilance of those who are 
in charge of the work, aided by that earnest and practical training 
which will fully impress upon the mind of each and every individual 
working therein the danger to his own life as well as the lives of those 
associated with him." 13 One member of the committee asked to have 
his name withdrawn from the final report. A convention of Subdistrict 
I of District I7 of the United Mine Workers, at Charleston, called the 
report a whitewash and condemned the committee for not allowing 
a minority version.14 The result, however, was predictable. Buoyed by 
operators who wanted no additional legislation, the West Virginia 
legislature rejected every mine-safety law proposed in I908 and passed 
no major piece of safety legislation for the next seven years. In con-
trast, it is worth noting that the West Virginia House and Senate over-
whelmingly approved resolutions calling for a national bureau of 
mines.15 
The I 9 I 5 legislation brought some substantial improvements, many 
of them long overdue. Six years after the Cherry mine fire had raised 
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the issue in sharp relief, West Virginia had its first provisions for pre-
venting mine fires in underground stables; the articles dealing with 
electricity and machinery were similarly late. Emphasis on shot-firing 
had produced a new requirement that no shots could be fired in any 
working place known to liberate explosive gas until some competent 
person had examined the area, but the law still contained no adequate 
restrictions on solid-shooting and the miners, rather than professionals, 
were still doing the shooting. Ten years after the chief inspector had 
suggested such a reform, foremen and fire bosses were required to 
pass state examinations and receive state certification. 16 Perhaps more 
interesting than the provisions of the I9ISlegislation are developments 
that occurred in the administrative structure of mine safety in the 
years between the passage of the two major acts. Frustrated by the 
absence of legislation, chief inspector John Laing began to issue ad-
ministrative regulations having, in his opinion, the force of law. Laing 
chose this method to deal with the problem of coal dust, insisting upon 
use of shot-firers and permissible explosives in unwatered dusty mines. 
In an even bolder move, Laing went beyond statutory requirements 
and administered departmental examinations for foremen and fire 
bosses. Denied the sanction of legislation, the West Virginia Depart-
ment of Mines had opened up an important new area of regulation.17 
In 1900 Ohio had the vaguest safety legislation of the major coal-
mining states. Nearly all its major provisions dated to the 188os. Dis-
trict inspectors were required to examine all mines "as often as 
possible"; ventilation requirements were minimal. The state's regula-
tions with regard to machinery, hoisting, and haulage were uniquely 
lacking in precision and detail. The law did, however, contain several 
redemptive features. It obliged the inspector to initiate prosecution 
when operators failed to correct deficiencies, and it gave the inspector 
leeway to go beyond the statutes and define additional dangerous con-
ditions for himself. Where West Virginia law had given the coroner 
the option of holding an inquest into the causes of mine deaths, Ohio 
required the coroner to do so. Finally, Ohio law, in contrast to West 
Virginia's, contained several provisions which were protective of the 
rights of mine labor. One section maintained the right of legal action 
for those injured through violation of the safety laws or for relatives 
of those who died; another contained elaborate procedures for re-
moving incompetent inspectors from office; and a third, the most un-
usual, sanctioned the right of employed miners to appoint two of 
their number to inspect the mine once each month.18 
For some time, Ohio legislators showed no interest in bringing the 
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state's safety legislation up to reasonable standards. A bill to improve 
mine ventilation was passed only by the state House of Representa-
tives; another which would have required shot-firers and fined opera-
tors who refused to furnish them received approval only in the Senate. 
Bills for the taxation of coal operations, for the regulation of explo-
sives and blasting, and for upgrading legislation on mine machinery 
and appliances, never emerged from committee. George Harrison, the 
state's articulate and active chief inspector, recommended revisions in 
1905, following his first year in office, but the legislature ignored his 
pleas that the state put something on the books to deal with electricity. 
"The Mining Laws of Ohio," noted Harrison in a 1906 letter to dis-
trict mine inspectors, "are so mild and far from covering the condi-
tions of mining at the present time, that it is certainly no hardship for 
operators to comply with them." 19 
Although Ohio was completely unlike West Virginia in that the 
state had not suffered a major disaster (five or more dead), revival of 
interest in safety legislation came roughly at the same time in both 
states. In 1906 Harrison obtained the assistance of Governor Myron 
T. Herrick and, in spite of determined opposition from operators be-
fore the Senate Committee on Mines and Mining, secured two pieces 
of legislation of some importance, given existing Ohio law. One called 
for watering and removal of coal dust, charged the inspector with in-
suring that dust did not collect, and provided fairly heavy fines for op-
erator failure to comply. The second, a miner competency act, required 
a prospective miner either to produce evidence that he had worked 
one year as, or with, a practical coal miner, or to be accompanied in 
his work by a competent coal miner. 20 Disturbed by the failure of the 
legislature to act on other basic matters such as electricity, explosives, 
and solid-shooting, in April 1907 Harrison, like his counterpart in 
West Virginia, turned to administrative law and issued a series of 
safety regulations. "This notice," said Harrison, "was issued in the 
utter absence and lack of power authorized by the present mining laws 
which have long been in existence, and which utterly fail to cover 
many of the dangers." The regulations covered blasting and electricity 
and required operators to employ fire bosses in all mines generating 
explosive gas. A year later the electricity and explosives regulations 
were codified and a requirement that each mine be inspected every 
three months was added to state laws.21 
The explosions of 1907, particularly at the Monongah mines in 
West Virginia and the Darr mines at Jacobs Creek, Pennsylvania, im-
parted a new momentum to the Ohio safety movement. Implementing 
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a suggestion made by Harrison almost four years earlier, in March 
1908 the legislature, with the strong support of state operators, created 
a commission consisting of three practical miners, three operators, and 
one other person (ultimately Harrison), to investigate safety condi-
tions and make recommendations for changes in the mine law. The 
commission visited over thirty mines and met with Joseph A. Holmes 
of the Geological Survey and the team of European experts which 
Holmes had imported. Because of the dated nature of so much of 
Ohio safety law, the commission decided to draft an entirely new code 
which, if enacted, would repeal all existing legislation. After eighteen 
months of deliberation, the commission submitted its report to Gov-
ernor Judson Harmon. In a special message to the legislature which 
clearly revealed the influence of the recent mine fire at Cherry, Illinois, 
Harmon transmitted the commission's recommendations to a recep-
tive legislature. They became law without a change and without a 
single dissenting voice or vote in House or Senate.22 
For the time, the new Ohio legislation was strong. New ventilation 
requirements brought the state to parity with Illinois and Pennsylvania. 
Although operators could still use the inherently dangerous furnace 
for ventilation, they could no longer employ air shafts with bottom 
furnaces as a means of ingress or egress. Another section reflecting 
the Cherry mine fire regulated underground stables and livestock, and 
the act contained precise provisions for signaling, haulage, and elec-
tricity. In one important area, the commission differentiated Ohio law 
from that of other states-Ohio's law was the best of the major coal-
mining states in providing supervision and training for inexperienced 
miners. Not only was the foreman to visit each working place at least 
once every other day (with authority to order work stoppage), but 
the law also called for an "overseer," a kind of foreman for the in-
experienced. Until the inexperienced operative had been in the mine 
three months, the overseer was required to visit his working place at 
least once every four hours; from three to six months, once every six 
hours; and from six to nine months, at least once a day. The new legis-
lation also attempted legislative supervision of miners by providing 
instructions for mining and shooting the coal.23 
Some weaknesses in the new Ohio law were evident at once. A dis-
trict inspector pointed out that the new mining code did not deal ade-
quately with the increasingly serious problem of shooting off the solid. 
Another, while admitting the progressive nature of much of the Ohio 
legislation, suggested that in several areas, including the certification 
of foremen and fire bosses, "it has been content to remain passive." 24 
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A governor-appointed Ohio Coal Mining Commission in 1913 added 
its concern that a change to the mine-run system of payment, then un-
der consideration, would increase fatalities from falls of roof and coal. 
Though the commission advocated mine-run for reasons of conserva-
tion, it balanced this suggestion with a number of safety recommenda-
tions. It called for legislation requiring that every company employing 
more than thirty-five men at the working face employ a safety foreman 
to fire the shots or supervise their firing. In its strongest statement, it 
recommended that solid-shooting be forbidden by law except in those 
mines where it was absolutely essential. The commission rejected ex-
aminations for miners but favored them for those in positions of re-
sponsibility. Finally, the commission recommended that coal-mining 
safety functions be placed under a regulatory commission with dis-
cretionary authority.25 
These proposals were welcomed by the miners of the state but met 
an unfavorable reception at the hands of operators. High costs, al-
ways at issue when legislation calling for new personnel was involved, 
were a major factor in operator opposition. Colliery Engineer, on the 
other hand, focused its attack on the proposed industrial commission, 
insisting that local conditions should determine mining regulations: 
"To substitute the opinion of a commission at Columbus for the facts 
shown by local conditions prevailing at the mine, is the height of ab-
surdity. The idea is a socialistic one evidently put forth for political 
purposes." This journal editorial argued that the employment of safety 
foremen would destroy discipline and opposed the pending solid-
shooting legislation because it entailed Industrial Commission discre-
tion.26 Operator objections proved largely futile. In 1914 mine safety 
was placed under the Industrial Commission of Ohio and specifically 
under the conscientious new safety commissioner of mines, J. M. Roan. 
Roan immediately prepared a list of mine-safety rules. The legislature 
also prohibited solid-shooting without a permit from the Industrial 
Commission, the law providing that permits could be issued only if 
solid-shooting were necessary for the "just and reasonably profitable 
operation of such mine," and as of February 1914, Ohio miners were 
being paid by the mine-run method. Operators succeeded only in pre-
venting passage of safety-foremen legislation.27 
With the possible exception of Pennsylvania, Illinois had the best 
mine-safety laws in the nation.28 By 1899 the state had provided for 
examination and certification of all mine officials, and in 1908 Illinois 
became the first state to extend certification to miners. Illinois's legis-
lation carefully defined the duties of mine personnel, though its in-
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structions for examination of the mine by the fire boss were the most 
backward of any major coal-mining state. Illinois was perhaps the 
only state to approach the problem of miner carelessness and inex-
perience through the avenue of formal education, providing in 19II 
for miners' and mechanics' institutes to instruct miners in the intrica-
cies of gas, dust, and other safety matters. This promising innovation 
was lost in 1915 when funds appropriated for the project were vetoed. 
The state's mine-fire regulations were also unique, a product of the 
I 909 Cherry fire. 
Illinois was unusual in that an inordinately large number of the 
legislative struggles over mine safety occurred over issues related 
to shot-firing, an outgrowth of the method employed in measuring 
miners' wages. After 1897, Illinois miners were paid on a mine-run 
basis; that is, they were paid for all the coal brought out of the mine, 
rather than for just those chunks that would not pass through a wire 
screen. When miners no longer had to preserve the coal in chunks, 
they stopped undermining the coal before shooting it and began to 
use more powder. Force replaced finesse at the working face. Opera-
tors and miners were soon poised on opposite sides of the question, the 
former favoring abolition of the mine-run system and legislation re-
quiring miners to undercut the coal, the latter insisting that opera-
tors employ shot-firers to work when men were out of the mine. The 
first in a series of decisions went to the miners in 1905, when the legis-
lature, responding to the Ziegler mine disaster of April 3 and acting 
at the close of a legislative session when operator representatives had 
left, passed a shot-firers bill. David Ross, the equivalent of a chief 
inspector in Illinois, was convinced that it was not enough to shift the 
firing function to professionals; he recommended divorcing miners 
completely from blasting and handling of powder. Although this sug-
gestion, which would have turned the average mine worker into a coal 
loader, was not acted upon, the legislature hardly dropped the matter. 
The basic shot-firing law was amended often and was complemented 
by several important pieces of legislation regulating the handling and 
the quality of explosives. 29 
The distinctive characteristics of Illinois law should not obscure the 
essential similarity to the reform process in other states. Reform took 
place within the same basic time frame, roughly 1905 to I9II, when 
Illinois's major omnibus bill became law. And here, as elsewhere, 
operators, represented in the Illinois Coal Operators' Association, and 
miners, through the United Mine Workers (rather than the Illinois 
State Federation of Labor), played predictable roles from which they 
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seldom strayed. Operators opposed safety legislation which would 
increase mining costs or restrict their control over the labor force; 
miners favored most safety legislation, choosing to oppose it only 
when it affected their paychecks. Such was the case in 1908, when 
the miners interpreted a mine-inspector proposal which would have 
prohibited solid-shooting under certain conditions as an attempt to 
increase work load without increasing worker compensation.30 Al-
though political compromise between the two contending groups could 
and did occur in all periods, until a formal mechanism for compromise 
was found, new legislation often left bitterness in its wake. That formal 
mechanism was the legislative commission, of which Illinois had two. 
The Joint Powder Commission contained representatives of operators 
and miners and functioned as a fact-finding board for dealing with 
blasting powders, an issue of particular complexity and sensitivity in 
Illinois. The Mining Investigation Commission, created under law in 
1909 largely at the urging of operators, was intended as an ultimate 
board of compromise for all coal-mining laws, including those dealing 
with powder. Its membership of three operators, three miners, and 
three nonpolitical independents was remarkably successful in balanc-
ing the disparate interests of operators and miners, profits and safety. 
Only once, in 1914, did the miners appear seriously interested in 
abrogating the commission arrangement and taking their case directly 
to the legislature.31 
In 1900 Pennsylvania mines were operating under 1893 safety 
legislation which, though exceedingly advanced for its time and pio-
neering in a number of areas, was rapidly becoming obsolete under 
turn-of-the-century mining conditions. Coal-trade journals had mixed 
opinions. Some were skeptical of the ability of new legislation to 
handle the problems ("The question may be asked-What's the use? 
We have had various laws.") ;32 others, indeed the majority, supported 
revisions in the mine-safety law.33 Led by its forceful and diligent chief, 
James Roderick, the Pennsylvania inspection service soon made its 
presence felt in the reform camp. Roderick regularly pointed out 
glaring deficiencies in the safety law. Years before West Virginia's 
inspection department became concerned about deaths from falls of 
roof and coal, he was advocating systematic regulations for roof prop-
ping. Among his early causes were reforms in the laws governing elec-
tricity, foreman supervision of miners, ventilation, responsibilities of 
superintendents, and solid-shooting.34 The chief inspector's activism 
carried into administrative regulation, where, as in West Virginia and 
Ohio, inadequacies in the written law were met by administrative dis-
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cretion. In 1907 discretion took the form of a list of department rules 
going beyond the statutes, but Roderick's greatest administrative 
triumph involved interpretation of existing law. The case began with 
the concern of Isaac G. Roby, inspector in the Connellsville coke 
region, where solid-shooting had become a regular practice because 
it was peculiarly suited to mining coking coal. Roby asked Roderick 
to interpret the 1893 legislation, which required that coal be "prop-
erly" undermined. Roderick stretched the provision to its limits, hold-
ing that proper undermining meant complete undermining; no shots 
could be drilled deeper than the undercuts. Neither operators nor 
miners liked the decision, and it was largely ignored. Rather than ac-
quiesce, Roderick clung to his interpretation of the law and, within 
two years, had convinced the Connellsville operators voluntarily to 
employ shot-firers to do the shooting when the men were out of the 
mine. "In the opinion of the Department," wrote Roderick, "no other 
single movement has been inaugurated within the history of the coking 
business that gives promise of such fruitful results in securing safety 
to the employes." 35 
The sequence of events that was to culminate in 19II in a major 
revision of Pennsylvania law began in 1907 when the state legislature, 
acting on one of Roderick's three-year-old suggestions, called on Gov-
ernor Edwin S. Stuart to appoint a five-man commission (two opera-
tors, two miners, and Roderick) to study the state's mining laws. 
Presented to the legislature in early 1909, the proposed code encoun-
tered opposition from two sources. As expected, operators emphasized 
the extent to which the new law would handicap the state in competi-
tive markets by increasing costs of production. While the commis-
sioners conceded that if adopted their report would "be a hardship to 
the operators' interests" and increase operating costs by one to five 
cents per ton, operators placed the cost increases at six to sixteen cents 
per ton. Appearing at hearings over the code, a representative of the 
Coke Producers Association of the Connellsville Coke Region said 
interstate competition would make it impossible to pass increased costs 
on to the consumer and that costs would instead be absorbed through 
wage cuts. Having reached this point, he concluded his statement with 
an appeal from William Jennings Bryan-"you shall not press down 
upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns" -that must have seemed 
quite out of character to the committee and bystanders.36 Operators 
also objected to provisions in the law which they felt would mean 
competency examinations for miners, and to others which placed too 
much authority in the hands of the mine foreman. "The only thing 
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left for the operator," said one representative of the Butler-Mercer 
field, "is to dig up enough money for the payroll and pay for the 
damages done under the supervision of the licensed men furnished by 
the state." 37 
Although the concerted opposition of operators at the House hear-
ings was probably enough to kill the bill, its fate was sealed when 
Francis Feehan, one of the commission's labor representatives, re-
fused to sign the final commission report because of two articles which 
he thought insufficient. Feehan wanted broader restrictions on the use 
of open lights and complete prohibition of the use of electricity in 
gaseous mines. Roderick, who had in other circumstances advocated 
this view of electricity, now saw Feehan and his supporters as a 
"radical" element which failed to appreciate the necessity for com-
promise. To the credit of the chief inspector, there is evidence that 
Feehan's stand was not representative of miner opinion. Patrick Gil-
day, authorized to speak for 37,000 miners in Pennsylvania's District 
2, faulted the bill for its "commercialism" and for its general inade-
quacy, but he pressed for its release from committee.38 
Following new discussions with operators and miners, much the 
same bill which in I909 failed to clear the House Committee on Mines 
and Mining was introduced into the next legislature in I 9 I I and passed 
with little discussion. For some reason, perhaps new legislation in 
Ohio and Illinois, Pennsylvania operators did not oppose the bill. 
Mines and Minerals speculated that there must have been some mis-
take or miscalculation: "a careful and critical analysis of the I9II 
Bituminous Mine Law of Pennsylvania cannot do otherwise than 
awaken a suspicion that the bituminous operators who sanctioned its 
passage did not fully realize to what extent the law would increase 
their cost of production." 39 The I9II law gave Pennsylvania the most 
detailed, and in many ways the best, mine-safety legislation in the 
nation. The articles on electricity, safety catches, hoisting machinery, 
openings, and motors were models of precision, designed, it would 
seem, to codify what might normally be administrative regulations. 
The law reflected Roderick's ongoing concern over explosions and 
his knowledge of European and American experiments on the coal-
dust phenomenon. In spite of his earlier hostility to a national bureau 
of mines on the grounds that "the persons in charge of the Bureau 
would unquestionably know less about the real condition of the mines 
than do the managers, superintendents, foremen and inspectors," 40 
Roderick was sympathetic to the bureau's work in dust and explosives. 
As a result, the I9II law contained some of the most far-reaching 
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coal-dust regulations yet enacted. It required that no shot-firer could 
fire a shot unless the dust was thoroughly wet for a distance of eighty 
feet around the hole; it prohibited the use of arc lamps in the presence 
of coal dust; and, in a regulation unique for the major coal-mining 
states, it mandated the use of permissible explosives, as tested by the 
Bureau of Mines, in portions of dry and dusty mines where explosive 
gas was present. Under the same conditions of gas and dust, the fore-
man was required to exercise extra care in firing. Along with operators 
and inspectors, Roderick had insisted for years that the foreign mining 
population was a safety hazard. Although the I9II act did not fulfill 
Roderick's wish to prohibit employment of persons without knowl-
edge of English in dusty and gaseous mines, it contained several pro-
visions designed to alleviate the foreign-language problem. One, for 
example, required that all danger signals be explained to non-English 
speaking employees, through an interpreter if necessary. Neither Ohio 
nor West Virginia codes contained foreign-language provisions.41 
The act's most definitive characteristic was the active nature of its 
language, a fact of considerable importance in fixing legal responsi-
bility and, therefore, in enforcing the act itself. Where the laws of Illi-
nois, Ohio, and West Virginia had been passive (e.g., coal is to be 
properly mined), Pennsylvania law made mine employees active 
agents in the safety process (e.g., the foreman is to insure that coal is 
properly mined). Everyone who had any function within a mine-
miners, drivers, trip-riders, cagers, and others-was given safety re-
sponsibilities. The superintendent, a kind of business manager for the 
mine and the direct representative of the owner, was charged with 
enforcing the mine law upon instructions from the inspectors and was 
also prohibited from obstructing the mine foreman or other officials 
in the performance of duties under the law. Such a provision was be-
lieved necessary because superintendents were traditionally interested 
not in safety but in production and profits. The mine foreman, how-
ever, shouldered the brunt of the safety responsibility. It was his task 
to supervise the working places in the mine, maintain safe haulage 
roads, make sure the coal was properly mined, and keep the dust 
watered; and he was responsible for hiring most of the officials below 
him, including the miners and the fire bosses. Although the miners, 
inspectors, and other reformers would have preferred that the super-
intendent shoulder more legal responsibility, the active language of the 
act was itself a major step forward in mine-safety legislation.42 
The I9II act remained Pennsylvania's basic mine-safety law 
through at least 1920. During the Progressive years, almost every at-
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tempt to amend it was defeated, the only important amendments com-
ing in I9I5 when provisions for certification of foremen and fire bosses 
were deleted from the law due to a new workmen's compensation 
act. Unfortunately, the basic enlightenment of the I9II law was not 
matched in the state's enforcement procedures. An inspector could 
remove workers from an unsafe mine if the danger was extraordinary, 
but he could not otherwise close a mine except by going through a 
four-stage process culminating in an appeal for a court injunction.48 
The law really exists only within the context of those who have 
some interest in its application and enforcement--operators, superin-
tendents, foremen, fire bosses, mine workers, inspectors, judges, legis-
lators. Each group interprets the law, and each contributes to its 
fulfillment or its decay. To what extent were these groups com-
mitted to mine safety? To what degree was state mine-safety legislation 
enforced? 
Money is one measure of commitment. Presumably a state generous 
in its mine-safety appropriations is more committed to enforcing its 
statutes than its miserly neighbor, though the latter may have better 
legislation. Continuing increases in appropriations by several states 
would indicate a general commitment to enforcement. Table 4 pre-
sents the total yearly expenditures for the mine-inspection depart-
ments of Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio for a twenty-year 
period, expressed as a function of tonnage.44 The figures fulfill some 
expectations and modify others. Of the three states, West Virginia con-
sistently spent the least money per ton on mine safety. Though Ohio's 
safety legislation was inferior to Pennsylvania's, that state's legislators 
often voted more funds for enforcement than their counterparts to the 
east. The evenness of the figures before I903-I904 (for Pennsylvania) 
and before I 906-I 907 (for West Virginia and Ohio), indicates that 
mine safety was funded, but not taken very seriously, before those 
dates. Each of the states made a brief effort to redeem itself after the 
I907 disasters, expenditures reaching temporary peaks in fiscal years 
I908 and I909. Taken together, the three states increased their real 
expenditures significantly after I903. 
Most district and chief inspectors agreed that however much money 
was being spent on inspection, the number of inspectors was inade-
quate. This complaint was particularly common in West Virginia, 
where chief inspector James Paul took every opportunity to plead for 
a larger inspection force. Although the legislature responded and 
tripled the force between I904 and I907, claims of inadequacy con-
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TABLE 4 
Expenditures of Mine Departments of 
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio, 1900-1920 
(expressed in 1926 dollars/1,000 short tons) 
Fiscal Three-state 
year Pa. bituminous West Virginia Ohio average 
1900 0.97 * * * 
1901 0.94 0.85 1.30 0.99 
1902 0.96 0.87 1.27 1.00 
1903 0.92 0.72 1.28 0.94 
1904 1.43 0.65 1.29 1.25 
1905 1.19 0.70 1.24 1.10 
1906 1.25 0.60 1.11 1.09 
1907 1.16 1.07 0.92 1.11 
1908 1.57 1.27 1.18 1.45 
1909 1.33 0.98 1.43 1.26 
1910 1.19 0.79 1.19 1.09 
1911 1.24 0.93 1.72 1.23 
1912 * 0.85 1.66 * 
1913 * 0.87t 1.66 * 
1914 1.55 0.89 3.47 1.51 
1915 1.45 0.87 2.85 1.39 
1916 1.28 0.72 * * 
1917 1.26 0.51 * * 
1918 0.69 0.44 * * 
1919 0.82 1.01 * * 
1920 * 0.69 * * 
*Not available 
tAn estimate, based on expenditures for nine months 
tinued. In 1900 or 1915, West Virginia inspectors were not inspecting 
the mines as often as the law required.45 The same was true of Ken-
tucky, a state that rose to prominence as a coal producer in these years 
and one seemingly caught off guard by its own rapid growth. In I 892 
Kentucky's eighty-eight operating mines, producing about 3 million 
short tons, were inspected by the chief and his assistant; in 1905, the 
same two officials were responsible for 203 mines with an output of 
well over 7 million short tons. Additions to the inspection force not-
withstanding, Kentucky's chief inspector continued to insist on the 
physical impossibility of inspecting the state's mines as often as the 
law required with the personnel he had. The problem was especially 
acute in inspection districts with difficult topography and inefficient 
transportation.46 Ohio's inspection service did not face these problems 
and managed to maintain a relatively high inspector/tonnage ratio, 
yet figures gathered there for 1898 and 1899 reveal how few of the 
state's mines were inspected four or more times in the course of a 
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TABLE 5 
Frequency of Mine Inspection in Ohio, 
1898 and 1899 
Frequency of 
inspection 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
17 
Number of mines 
1898 1899 
419 404 
223 115 
125 95 
73 54 
28 33 
22 20 
9 17 
10 4 
1 8 
2 6 
2 
5 
1 
year, a number recurring in the legislation of most states. Table 5 
shows how often Ohio mines were inspected.47 These figures also indi-
cate that in the absence of a statutory requirement for regular inspec-
tion, the inspectors apparently went where they felt they were most 
needed-to the dustiest, most gaseous, most poorly ventilated mines. 
Presumably, the state's dozen most dangerous mines received more 
adequate inspection under this system than they did in other states, 
where each mine was, in terms of the number of times it had to be 
inspected, treated equally. In short, although the numbers reveal the 
need for more inspectors, Ohio's flexible use of manpower may have 
been the most efficient. 
If we can believe Charles Connor, inspector for the Fifth District in 
Pennsylvania, that state, for all its fine legislation, did not transcend 
the inspection problem. Connor was supposed to visit each mine in 
his district once every seventy-eight working days, but the district con-
tained I03 mines and it took Connor an average of one day to inspect 
each mine. What makes the Pennsylvania experience unique is that 
Connor's analysis, regularly reinforced by the state's miners and oper-
ators, did not produce significant additions to the inspection staff. 
Between I900 and I9I4, when other state inspection forces were 
growing rapidly, Pennsylvania's changed little. The state added one 
bituminous inspector to its force of twenty-four in I9 I I, another in 
I9I2, and two more in I9I3.48 For this snaillike progress the state's 
chief inspector, James Roderick, must share responsibility. Roderick 
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TABLE 6 
Tonnage per Inspector, 1900-1920 
(in 1,000 short tons) 
Four-state 
Year Pennsylvania Illinois West Virginia Ohio average 
1900 3,326 3,681 * 2,712 * 
1901 3,429 3,904 6,017 2,992 3,682 
1902 4,107 4,705 6,142 3,360 4,276 
1903 4,296 5,279 7,334 3,548 4,624 
1904 4,081 5,210 8,101 3,485 4,552 
1905 4,933 3,843 7,558 3,650 4,786 
1906 5,387 4,148 8,478 3,887 5,225 
1907 6,255 5,132 9,618 4,591 6,123 
1908 4,882 4,766 8,379 3,753 5,065 
1909 5,748 5,090 10,369 2,794 5,482 
1910 6,271 4,590 12,334 3,421 5,965 
1911 5,782 4,473 11,966 2,563 5,34'8 
1912 6,225 * 5,561 2,877 5,210t 
1913 6,206 * 5,938 3,016 * 
1914 5,285 * 5,976 1,570 * 
1915 5,265 * 6,432 1,869 * 
1916 5,676 * 5,764 2,894 * 
1917 5,748 * 5,762 3,395 * 
1918 5,951 * 5,995 3,817 * 
1919 5,025 * 5,269 2,989 * 
1920 5,686 * 4,735 3,823 * 
*Not available 
tEstimated 
believed that coal operators were beginning to conceive of the inspector 
as a supervisor, as a substitute for hired, private supervision by the 
foreman, fire boss, and superintendent. He held firm to his belief that 
the state had enough inspectors, and that to increase their number 
would simply allow coal companies to rely on them more than the law 
contemplated. "It is not the duty of the inspector," Roderick said, "to 
oversee the work of the miners except at stated intervals. His important 
duty is to see that the persons in charge of the mines comply with the 
provisions of the law governing the operation of the mines so as to 
guarantee health and safety to those employed. The State cannot share 
the responsibility for the conduct of the employes. The responsibility 
must rest upon the superintendents and foremen and other officials of 
the mine." 49 If the number of inspectors is related to the amount of 
mining taking place (see Table 6),50 it appears that Roderick may 
have overestimated the extent to which Pennsylvania's inspectors were 
taking the place of supervisory personnel. During the crucial years 
from 1905 through 1912, the work load of Pennsylvania inspectors 
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was higher than that in Ohio or Illinois. West Virginia's inspectors 
were consistently responsible for far more tonnage than those of any 
other state, Ohio's for far less. Ohio's ratio benefited from the low 
growth rate of the state's bituminous industry; West Virginia's suffered 
from the opposite condition. As a group, the states failed to relieve the 
burdens on their inspectors until fiscal 1908. 
The quality of state inspection staffs was seriously affected by low 
salaries. Impoverished assistant inspectors regularly resigned for the 
greener pastures of private enterprise, making it difficult for states to 
maintain experienced work forces. Chief inspector Harrison of Ohio 
estimated that it took two years to train a state inspector and lamented 
his state's salaries, which he said had not been raised in fourteen years. 
In Kentucky, C. J. Norwood lost his entire force of three assistants 
over a salary dispute in 1908. West Virginia experienced no mass de-
fections, but resignations were common even among loyal employees 
like P. A. Grady, who in 1912 reluctantly tendered his resignation to 
accept a position with the Justus Collins coal enterprises. The state 
suffered in comparison with Pennsylvania, where inspector salaries 
were always higher, but West Virginia Governor John Cornwell came 
nearer the problem in his 1919 message. "It is an anomalous condi-
tion," he said, "that the State should require the Chief of the Depart-
ment to secure and retain first class men as District Inspectors whose 
rate of pay is less than that of men who drive mules." 51 
Inspectors who resisted the lure of higher salaries were still unlikely 
to be totally objective in performing their duties. Upward mobility for 
a mine inspector meant either moving into the federal bureaucracy 
(as James Paul did in 1908) or, more likely, accepting a position as 
superintendent with a mining company at a salary between so and 
Ioo percent above his wages as an inspector. Although a great ma-
jority of inspectors began their mining careers as miners, very few 
went directly from the pits to the inspection service. Most inspectors, 
even in Illinois where the force had a reputation for radicalism and 
strong ties to labor, came to their posts following employment as mine 
managers or superintendents. Chief inspectors were more likely than 
district inspectors to have some training in civil or mechanical en-
gineering, perhaps a slight liberalizing influence. Engineering back-
grounds were common to Robert Montgomery Haseltine, who served 
as Ohio's chief inspector from 1888 to 1898; James Paul, West Vir-
ginia's chief from 1897 through 1908; and the English-born Joseph C. 
Thompson, director of Illinois's Department of Mines and Minerals 
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from 1918 to 1920. Certainly few chief inspectors were as unpopular 
with labor as West Virginia's John Laing, who began as a miner but 
at the time of his appointment owned several mining properties in the 
Cabin Creek and New River districts. 52 
Engineered by West Virginia operators, Laing's appointment is only 
the best example of the politics of mine inspection. That mine in-
spection was often political was an article of faith not only among 
miners but with operators and inspectors as well. If the United Mine 
Workers Journal overstated the case in its insistence that almost all 
mine inspection departments were "controlled absolutely by a ring 
of political ward heelers," 53 inspection services were nonetheless 
strongly politicized, particularly in those states (West Virginia and 
Ohio but not Illinois or Pennsylvania) where appointments were made 
directly by the governor. In Ohio inspection posts were considered 
political plums for the party in power. As of 191 I, chief inspector Har-
rison claimed the state had largely eliminated politics, but this was 
true only in the sense that the state's governors were now appointing 
an equal number of Republicans and Democrats. Party affiliation, in 
short, was still at issue in Ohio mine inspection. A West Virginia 
district inspector implied a very different definition of politics when he 
reported "that there are coal operators who will endeavor to have a 
district inspector removed from office rather than obey the mining 
laws, or carry out the recommendations made by the inspector." 54 It 
was this definition which regularly turned the appointment of mine 
inspectors into a struggle between rival interest groups, to the great 
disadvantage of the miners, who failed to exercise much influence 
even through their unions. To the operators went most of the spoils. 
"There is not an inspector in the state," said a frustrated Logan County, 
Illinois, miner, "who is not holding his job through the influence of 
some coal operator." 55 Testifying before the United States Industrial 
Commission, R. G. Brooks, a Scranton, Pennsylvania, coal operator, 
admitted that operator influence in the appointment process could 
prejudice mine inspection: "Oftentimes corporations use their influ-
ence for some person, and I think perhaps the average man will not be 
quite so severe where a corporation has aided him a little. I think that 
is another factor which is sometimes detrimental to the man's being 
absolutely free to carry out his inspections." Asked if the principle of 
competency was usually followed in selecting inspectors, Brooks re-
plied: "No, I do not think it is." 56 
The mine workers viewed the politics of mine inspection as a func-
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tion of the strength of organized labor in the coalfields. Inspection 
would improve when the workers were effectively organized to exert 
influence on the appointment process. But since organization promised 
no immediate relief, miners sought to limit operator influence in the 
appointment process by making the offices elective rather than ap-
pointive and, if that proved unrealistic, at least to insure qualified 
inspectors by requiring all candidates to pass board-administered ex-
aminations. Neither effort met with much success. Inspectors were 
elected in Kansas, Oklahoma, and the Pennsylvania anthracite region, 
but none of the major bituminous areas enacted the necessary legisla-
tion. Operators rationalized and argued that election would result in 
the selection of incompetent inspectors-and no one wanted that. 
Holmes opposed election on the grounds that it would politicize the 
system, a position which failed to recognize that inspection was already 
political.57 Examination and certification of inspectors, a much less 
radical solution since it retained the appointment procedure, was used 
in Pennsylvania and Illinois but not in Ohio or West Virginia. In the 
latter state, bills for examination of mine inspectors were reported 
from committee with negative recommendations in 1901 and 1905, 
and an effort to create a state mining board in 1909 was strongly op-
posed by inspectors, who believed its composition-two operators and 
two engineers-would allow the operators to control the department. 58 
While it is apparent that competency examinations did not eliminate 
politics, it is likely that the inspection systems of Ohio and West Vir-
ginia suffered from the absence of systems for eliminating candidates 
lacking appropriate technical abilities. 
These procedures produced inspection systems stronger at the top 
than at the bottom. As a group, chief inspectors, no matter what their 
origins, did their best to enforce the laws. Only in West Virginia, 
where the highly political nature of John Laing's appointment as head 
of the state's inspection service in 1908 served to prejudice the agency 
in the eyes of miners, was the chief inspector criticized for insufficient 
devotion to law enforcement. Laing's administration, unfortunately, 
was unimaginative, even stagnant, and that of his successor, Earl 
Henry, was no better. According to one district inspector, Henry "has 
at all times cautioned the Inspector not to impose any unnecessary 
hardships on the operator." 59 Elsewhere, chief inspectors approached 
heroic dimensions. Illinois miners could on the one hand assert that 
the Illinois inspection service "is not giving satisfaction to the mine 
workers" and on the other seek the directorship of the Bureau of 
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Mines for their chief inspector and former UMWA organizer David 
Ross. In Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Kentucky, the chief inspectors played 
leadership roles, riding herd on recalcitrant district inspectors and in-
sisting on thorough and impartial enforcement. Responding to criticism 
that his inspectors were not forcing compliance with the law, Penn-
sylvania's Roderick once transferred half of his inspection force to 
new locations. J. M. Roan, who as safety commissioner was respon-
sible for Ohio's mine inspection after 1914, was typical of the zealous 
chief inspector. Roan was firm with operators seeking special treat-
ment. When one operator failed to provide a second opening as in-
structed by the district inspector, Roan suggested that he do so and 
"avoid any unpleasantness in the matter." 60 A request from another 
operator to maintain only one opening was firmly turned down. A coal 
company which had neglected to forward fire-boss reports to the state 
received a standard hard-line letter from Roan: "You might look 
upon this matter lightly, but the Mining Department considers it a 
very serious proposition." 61 Like Roderick, Roan worked to perfect 
the state's enforcement mechanisms. To cope with the hazards of dry 
winter dust, he established a system of double inspection, under which 
a district's regular inspector was joined in his rounds by an inspector 
from another district. This new system also meant unannounced in-
spections, for Roan affirmed that mine managements "will have to at-
tend to their 'knitting' or there is liable to someone drop in on them 
at any time." [sic] 62 To eliminate excuses offered by operating com-
panies for noncompliance with inspector orders, Roan worked with 
district inspectors to develop a uniform time-compliance system. 63 
Evidence of insufficient diligence on the part of district inspectors 
is of two varieties. Miner charges of inspector neglect were common. 
"At present a law means little and a mining rule less," wrote the 
United Mine Workers Journal following explosions at Pocahontas, 
Virginia, and Raton, New Mexico, in 1906. "The inspectors do not 
enforce the one and mine bosses disregard the other." 64 Although the 
Journal usually argued that state legislation was inadequate, after the 
1902 Fraterville, Tennessee, explosion it made the point that "the min-
ing laws were sufficiently broad to compel obedience to the recom-
mendations of the inspector if he were inspired by a proper sense of 
duty." 65 Miners also accused inspectors of ignoring their obligations 
to pit committees (groups of miners seeking a voice in mine man-
agement) and of being too lenient with operators. Coal and Coke 
Operator confirmed the charge of leniency when it noted that the elec-
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tricity provisions of the 1893 Pennsylvania mine law have been "re-
garded as a dead letter by the mining department, more or less . . . 
because it was recognized that to [enforce them] would interfere with 
steady and profitable employment for many thousands of men and 
millions of capital." 66 The second variety of evidence is of an entirely 
different nature, amounting to a logical deduction from observable pat-
terns in the inspectors' reports. Although most inspectors encountered 
unsafe conditions in their districts and/ or some resistance to enforce-
ment on the part of miners or operators, there are cases of inspectors 
reporting virtually complete satisfaction with conditions and attitudes. 
Lance B. Holliday of West Virginia's Ninth District, for example, in 
1910 reported "a universal tendency on the part of operators and of-
ficials to fully comply with the Mining Laws in every respect." R. S. 
LaRue of the First District claimed he had "no difficulty in having the 
mining laws complied with this year." One step down from such all-
encompassing statements were comments like that made by I. M. Kel-
ley of the First District, who admitted encountering some problems in 
ventilation and drainage when he took over the post but held that the 
defects had been remedied. "My suggestions," he said, "met with a 
hearty co-operation from all in authority." 67 If such statements were 
present in every inspector's report, we could then either judge the en-
tire inspection force incompetent or conclude that these words, how-
ever absolute they seemed, couched some kind of relative standard. In 
fact, since other inspectors experienced difficulty and reported it, and 
since the districts of Holliday, LaRue, and Kelley were of the same 
character, we can only conclude that the positive reports of these in-
spectors and others like them served only to mask reality and deter 
enforcement of the mine laws. With the criticisms of mine inspectors, 
these saccharin reports indicate that a minority of state inspectors-
mostly from West Virginia-did not enforce the mine-safety laws. 
The inspectors, of course, were only one element in the enforcement 
equation. Miners, operators, and mine management (superintendent, 
mine manager, boss, fire boss) were also crucial to the result, and 
there is evidence that each of these groups met its safety responsibili-
ties less than fully. While the utility of blaming the miner for accidents 
can be questioned, and although criticism of miners served purposes 
which went well beyond logical analysis, it is nonetheless clear that 
miners continually violated the safety laws and often resisted the 
orders and suggestions of inspectors. To some extent, the violations 
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varied with state legislation. In West Virginia and Pennsylvania, 
miners ignored regulations against solid-shooting; in Illinois, they 
regularly transgressed contract provisions by using too much powder 
to shoot the coal. Everywhere, to judge from inspectors' reports, they 
rode illegally on mine cars, carried too much powder into the mines, 
used the wrong oils in their lamps, failed to timber properly their 
working places, and were careless in handling explosives. Two broth-
ers died in Jefferson County, Ohio, when a spark from a lighted lamp 
ignited a keg of powder being used as a seat. 68 Almost without ex-
ception, state inspectors cast the miners in a central role in mine safety. 
Ohio's Roan scored old miners, who "seem to think it is cutting their 
pride, more or less, to accept instructions." 69 In three widely separated 
reports, Roderick of Pennsylvania emphasized that miners presented 
more serious obstacles to enforcement than operators. "I have found 
it a rare thing," he said, "for an operator to refuse to comply with any 
instructions or suggestions given by the inspectors regarding the pre-
venting of accidents. If the employes gave the same kindly consider-
ation to suggestions from the inspectors that the operators give, fewer 
accidents would have to be recorded." 70 
Roderick's comments notwithstanding, owners and managers were 
not always, or even usually, the willing servants of the law. West Vir-
ginia Governor William Dawson was probably closer to the truth 
when he divided coal operators into two classes-those "who yield 
cheerful obedience to the law, who see in the inspector a friend and 
an aid, and consider the bureau of mines an institution for their bene-
fit; [and those who] resist the enforcement of law, see in every in-
spector a spy and an enemy, and look upon the bureau as an invention 
of oppression." 71 Though there is evidence that the first category 
grew rapidly following the bad years from 1905 to 1908, the second 
category, or variations on it, was always prominent. Neither miners 
nor inspectors, after all, could maintain proper ventilation equipment 
or currents, construct fireproof underground stable areas, install 
shields for mine machinery, provide sufficient supervision, or fulfill 
any number of other management functions. For every miner who ini-
tiated an explosion by shooting coal off the solid, there was a mine 
foreman who failed to measure the air currents or instruct the miners 
in proper technique, or an operator who allowed the dust in his 
mines to dry and accumulate. For every miner who died because he 
chose not to timber his working place, another died because a fore-
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man had not provided him with timbers. Operators neglected to pro-
vide up-to-date mine maps, failed to post special rules for government 
and operation of the mines, sold illegal oils to their employees, and 
insisted on employing mining machinery even when it led directly to 
promiscuous shooting. Although the necessity of good ventilation had 
been recognized since 1870, operators were particularly negligent in 
this critical area.72 Frank Parsons, inspector in West Virginia's Second 
District, noted that the problem of ventilation apparatus-doors, over-
casts, stoppings-was "the worst thing with which I have had to 
contend." 73 Another inspector found poor ventilation in many op-
erations and traced the cause to incompetence. Foremen were measur-
ing the air currents, he said, but at the wrong place. The extent of the 
problem is revealed in a 1900 survey conducted by the West Virginia 
inspectors. Of 320 mines inspected in that year, eighty-six received 
a rating of "fair," eighteen were rated "bad," and the remainder were 
classified as in "good" condition. Virtually every mine rated in fair 
or bad condition-almost one-third of the total-was listed as de-
ficient in ventilation. 74 
The policies that produced such conditions were generally sus-
tained by mid-level management. Hired to get out the coal and make 
the mine a paying proposition, superintendents, foremen, and even 
fire bosses took this, rather than safety, as their primary function. In 
one case, a mine manager resisted changes that would increase the 
cost of production even when the changes had been approved by 
the owners. Similar reasoning led a Pennsylvania fire boss to allow 
the men to enter the mine even after he had located dangerous gas con-
centrations. Illinois miners claimed to have knowledge of fire bosses 
who conducted inadequate examinations because they were afraid of 
being discharged by the company. Mine inspectors' reports confirm 
the literary observations of Powers Hapgood: mine managers were 
often incompetent and almost always closely tied to the owners' inter-
est in production. 75 
Hostility and a strange kind of gamesmanship characterized op-
erator-inspector relationships in a number of cases. Compliance with 
inspector orders was often half-hearted, incomplete, or slow, a tactic 
rather than a genuine attempt to fulfill the law. Thomas Waters, in-
spector for Ohio's First District, wrote of operators who were little 
affected when an inspector closed their mines. They made a few im-
provements-enough to be permitted to resume work-and then 
turned their whole attention to production, ignoring health and safety. 
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West Virginia's J. G. Boyd found most operators inclined to cooperate, 
but was deeply distressed by "a few who pretended that they were in 
sympathy with the department," but who, when put to the test, were 
found to be "insincere in their convictions." 76 Inspectors had only a 
limited number of weapons with which to counter this negativism of 
operators, mine officials, and miners. The state mine-safety statutes 
prescribed fines for violations; they were seldom large, even when a 
corporation was involved. Inspectors could not assess fines on their 
own authority; only the courts could do this, following a conviction 
for violation of the law. All violations were misdemeanors rather than 
felonies. If death occurred, coroners' juries were responsible for ini-
tiating criminal proceedings. Besides prosecuting, the inspector could, 
through a variety of processes worked out in the state legislation, close 
a mine he thought unsafe. In most cases the law required an inspector 
to accomplish this by securing an injunction through the proper court. 
Finally, inspectors in some states possessed the power of publicity-
the ability to shame recalcitrant operators into obedience by publish-
ing accounts of fatal accidents. 
Of these tools, only prosecution was of much use. Inspectors closed 
mines in Illinois, Kentucky, West Virginia, Ohio, and perhaps other 
states, but they did so infrequently and received as much opposition 
as aid from local courts. Ohio operators became incensed when chief 
inspector Harrison liberally interpreted the state law to allow inspec-
tors to close mines at their discretion. The Ohio Coal Operators' As-
sociation claimed that since the law expressly provided that inspection 
"shall not unnecessarily obstruct the operation of mines," the power 
of inspectors was limited to specific orders. If enforcement procedures 
were as the operators said, wrote Harrison, then violators could sim-
ply discontinue the practice in the inspector's presence and wait for 
his return. He concluded: 
Every law on the statute book might be ignored with the greatest im-
punity, and without fear of prosecution. 
We have heard some very peculiar opinions regarding the Ohio 
mining laws, but we trust you will pardon us for saying that the one 
contained in your letter is without a doubt the most unique, far-
fetched and utopian construction we ever knew applied to them. At 
first, we were disposed to treat this definition as a huge joke, perpe-
trated on the two writers of the letter or on the chief inspector of 
mines, by some witty humorist or willful wag who was more encum-
bered with surplus time than onerous duties .... 
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We feel sure, however, that there is not five per cent of the coal 
producers of Ohio, that would want to have their mines operated un-
der any such loose system as your definition of the law would inaugu-
rate.77 
In West Virginia, inspectors applied the injunctive remedy with some 
zeal after 1906, but they soon discovered that coal companies had the 
advantage in presenting evidence to the courts. In 1908, chief inspec-
tor Paul was angered when a court reopened the Jed Mine in McDowell 
County, which the mines department had closed because of dangerous 
gas accumulations, and then rejected a petition for appeal.78 
Coroners' juries also contributed little to the enforcement process. 
Governor Dawson of West Virginia captured the essence of the in-
stitution in a report to the legislature on the recent Pocahontas disaster. 
The coroner's jury handling Pocahontas, said Dawson, had "rendered 
a verdict that the cause of the explosion was not known, but which 
declared none of the mine people blameworthy. Just how the jury 
could arrive at that result is a little puzzling. If the cause of the disaster 
was not known it would seem impossible to know that no one was to 
blame for it .... The fact is that investigation by coroner's juries into 
mine disasters rarely amount to anything." [sicF9 Not all coroners' 
juries fit Dawson's description. There were a number of cases in which 
coroners' juries recommended grand-jury proceedings against miners, 
inspectors, foremen, superintendents, and even owners; and occasion-
ally a coroner would recommend changes in the mine laws. On the 
whole, however, activist coroners' juries were regarded with wonder 
by contemporaries. The institution served mainly to prejudice law-
enforcement officials against legal action and to shift the burden of 
prosecution to district attorneys. 80 
In I906 Ohio's Harrison, convinced of the need for stronger en-
forcement, ordered his inspectors to threaten mine bosses and miners 
with prosecution, and within two to three years Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
West Virginia, and presumably other states, had all turned in earnest 
to the courts. Prosecutions increased dramatically, from a smattering 
before 1905 to more than ISO in Pennsylvania and West Virginia in 
I9IO. But the movement was sheathed in limitations. Everywhere fines 
were minimal, even for superintendents and foremen. Although Har-
rison claimed that the strongest feature of the new I 9 1 o mining law 
was its penalty provisions, in I9II fines collected under the act 
amounted to only $400. There, as elsewhere, imprisonment for safety-
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law violations was unheard of, even, apparently, for those respon-
sible for fatal accidents.81 The reports of the state mine inspectors, 
although probably an incomplete source of information, provide ample 
evidence of selective enforcement and class-biased justice. To begin 
with, the reports for Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio contain 
little evidence of prosecutions before I904 and none after I9I2, re-
flective of the limited influence of the safety movement except within 
a narrow chronology. By any standard-recorded violations, numbers 
of mines and employees, the detailed and technical nature of mine-
safety legislation-the total numbers of prosecutions were minimal. 
For the three-state area in I9IO, prosecutions totaled 395; for I911, 
3 I2-and these clearly were peak years. Moreover, law enforcement 
officials were extremely reluctant to prosecute higher management. In 
West Virginia and Ohio, miners and mine bosses were virtually the 
only ones prosecuted, the former primarily for solid-shooting, the lat-
ter usually for failure to measure air currents. Of a total of I 63 
prosecutions in West Virginia in I9IO, miners accounted for I59· 
Pennsylvania completed 489 prosecutions in the four years from I908 
through I9I 1. Of these, 27 were of superintendents, 39 were of fore-
men, 3 I were of fire bosses, and the remainder, 392, were of ordinary 
mine workers.82 
Selective enforcement was perhaps abetted by xenophobia. Writing 
to the Industrial Commission, safety commissioner Roan of Ohio em-
phasized the need for inspectors to have the power to make arrests of 
miners immediately upon observation of a violation. This was, he 
said, especially urgent in the case of foreigners: "many of them are 
like white eggs-when you mix them up in a dozen you cannot tell 
which one you had in your hand to start with." 83 West Virginia in-
spectors, moreover, evidently ceased prosecuting operators and man-
agers when it became clear that they could not be convicted. "Through 
some process not clear to this department," said chief inspector Paul, 
"the courts have not disposed of prosecutions pending against mine 
officials." 84 A district inspector reported that workers had "completely 
lost all confidence in the local courts ... [and were] thoroughly con-
vinced that justice could not be obtained towards the enforcement of 
the mining laws." 85 Only for Pennsylvania is there evidence of prose-
cution of superintendents, and there, too, the great majority of cases 
were brought against mine workers. The inspector reports provide no 
proof that mine owners were prosecuted in any state. Major journals 
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of operator opinion applauded and encouraged selective prosecution, 
which merged conveniently with their view that miners were responsi-
ble for safety problems. 86 
With the enactment of Pennsylvania's 1911 mine-safety law, an era 
of frenetic state activity came to an end. The next decade would bring 
only refinements. From the moment this impressive legislative struc-
ture was created, however, it was outmoded, a nineteenth-century so-
lution to twentieth-century problems. An industry serving national 
markets, shipping its products hundreds and thousands of miles across 
state borders and employing a national labor supply which refused to 
remain stationary, had constructed its safety edifice on firm but in-
appropriate state foundations. It is difficult, of course, to conceive of 
its having been done any other way. Industrial safety was a natural 
state obligation, a historically sanctioned function of the police power 
of the states. Few voices were heard proclaiming the benefits of na-
tional social legislation except in industries such as railroads and the 
merchant marine that were widely recognized as interstate. When the 
winter of 1907-1908 made a mockery of existing state legislation, 
the reformers did not drop their aversion to national safety legislation. 
Instead, they sought to nationalize the existing legislation, first by creat-
ing a national Bureau of Mines to furnish state legislation with a scien-
tific underpinning; and second, through a campaign to make 
mine-safety legislation uniform from state to state. Uniformity, and a 
related concept, standardization, at once asserted the negative view 
that national legislation in coal-mining safety was constitutionally in-
appropriate and the positive view that some form of national action 
was necessary. In short, the idea of uniform state legislation expressed 
an ambivalence built into federalism and was designed to bridge a 
temporary gap in the constitutional system. 
Uniform state legislation and standardization were considered de-
sirable goals in many areas besides coal-mining safety, most commonly 
where safety was a factor. The Industrial Commission in 1900 recom-
mended, for example, that a uniform law regulating hours of labor for 
industrial occupations be adopted by all the states. Almost two de-
cades later, the Bureau of Standards, the Department of Commerce, 
and the Working Conditions Service in the Department of Labor be-
gan investigations which were designed to lead to uniform safety codes 
for building equipment, fire prevention, elevators, cranes and derricks, 
conveyors, steam engines, oil and gas engines, textile machinery, ex-
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plosives, and rubber goods. The movement for uniform state legisla-
tion attracted A. Mitchell Palmer, who urged uniform child-labor 
legislation, and produced a conference on the general topic, sponsored 
in January 1910 by the National Civic Federation. Like Palmer's de-
sire for uniform state legislation, that of the National Civic Federation 
arose from an essentially conservative base, from an opposition to 
further centralization of power. Among the organizations attending 
the conference were the Grange, the AF of L, the N a tiona! Associa-
tion of Life Insurance Presidents, the AMA, the Census Bureau, the 
American Public Health Association, and the National Association 
of State Labor Commissioners. Others promoted uniform legislation 
to cope with the problems of habit-forming drugs, divorce laws, cor-
poration laws, direct election of senators, and quarantine. 87 
Miners, operators, engineers, inspectors, and government officials 
were nearly unanimous in their advocacy of uniform coal-mining 
safety legislation. From the engineering standpoint, uniform legisla-
tion was feasible and desirable for its effect in simplifying statutes. 
"The engineer," noted J. A. Garcia from personal experience, "must 
either stuff his brain with a mass of legal lore and keep stuffing afresh 
as new legislation is enacted, or make his own code and index the 
laws of each state for convenient reference." 88 Engineers agreed that 
the varied conditions under which bituminous coal mining took place 
presented no important obstacle to uniform safety legislation. More 
common was the argument that uniform legislation was necessary be-
cause of the migratory nature of mine labor. Miners, said Pittsburgh 
mining engineer W. E. Fohl, were of low intelligence and were natural 
transients. He suggested uniform rules and laws "in order to firmly 
fix their observance in the habits of this floating contingent." 89 Draw-
ing an analogy between miners and ducks, Iowa inspector William E. 
Holland said: "A large portion of the coal-mining fraternity, like the 
wild ducks, migrate with every change of season .... They find a dif-
ferent set of laws in every state and accidents are liable to happen from 
unfamiliarity with the law in the state to which they have removed. 
With a uniform code, this condition would be eliminated." 90 The 
bureau's 0. P. Hood voiced the same concern in 1916 when he recom-
mended a uniform signaling system: "As it is now, when a miner goes 
from one camp to another he has a set of signals to learn and if con-
fused may give the wrong signal and endanger life." 91 
Uniformity was most often defended on the grounds that economic 
conditions in the bituminous industry made mine-safety legislation an 
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economic liability unless similar legislation were passed in competitive 
states. The coal industry (i.e., the central competitive field), the argu-
ment went, was so intensely competitive that legislation passed in one 
state put that state at a competitive disadvantage until similar legisla-
tion was passed in other states in the field. Two operators, from oppo-
site ends of the central competitive field and both interested in uniform 
workmen's compensation legislation, made this point with some clari-
ty. Z. Taylor Vinson put forward the case of the West Virginia opera-
tor: "If we should have a workmen's compensation law in West 
Virginia, and you do not have it in Pennsylvania or Illinois, or other 
coal producing states, then obviously the coal operators of West Vir-
ginia will have to bear that burden alone, and it will be impossible 
under competitive market conditions to bring about any uniformity 
unless all the states adopt substantially the same plan, but if it exists 
in practically the same degree throughout the whole country, then the 
burden would be borne by all in the first instance and ultimately re-
funded by the consumer." 92 Operator A. J. Moorshead of Illinois, one 
of the foremost advocates of uniformity, described Illinois's work-
men's compensation act as "a good measure if it were a national one," 
but burdensome "when it is saddled upon one State and not upon the 
neighboring states."93 
Though a favorite among operators, the argument from economics 
was widely recognized as valid. John Mitchell, president of the United 
Mine Workers for a number of years, was skeptical of the possibility 
of achieving uniformity in legislation but still accepted industry eco-
nomics as uniformity's primary justification. Even the United Mine 
Workers Journal, admittedly interested in uniformity as a means of 
upgrading legislation in states where the union was weak and without 
political influence, purported to understand the economics of com-
petition. "We prefer to believe," stated the Journal, "that most of the 
operators would prefer the general adoption of safeguards, providing 
their competitors were also obligated to adopt the same." 94 Such im-
portant figures in the uniformity movement as Governor E. F. Dunne 
of Illinois, James Roderick, Van H. Manning, and J. T. Beard of 
Coal Age might have seconded engineer Fohl's suggestion for a new 
commandment: "Thou shalt not sell coal at a lower price than thy 
neighbor if such selling is only possible by reason of neglect of the 
natural laws which govern the preservation of human life and the 
conservation of Nature's bounty." 95 In practice the ingredients of a 
competitive advantage encompassed more than safety legislation, so 
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that, for example, the nature of West Virginia's coal seams and labor 
supply would have provided that state with a competitive advantage 
no matter what state legislation was passed. Nonetheless, the argu-
ment which tied safety to competition was so widely accepted and so 
seldom questioned that its truth was a matter of little practical impor-
tance. Liberals treated it with respect. In a piece written for the Survey 
in 1909, Charles McCarthy of the Wisconsin Legislative Reference 
Library referred to the fear of interstate competition as "a bugaboo." 
He insisted, however, that Wisconsin businessmen would not accept 
that view until they had been provided with data and information. John 
B. Andrews, secretary of the American Association for Labor Legis-
lation, also expressed the power of the competitive argument. "Too 
much emphasis," he said, "has sometimes been put on the interstate 
competition argument in protective legislation, but there is a real prob-
lem here that calls for uniformity of minimum legal standards." 96 
Uniformity of state legislation was not, of course, the only possible 
solution to the peculiar safety problems arising from an interstate coal 
industry with nearly national markets and a migratory labor supply. 
Federal regulation, by commission or Congress, also had its advocates. 
Among them was a senator, who introduced a bill calling for federal 
inspection and regulation of all coal mines, and a congressman, more 
conservative, desiring federal regulation as the only road to uniformity 
but believing that the federal Constitution prohibited the requisite 
legislation. Moorshead for a time saw federal control of the entire 
mining industry as the only solution. 97 Other leading proponents of 
federal regulation for the coal mines included John R. Haynes, Cali-
fornia's commissioner of mines, who viewed the current state regula-
tory system as inefficient and proposed instead a five-man commission 
analogous to the Interstate Commerce Commission, and Van Amberg 
Bittner, who occupied a number of positions in the Pennsylvania hier-
archy of the United Mine Workers. In 1916 Bittner's views became of-
ficial UMWA policy when the national convention declared itself in 
favor of ownership and control of the coal industry by the federal 
government.98 Federal regulation was not, however, a real alternative 
to uniformity and standardization in the Progressive period. Bureau 
supporters James R. Garfield, Manning, and Holmes all rejected fed-
eral regulation in favor of uniformity. Holmes did not see the mines 
as properties of interstate commerce and said that he hoped any move-
ment for federal regulation or rule-making "won't meet with much 
success because I think that ought to be cared for by the state." 99 
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A number of advocates of uniform legislation indicated a willing-
ness to go beyond uniform legislation to some kind of truly national 
action if the movement failed. This is of some importance, since it 
indicates that uniformity was, for some, as much a transitional concept 
looking forward into national legislation as an attempt to support the 
old state system. The people, said the Outlook in a 1913 editorial, "are 
coming to realize that unless the States co-operate to secure legal con-
formity the people will look to the Federal Government for relief, an 
event that would foreshadow the withering of State power." 100 The 
next year the convention of the United Mine Workers was the scene 
of an important debate on whether the states or the federal govern-
ment should have jurisdiction over safety and other mining matters. 
A number of delegates who had become soured on uniform legislation 
led the convention to support a resolution calling for more activity in 
behalf of uniform legislation only if an appeal to the Congress failed. 
President John White's insistence that national legislation would re-
quire an amendment to the federal Constitution seemed to deter the 
delegates not at all, for they were convinced that uniformity would 
not work in states like West Virginia and Colorado, where the opera-
tors controlled the legislatures. "It would be useless," said one dele-
gate, "for us to try to get laws like that on the statute books. Why 
couldn' [sic] we get it before the United States Government and get 
some action on it? The Federal Government controls the whisky ques-
tion from one State to another." 101 There is also something instructive 
in the model used by uniformity proponents-the national, unitary 
legislative and inspection systems of Britain, France, Belgium, and 
Germany.102 
The legal profession, particularly, was aware of the substantial legal 
and constitutional importance of the movement for uniform state leg-
islation. In 1916, the report of the American Bar Association Com-
mittee on Uniform State Laws claimed that "uniformity is not simply 
a name, it is a principle, and a principle which is of the very essence 
of democracy, if we mean by democracy that state of society in which 
there is one law equable in its application to the rights of all men alike 
everywhere." 103 Although proponents of uniformity commonly de-
fended the practice as one which would maintain the Constitution in-
tact, it was also widely recognized that uniformity was a means of 
nationalizing a federal constitutional structure. "The Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws," wrote one observer, "is an extra-constitu-
tional body designed to accomplish the very thing that the Constitu-
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tion would prevent, or at least that which the Constitution directs 
should be done in a different way." 104 Ostensibly only a voluntary 
program of state action, uniformity was for some a stalking horse for 
nationalization. 
The migratory nature of labor and the competitive qualities of the 
market in the coal industry thus combined with a strong sense of resis-
tance to direct federal regulation to produce a climate in which uni-
formity was pursued as possible and desirable. Within this framework, 
a national scientific organization was the specific, if intermediate, goal. 
In 1906 John Mitchell supported a bill to create a bureau of mines, 
suggesting that the encouragement of uniform protective legislation 
would be one of the proposed agency's five principal functions. 105 Two 
years later, when Congress came close to creating a bureau, the poten-
tial impact of the institution on state safety legislation was a common 
supporting rationale. In one of his more eloquent moments, Ohio in-
spector Harrison claimed that "absence of an established central body 
is a 'missing link,' an immovable stumbling block in the way of effec-
tive concert of action by various state mining departments." 106 While 
operators were more cautious lest a federal agency interfere with state 
inspection functions, one operator journal ventured to suggest that 
a new bureau might bring about uniformity through its "influence and 
prestige." 107 Holmes, as bureau director, incorporated the uniformity 
idea into his four-part bureau plan of action. Under part one the bureau 
made mine-safety investigations and disseminated results; under part 
two (uniformity) the states enacted appropriate legislation for inspec-
tion and safety. For the bureau, too, uncoordinated state legislation 
was not enough; federal legislation was too much. Uniformity prom-
ised the results of federal legislation without its drawbacks. Unfor-
tunately, the bureau was ill prepared to assume much responsibility in 
the movement for uniform state legislation. In many cases it had no 
knowledge upon which to base recommendations to the states or had 
not compiled relevant codes and statistics. Sensitive to criticism for in-
terfering in state concerns, Holmes and Manning steered their agency 
clear of state legislative matters, though the bureau followed state leg-
islative movements, particularly in Illinois and Pennsylvania. 108 
Only in two areas-mine accident statistics and electricity-could 
the bureau's involvement in matters of uniformity and standardization 
be considered even moderately successful. The need for standardiza-
tion of mine-accident statistics arose because of disparate criteria em-
ployed by the states in classifying mine accidents and determining fiscal 
106 Coal-Mining Safety in the Progressive Period 
years and subjects of study. Some states, for example, had records of 
deaths in their mines but none of accidents resulting in injuries only. 
When the Bureau of Mines first became involved in statistical stan-
dardization in 1910, statistics were collected from operators, state-
mining departments, and state inspectors. Under James Paul and 
Edward W. Parker, the bureau within two years had strengthened the 
relationship with the state mine inspectors and was relying solely on 
them for its statistical information. The first monthly report of coal-
mine accidents was published by the bureau for discussion at the an-
nual meeting of the Mine Inspectors' Institute of America (MIIA) in 
June 1911. By 1913 every state except four-Arkansas, Oklahoma, 
Kentucky, and Illinois (and arrangements had been made with Illinois) 
-was cooperating with the bureau, and when Holmes made public his 
dissatisfaction with the lagging states, he soon had their cooperation. 
A national conference, called by the bureau for February 1916 and 
attended by mine inspectors, labor commissioners, chairmen of mine-
rescue commissions, state industrial accident board members, statis-
ticians, and representatives of compensation commissions, brought 
further refinement to accident standardization and produced a com-
mittee to recommend to the states standard forms for mine statistics. 
While experts could still find substantial fault with the system-use 
of the tonnage basis (accidents per ton of coal mined) and a dearth of 
data for nonfatal accidents were frequent complaints-a solid be-
ginning had been made.109 
The first organization to work in the area of electrical standardiza-
tion was the American Mining Congress. Its Committee on the Stan-
dardization of Electrical Equipment in Mines, established in 1908, 
within one year had drafted a code of electrical rules for enactment 
into law by state legislatures and, perhaps a victim of its own success, 
was discharged after making its first report. The code developed by the 
committee was adopted almost verbatim by the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture in 191 I. After 1912, the AIEE, the AIME, and the MilA became 
involved with the bureau in work on electrical codes. Two other or-
ganizations-the National Safety Council and the United States Bureau 
of Standards-were rebuked for involvement in an area which, ac-
cording to the bureau, was not in their province. Most of the efforts at 
standardization of electrical codes went unrewarded. The Pennsyl-
vania experience was not repeated, although a few states did enact 
stricter laws for electrical equipment based on bureau recommenda-
tions. As late as 1920 the Pennsylvania anthracite field and many 
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bituminous states had few electrical regulations, and the MilA was hav-
ing its first full-scale debate on electrical standardization. Sorely dis-
appointed with progress in electrical standardization and particularly 
disturbed by the obstructionist tactics of operators on the MilA's legis-
lative committee, Illinois mine inspector Joseph Haskins was ready to 
turn to federal legislation. "While most of us know little of the princi-
ples of electricity," he told the 1920 convention of the MIIA, "we do 
know the mining game and our experience has been such that we have 
little hope of obtaining what we need in the way of legislation other 
than through the national government." 110 
Although they could claim no more success than the Bureau of 
Mines, the Mine Inspectors' Institute, the American Mining Congress, 
and the state of Illinois were more active in pursuit of uniform state 
legislation. Organization in pursuit of uniform coal-mining safety 
legislation began in response to the explosions of December 1907, 
when the editor of Coal Age, James T. Beard of Scranton, Pennsyl-
vania, acting at the request of chief inspectors George Harrison, James 
Roderick, and James Paul, plumbed sentiment for a national organiza-
tion of inspectors. At the first meeting of the Mine Inspectors' Institute 
in June 1908, the inspectors affirmed their interest in uniform legisla-
tion and moved on to substantive matters. Recognizing the importance 
of scientific investigation to uniform legislation and standardization, 
the institute under the presidency of Harrison, who served from 1908 
through 19II, lent strong support to the campaigns for a national 
bureau of mines and for additional testing stations. Signs of difficulty 
first appeared at the 1910 meeting, when the Committee on Uni-
formity, created in 1909 to prepare a list of substantive provisions to 
be embodied in state mining codes, announced that it had been unable 
to meet until the week of the convention. The committee's hastily 
prepared report proved too vague to be useful to state legislators. Al-
though one committee member, Peter Hanraty of Oklahoma, pre-
sented a list of sixteen rules for consideration (six dealing with shot-
firing), the committee apparently thought them inappropriate and 
they were not made part of the report. It is probable that even at this 
early date there was division within the institute over precisely what 
matters should be the subject of uniform legislation. 111 Having missed 
the opportunity to influence the crucial legislative packages produced 
in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Illinois in 1910 and 19II, the MilA 
moved into a decade of apathy and impotence. From 1911 through 
1914 the inspectors showed little interest in the subject, even in 1913 
108 Coal-Mining Safety in the Progressive Period 
when a strong advocate of uniformity, Thomas K. Adams, held the 
institute's presidency. Beginning with the 1914 meeting, a partial re-
vival of interest in uniformity occurred, led by the institute's organizer, 
J. T. Beard. As chairman of the Resolutions Committee, Beard indi-
cated his desire to awaken the institute by announcing that resolutions 
should in the future be more practical than they had been previously, 
and a year later he was openly critical of the institute for its general 
inactivity and insufficient attention to uniform legislation. In answer 
to the multiplying critics of uniformity, Beard admitted that uniformity 
could not be applied to all details of coal-mining safety, but he was 
adamant that certain subjects-particularly certification of mine of-
ficials and rules for classifying the mines with respect to dust, gas, 
and ventilation-were appropriate subjects for uniform legislation. A 
simple resolution calling for competency examinations for all po-
sitions of authority underground were the firstfruits of Beard's labor 
and the first substantive commitment of the mine inspectors in several 
years. By 1919 his committee had renewed its rather meager efforts 
with a series of resolutions dealing with explosives.112 
That an organization formed expressly to pursue uniform mine-
safety legislation could so quickly and completely lose interest in its 
goal requires some explanation. Poor timing is part of the answer. 
When the group finally was capable of action, the states had com-
pleted a major legislative cycle. There was comparatively little law-
making between 1911 and 1920, and the institute was left with little 
to do. Moreover, an increasingly large element in the institute had 
begun to see immense difficulties in preparing a code of laws accept-
able to all or even most of the coal-mining states and therefore viewed 
uniformity as impractical or as a violation of states' rights. Roderick 
of Pennsylvania, who as president had advocated a more active role 
for the MilA, by 1915 could only lament that uniform mine legislation 
was an impossibility due to diverse conditions in the states. Discussion 
of uniform legislation was a waste of time since only a few things 
could be made uniform. "I believe," he said, "that the mining laws 
of every State must deal with its own conditions." 113 Support for 
Roderick's position came from R. A. Shiflett and James Dalrymple, 
chief inspectors of Tennessee and Colorado. Others, including P. J. 
Moore of Pennsylvania, who questioned whether the institute had 
"any right to presume to advocate a general law," and J. J. Rutledge 
of Oklahoma ("I do not believe we can make any hard and fast rules 
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in coal mining"), emphasized that the complexities of coal mining 
necessitated administrative, rather than legislative, regulation.114 
Organizationally, the inspectors were hampered by a number of 
factors incident to the occupation and its politics. Inspectors were 
divided politically: some state delegations were dominated by miners, 
others were closely tied to operator interests. Within the national or-
ganization continuity was a persistent problem because mine depart-
ment personnel changed frequently and the states sometimes refused 
to cooperate in allowing inspectors to attend conventions. Perhaps the 
problem lay in the personality of the mine inspector, described as "a 
conservative man ... a man that says very little in public, and ... is 
very cautious about what he does say." 115 Whatever the cause, the 
mine inspectors played their role in the movement for uniform mine 
legislation with little enthusiasm. For an organization formed to fur-
ther uniformity, the accomplishments of the Mine Inspectors' Institute 
were paltry indeed. 
The Illinois movement for uniform legislation bore little similarity, 
in personnel or procedure, to the efforts of the mine inspectors. It was 
initiated by Illinois operators caught in a competitive squeeze and 
looking to uniformity to spread the burdens of safety legislation 
throughout the central competitive field. "The way we are going now," 
said A. J. Moorshead, president of the Madison Coal Corporation and 
one of the movement's leaders, "some States have little or no legis-
lation to govern them in mining, while others are saddled so heavily 
that they are brought to insolvency, which, as I said before, is the 
case in Illinois." 116 As early as 1911 Governor Charles S. Deneen 
publicly recognized the importance of uniform legislation in the coal-
producing states and suggested an interstate conference. No action was 
taken until the Illinois Mining Investigation Commission entered the 
picture in 1915, requesting Governor E. F. Dunne to invite represen-
tatives of coal-mining states to form an interstate commission for the 
drafting of uniform mine legislation. Necessary mine safety and con-
servation legislation, said the Illinois Commission, could not be en-
acted in Illinois precisely because of competitive conditions: "Under 
existing conditions in some of the states, the industry actually enjoys 
a premium for unsafe conditions in comparison with the men engaged 
in the mining industry in the State of Illinois. These are evils directly 
flowing from a want of uniform legislation governing the coal mining 
industry." 117 Dunne sent state governors an invitation to appoint repre-
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sentatives to meet in Illinois in conjunction with the American Mining 
Congress's annual convention. In the invitation he noted the benefits of 
uniform legislation in commercial areas. "No competition between the 
different states of the Union," he said, "should be allowed to exist 
based upon the cheapness of production at the cost of human life and 
limb, and which tends to discourage progressive legislation; no pre-
mium should be placed upon the financial conditions of recklessness 
in mining methods." At the Bureau of Mines, Van H. Manning ap-
plauded the fledgling movement.l18 
For a time the Illinois movement appeared likely to evoke national 
action. Operators, miners, engineers, inspectors, and others who had 
been appointed to state commissions by their governors met in Chicago 
in November 1916 and reconstituted themselves as the Uniform Coal 
Mining Laws Association, with Moorshead and Robert Harlan of the 
UMWA as president and vice president. Using the Illinois Mining In-
vestigation Commission as a model of group compromise, this new 
association (essentially a section of the American Mining Congress) 
called for the creation of a nine-member Commission on Uniform 
Coal Mining Legislation, to consist of three miners, three operators, 
and three representatives of the general public with the director of the 
Bureau of Mines an ex-officio member. This commission was to draft 
and present to the next annual meeting of the Mining Congress a code 
of uniform coal-mining laws which the Uniform Laws Association 
could then recommend to the legislatures of the states. Unfortunately, 
nothing was done to pursue these plans in the following years. The 
Resolutions Committee of the American Mining Congress rejected 
the proposed Commission on Uniform Coal Mining Legislation and the 
AMC took no further action. High prices caused by the extraordinary 
demands of a war economy temporarily vitiated the economic impulse 
which was at the base of the Illinois movement. Along with other 
relatively high-cost producers, Illinois coal operators no longer had 
their competitive relations determined by the lowest common denomi-
nator-usually West Virginia production. Five years earlier, when 
interstate competition had made uniform legislation logical and neces-
sary, operators had been so divided that the degree of cooperation 
requisite to uniformity had proved unachievable. "One state does 
not," Moorshead had noticed, "in the matter of legislation, care a 
continental about the others." 119 
"We live in an age of organization," said the president of the Mine 
Inspectors' Institute in 1913.120 Mere knowledge of this truth, how-
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ever, was not enough. Failure marked the various movements for 
uniform coal-mining safety legislation precisely because the organiza-
tional matrix brought to bear on the problem-the Mine Inspectors' 
Institute, the American Mining Congress, the Bureau of Mines-
proved unable to bring cohesion to a fragmented and archaic political 
system and was incapable of resolving the contradiction inherent in a 
national industry regulated by state laws. To solve its problem the 
coal industry would eventually turn to national legislation. 
CHAPTER 
4 
The Miner and the Union 
THE MINER worked in a highly competitive, labor-intensive in-
dustry, in which operators routinely met their competition by reducing 
the wages of the working man. Whether they did so directly, by paying 
him less for the same work, or indirectly, by increasing prices at the 
company store or establishing a new system for measuring miner pro-
duction, made little difference. In either case, the miner was under 
pressure to maintain his standard of living, even if that meant em-
ploying unsafe mining techniques, and his ability to respond to this 
pressure by moving into another line of work was considerably cir-
cumscribed by the geographical isolation of most bituminous mining 
operations. This isolation also made the miner dependent on the oper-
ator for much of his existence and correspondingly diminished his 
willingness to protest against unsafe working conditions. If one turns 
from the roles of employee and wage earner to the role of the miner as 
worker, it becomes clear that an image of the miner as economically 
motivated and dependent is valuable but limiting. As a worker, the 
miner was unusually independent. He worked alone or with one other 
miner, usually without supervision or even instruction. Experienced 
miners, in particular, came to see this independence as a valuable right 
and to resent infringements upon it, a self-concept which came into di-
rect conflict with that aspect of the coal-mining safety movement which 
defined progress as increased supervision of the miner at the working 
face. Finally, great numbers of coal miners in this period were recent 
immigrants, largely without a speaking knowledge of English; they, too, 
contributed to the prevalent and deserved reputation of the miner as 
a careless employee. Much of the Progressive movement in coal-
mining safety was an attempt to reduce the extent of that carelessness 
and its consequences. This analysis must, of course, be interpreted 
within the context of the entire mine-safety problem. The miner was 
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only one element in that problem, and not the most important one. 
Whether a miner employs an unsafe technique is, after all, not abso-
lute but relative to the condition of the mine. 
Miners in many areas were members of a strong national organi-
zation, the United Mine Workers of America. Through its national, 
district, and local organizations the UMW A worked for state and fed-
erallegislation and made more limited contributions to the coal-mining 
safety movement through use of the contract and, when it seemed 
necessary, through the strike. However, the union in this period was 
interested mainly in membership, and its membership was interested 
primarily in economic issues, not in safety. Some union demands were, 
in fact, antithetical to the requirements of safety, and the union some-
times used the contract and the strike to achieve goals which, while 
justifiable in the union context, were roadblocks for mining safety. 
In the hands of operators, miner carelessness became less a keen 
analysis of the causes of mine accidents than a rationale or tactic. As 
mine disasters multiplied and increased the pressures for new legisla-
tion, operators affirmed the excellence of existing law and used the 
issue of miner carelessness to shift the locus of the discussion away 
from additions to the statutes. Mine managers protested that they 
should not be held responsible for accidents, since they could not pos-
sibly supervise every careless or incompetent miner. The Coal Trade 
Bulletin epitomized this view of mine safety. By 1905 it had concluded, 
without data, that 99 percent of all mine accidents "are due absolutely 
to the carlessness or wilful negligence of the men employed in them" 
[sic]. While the Monongah explosion affirmed for many the need for 
scientific research into the causes of mine explosions, the Bulletin 
found its own lesson. "The human element in the industrial equation," 
it noted, "is the one unknown quantity that sets at naught all efforts to 
safeguard properly the lives of the workers in mine or mill. This fact 
was never more clearly demonstrated than in the disaster which snuffed 
out so many lives at Monongah." When Pennsylvania's chief inspector 
James Roderick maintained in an annual report that carelessness was 
responsible for more mine accidents than any other single factor, Coal 
Trade Bulletin said this expert testimony demonstrated "beyond cavil, 
that legislation cannot remedy the evils which result from the per-
versity of human nature." The Cherry mine fire was analyzed along 
similar lines. Men died not because the mine had no second opening, 
but because stable employees had "lost their heads at a critical mo-
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ment." 1 Charges of miner carelessness were also common in the re-
ports of state mine inspectors. Even Crystal Eastman, in her 1910 
expose of the Pittsburgh mining industry, concluded that victims were 
responsible for 35 percent of fatal mine accidents.2 
It was one thing to subscribe to the theory that miner carelessness 
was responsible for most mine accidents. It was quite another to con-
clude that accidents could not be prevented. That conclusion was 
drawn often enough, however, to elicit this comment from Eastman: 
"Those emphatic, reiterated assertions, those tales of recklessness often 
repeated, have grown into a solid, inert mass of opinion among busi-
ness and professional men in the community, a heap of unreasoned 
conviction." 3 The official opinion of the Industrial Workers of the 
World (IWW) was similar: 
It is customary for the miner [sic] owners and officials to blame all 
accidents on the "carelessness," "neglect," or the "ignorance" of the 
mine workers, but if such subterfuge is too raw to pass muster before 
public opinion, they blame it on their "God" or "Providence." How-
ever, experience has proven that where strict rules have been adopted 
and enforced, "carelessness, neglect, and ignorance" disappear as if 
by magic and the death-dealing God or Providence keeps out of the 
mine. This only goes to show that if the rules and regulations for coal 
mining were made by honest men without regard for immediate prof-
it, and if they were rigidly enforced, mine accidents could be brought 
down to the same level as in the most favorable occupations.4 
The IWW was only one participant in a small but significant reaction 
against miner carelessness as an operative concept. Conceding that 
in some sense, every accident was the result of negligence or oversight 
on the part of the man injured or his fellow workers, Coal Age ac-
knowledged the possibility that certain precautions taken by mining 
officials would make some accidents unnecessary. Since under work-
men's compensation the operator had to pay the bill anyway, the 
journal concluded that it was useless to blame others. Edward O'Toole, 
general superintendent of the United States Coal and Coke Company, 
Pittsburgh, expressed the viewpoint of the more enlightened operators: 
I have no doubt but that you have heard excuses I have often heard 
-"It was the man's own fault that he got killed, for he was told to set 
his timber, and he knew there was danger, etc."-! believe the time 
has now come to quit blaming the dead man; and I hope the Bureau 
of Mines is waking up to the fact, that it is not only the duty of the 
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officials to point out and tell the men of the dangers, but it is their 
duty to see that the dangers when recognized and pointed out are 
removed before they permit a man to work the place. 5 
At issue was not so much the fact that miners were careless, but the 
source of that carelessness and what to do about it. Miners and the 
United Mine Workers Journal, if they acknowledged the issue at all, 
argued that miner carelessness was a direct result of the policies of 
callous coal operators, who thoughtlessly employed inexperienced, 
ignorant labor. The Journal scored an anti-union mine in Webster 
County, Kentucky, for importing Negro agricultural workers from the 
Deep South, "where living is cheap, wages correspondingly low, or-
ganization unknown. These men are sent into the to them unknown 
dangers of the mines, without the experience which would make for 
their safety." 6 Mine inspectors consistently viewed carelessness as the 
result of the lack of English-language capability, though this analysis 
ignored the large number and proportion of accidents in which En-
glish-speaking miners were involved. James Roderick first raised this 
issue in his annual report for 1900, and he continued to be the out-
standing proponent of the view that safety and language were closely 
related.7 Foreign miners also were charged with illiteracy and low 
intelligence. The present discipline problem in the mines, said Mines 
and Minerals, "is due to the large number of aliens .... These men are 
for the most part illiterate, and of a lower standard of intelligence than 
their predecessors of some years ago." Coal agreed, but rejected Mines 
and Minerals' solution of more discipline in favor of waiting for a 
gradual increase in intelligence among miners. "This must be a process 
along evolutionary lines; it cannot be effected by revolutionary [i.e., 
legislative] methods." "The Slav," wrote Coal and Coke Operator, "is 
a man who bears on his mental and physical make-up the effect of 
centuries of governmental and social oppression. . . . Being put to 
work early in life, the children are stunted in mentality and physique, 
as a rule." 8 The problem of miner drunkenness also was raised, though 
less often. 9 
Carelessness was not always associated with drunkenness, lingual 
or intellectual disabilities, or illiteracy. Contemporaries recognized the 
unique characteristics of the occupation and concluded that these 
characteristics were related to safety attitudes. Although supervision 
at the working face was increased by statute in the Progressive period, 
even in 1920 most states required only one visit by a mine official to 
each working face per day. Thus, particularly in large mines, the miner 
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retained a large degree of independence and freedom from control. 
Unlike factory workers, most miners worked alone or in pairs, began 
and finished work on their own schedules, and while at work labored 
as much or as little as they desired and at their own pace. Except for 
delays in the work (which, according to one union leader, were them-
selves responsible for fostering miner independence from the boss), 
miners were isolated even from their co-workers. Historically inde-
pendent, miners grew jealous of their independence and hostile to 
supervision and advice. "Anything that makes me mad," said one un-
employed miner, "is a boss trying to bulldoze me around-that's the 
worst thing I hate in the damn mine-and they don't get away with it 
either. I quit 'em and get the hell out of there. I know how to mine 
coal, the boss can't tell me nothin' ." 10 According to one Illinois in-
spector, the miners disliked face bosses, "classing them as dictators." 11 
Miners insisted that supervisory personnel had no business telling 
them where to set their timbers and, because they commonly paid for 
the explosives they used, miners questioned the boss's right to dictate 
where they placed their shots. Inspectors pictured the miner as fear-
less, proud, willfully neglectful, and hardened to danger, and they 
were often critical of the safety attitudes of older, more experienced 
miners who seemed to feel that their years in the mines had provided 
all necessary knowledge and justified their independence.12 "I am 
frequently told by miners," said inspector J. E. Sheridan from his 
experience in the New Mexico territory, "when I instruct them to make 
their places safe, that if they are willing to take the risk, they don't 
see where it concerns me, if they are in jeopardy, that they should be 
allowed to attend to their own business." 13 This traditional indepen-
dence caused one businessman to rate ex-miners as poor prospects for 
subsequent employment. "The ex-miner," he noted, "resents all sug-
gestions as to his working methods, resents all effort to compel con-
tinuous application, and assumes in general, a hostile attitude to all 
supervision." 14 One theory associates this hostility less with indepen-
dence than a form of group solidarity derived from the miner habit of 
congregating around piles of gob (slack, waste) when work stopped. 
"It's the gob pile oration," commented one miner, "that makes the 
miners less submissive than other workers." 15 
Other features of the coal business led miners to disregard danger. 
The method of paying the miner-by the ton of coal mined--encour-
aged him to get out as much coal as he could. To get out a good day's 
production, recalled former miner John Brophy, "an experienced 
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miner would often work calmly on under conditions that would ter-
rify a novice." 16 The irregular nature of employment, making each 
hour in the mine more precious, encouraged the miner to work as fast 
as possible. And a miner did not just enter the mine and begin to 
haul out coal. He was often required to make elaborate preparations 
of his working place (draining it of water, setting timbers, etc.) before 
he could begin to make his cuts and plant his shots. Because the non-
union miner received no direct compensation whatsoever for this "dead 
work," he was tempted to do it quickly and without sufficient care. 
Companies attempting to cut the death rate from falls of roof and 
coal would increase supervision rather than adjust the miner's pay to 
cover dead work. These circumstances contributed to the miner's 
reputation as an impatient, hasty, and therefore careless worker, but 
few observers realized that the miner was a victim of coal-industry 
economics. Two advisers to the Bureau of Mines, for example, ac-
knowledged the economic motivation for carelessness but labeled it, 
somewhat harshly it would appear, greed.17 
Evaluation of the relationship between the foreign miner and safety 
presents particular difficulties, since contemporaries seldom ap-
proached the subject with objectivity. One scholar, an official of the 
I 9 I o census, said that as long as accidents happened, the "best inter-
ests of society will be served by permitting the least valuable members 
of the mining communities to be the victims." To F. J. Warne, Slavs, 
unmarried and childless, were the least valuable members.18 Lyman 
Beecher Stowe reported mentioning the large loss of life in the mines 
to a corporation executive who replied: "Yes; but, after all, it's not 
so serious, because most of the men killed are ignorant foreigners who 
can be easily replaced." 19 Others believed that discipline, obedience, 
and respect for mining law were Anglo-Saxon characteristics, innate 
or the product of American institutions.20 
In the first two decades of the century, the new immigrants from 
southern and eastern Europe moved into the nation's coal mines in 
response to the demands for mine labor caused by the sharply rising 
demand for coal. The years of heaviest immigration, I905 through 
I 9 I 4, paralleled the first realization that an industrial accident prob-
lem of monumental proportions existed. The worst year in the history 
of industrial accidents, I907, was presaged by two years of very heavy 
immigration.21 Did the new immigrants in any sense cause the safety 
problems? Were they more inexperienced than the old immigrants? 
Were they less literate? Were they less able to speak English? Were 
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they, in short, more likely than their predecessors to exacerbate the 
mine-accident problem? 
Unlike the English, Irish, and Germans, who dominated immigra-
tion rolls until the 188os, few of the new immigrants had been em-
ployed as miners in their country of origin. The new ethnic groups 
moving into the mining industry-Slavs, Northern and Southern Ital-
ians, Croatians, and others-were agricultural peoples, without mining 
experience. Some 7. 7 percent of the Southern Italians engaged as mine 
workers in America had previous experience in the mines; 13.7 per-
cent of the Northern Italians; 9.8 percent of the Poles; 3.6 percent of 
the Croatians; 10.9 percent of the Magyars; and 10.7 percent of the 
Slovaks; in contrast, 88.2 percent of the Scottish and 55 percent of 
the German mine workers had mining experience abroad, but like the 
Irish and English, their influence in the mines was declining rapidly.22 
That lack of mining experience was directly related to injury and 
death was a common assumption and one supported by logic. When 
bureau director Manning said a mine was "all wondrously strange 
and intricate" 23 to the new miner, he was understating the case. Mining 
was no simple occupation to be learned in a few days. Timbering, set-
ting of shots, use of the pick and powder, and the judgments that went 
with these skills were learned only gradually. On the basis of common 
sense, the United Mine Workers Journal seems justified in concluding 
that "the peril of the mine lies in the immigrant ship." 24 Contempo-
raries, however, went beyond logic and common sense and attempted to 
prove the point using evidence that was, by itself, manifestly irrelevant. 
West Virginia, for example, published information correlating years 
of experience in the mine with absolute numbers of fatalities, thereby 
implying a relationship between inexperience (if not the new immi-
gration) and high death rates. But since the number of employees at 
each level of experience was not provided, the state's data proved 
nothing. This statistical effort tells us considerably more about the 
values and assumptions of the West Virginia Department of Mines 
than it does about the causes of mine accidents. 25 
Of the various language abilities, reading English was most valu-
able to the mine worker, since that skill would enable him to compre-
hend posted mine rules and regulations, instruction manuals, and the 
Miners' Circulars published by the Bureau of Mines. Data collected 
by the Immigration Commission in 1909 and 1910 indicate that 96.9 
percent of native-born white bituminous coal mine workers of native-
born fathers could read English; only 75·3 percent of native-born 
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Negroes of native-born fathers had similar capability. English, Irish, 
Scottish, and Welsh miners were also likely to be able to read English. 
There are, unfortunately, no data indicating the English-language capa-
bility of any other mining group. To some extent, literacy in one's 
native language would substitute for English, since mining materials 
of the type mentioned were occasionally printed in foreign languages. 
A miner was likely to be able to read if he was born in this country 
(regardless of his ethnic heritage) or if he belonged to the older im-
migrant groups. Reading ability in native language was high among 
Northern Italians (87.8 percent), Magyars (89.2 percent), and Slo-
vaks (82.4 percent) and low among Southern Italians (65.7 percent) 
and Croatians ( 66.9 percent) .26 
While there are no statistics for English-reading capability among 
most foreign-born miner groupings, the Immigration Commission did 
collect data for English-speaking capability. This, too, was a valuable 
asset for the miner, for it allowed the novice to converse with other 
English-speaking miners, many of whom had experience in the mines, 
with various mine officials, and with the mine inspector. Such con-
tacts would, presumably, accelerate the learning process and encour-
age adherence to mining laws. Table 7 reveals that of the major 
reporting groups, some-Magyars, Poles, and Slovaks-acquired En-
glish-speaking capabilities more slowly than others. 27 More important, 
it is apparent that these groups maintained their native language for 
some time. Of the reporting non-English-speaking miners who had 
been in this country for more than five but less than ten years, more 
than 30 percent still did not speak English. 
These statistics present a strong logical case for the assumption, so 
crucial in contemporary analyses of mine safety, that the foreign-born, 
new-immigrant miner was a serious obstacle to accident prevention. 
"It is clear," said the Immigration Commission, "that the employees 
of the races of southern and eastern Europe, having had little experi-
ence in mining either in this country or abroad, are particularly liable 
to accidents. And as the responsibility for accidents rests in most cases 
with the men injured, to say that they are particularly liable to acci-
dents is in effect to say that they are responsible for a considerable 
proportion of all the accidents occurring in the mines." 28 The com-
mission did not, however, provide irrefutable proof that the new im-
migrants were "particularly liable to accidents." The case for West 
Virginia was the strongest (see Table 8).29 White Americans in that 
state were some 46 percent of the reporting work force yet accounted 
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TABLE 7 
Percentage of Foreign-born Employees Who Speak English, 
by Ethnic Group and Years in the United States, 1910* 
Ethnic Number Under 5 yrs. 5-9 yrs. 10 or more Total 
group reporting % % yrs.,% % 
Bohemian and Moravian 735 43.3 72.6 91.0 72.2 
Bulgarian 172 19.2 94.4 87.5 30.2 
Croatian 2,394 47.2 68.1 78.9 57.8 
Dutch 101 66.7 78.9 96.2 84.2 
French 760 36.8 65.9 90.0 70.9 
German 2,639 63.9 85.1 97.4 90.5 
Greek 111 52.6 74.2 91.3 66.7 
Italian, north 6,528 40.3 71.5 86.7 62.2 
Italian, south 4,188 43.2 70.5 85.4 60.8 
Italian (not specified) 103 40.4 77.4 85.0 60.2 
Lithuanian 1,870 47.9 80.6 89.3 75.5 
Magyar 4,470 34.4 65.0 78.9 51.9 
Mexican 107 67.9 81.5 75.0 74.8 
Montenegrin 136 29.9 64.3 100.0 36.0 
Polish 7,190 30.5 60.1 78.8 52.1 
Roumanian 151 43.9 66.7 100.0 47.7 
Russian 1,810 41.5 73.9 87.4 60.4 
Ruthenian 300 20.9 55.1 84.9 44.3 
Servian 127 43.1 75.5 80.0 61.4 
Slovak 11,137 35.3 63.2 80.7 58.6 
Sloven ian 1,864 42.2 72.1 83.3 60.9 
Swedish 306 60.9 94.4 100.0 96.4 
Total 48,656 38.8 68.2 85.6 61.2 
*Includes only non-English-speaking groups with 100 or more males reporting. The total is for 
all non-English-speaking groups. 
TABLE 8 
Mine Fatalities in West Virginia, 
1904-1908, by Ethnic Group 
Distribution of employees, Distribution of fatalities, 
Ethnic 1908 1904-1908 
group Number % Number % 
American (white) 23,979 46.3 551 35.5 
American (black) 11,270 21.8 254 16.4 
Italian 6,046 11.7 311 20.1 
Polish 1,901 3.7 94 6.1 
Austrian 1,013 2.0 19 1.2 
Russian 851 1.6 15 1.0 
Slavic 620 1.2 96 6.2 
Lithuanian 506 1.0 35 2.3 
English 488 .9 34 2.2 
German 430 .8 24 1.5 
Irish 264 .5 7 .4 
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for only 36 percent of the fatalities; Italians, on the other hand, were 
12 percent of the reporting work force but 20 percent of the fatalities. 
Still, the number of fatalities is relatively small and susceptible to sub-
stantial changes through even one major disaster. Furthermore, in 
Pennsylvania, where the new immigrant ethnic groups formed an even 
larger percentage of the total work force, it is not at all clear that such 
groups were more liable to accidents than others (see Table 9).30 
Native white and black workers represented about IS percent of 
Pennsylvania's mine labor force in I9IO; yet from I899 through 1912 
they accounted for more than 18 percent of the mine fatalities. The 
Slavs, Italians, and Poles, on the other hand, appear to have been fa-
tality victims in rough proportion to their percentage of the bituminous 
TABLE 9 
Mine Fatalities in Pennsylvania (Bituminous), 
1899-1912, by Ethnic Group 
Ethnic Distribution of employees 
group 
American (white) 
American (black) 
Bohemian 
Croatian 
English 
French 
German 
Greek 
Irish 
Italian, north 
Italian, south 
Italian, unspecified 
Lithuanian 
Magyar 
Polish 
Roumanian 
Russian 
Scottish 
Servian 
Slovak 
Slovenian 
Swedish 
Welsh 
Austrian 
Belgian 
*Includes white and black Americans 
tlncludes all Italians 
:j:l ncludes Slovak and Slovenian 
Number % 
6,448 13.1 
913 1.9 
457 .9 
1,971 4.0 
1,312 2.7 
339 .7 
1,538 3.1 
75 .2 
663 1.3 
3,379 6.9 
2,239 4.6 
99 .5 
640 1.3 
3,528 7.2 
6,025 12.3 
105 .2 
1,283 2.6 
562 1.1 
86 .2 
9,998 20.3 
1,560 3.2 
216 .4 
191 .4 
247 .5 
153 .3 
Distribution of fatalities 
Number % 
1,216* 18.54* 
32 .49 
17 .26 
212 3.23 
40 .61 
211 3.22 
12 .18 
109 1.66 
884t 13.48t 
101 1.54 
96 1.46 
762 11.62 
3 .05 
225 3.43 
98 1.49 
1 .02 
1,214:j: 18.51:j: 
63 .96 
42 .64 
485 7.39 
28 .43 
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mining population. The group that Roderick called the "English-
speaking races"-American, English, Welsh, Scottish, Irish, and 
German-represented 24 percent of the mining population but ac-
counted for 28 percent of the fatalities over the 1899-1912 period. 
Taken together, the two sets of figures indicate the possibility-but 
only the possibility-that the new immigrant miner was an obstacle to 
progress in mining safety. At the very least, that assumption should 
have been subjected to rigorous testing. Rather than interpret its 
evidence, the Immigration Commission believed what it wanted to 
believe.31 
What should have been a tentative interpretation of the accident 
problem became an article of faith, and the foreign miner was thrust 
into the center of the mine-safety movement. Reformers focused on 
the language problem. The Bureau of Mines, wrote Manning, "has 
made much progress in its safety work among the miners, but finds that 
its work is being greatly hindered by the large number of non-English 
foreign-born, who are unable to read, write, or understand the En-
glish language and in a good percentage of cases even unable to read 
or write their own language." 32 E. E. Bach of the Ellsworth, Penn-
sylvania, Collieries, said " 'English First' is the greatest asset to Safety 
First in both government and industry." 33 Native American and older 
immigrant employees, too, complained of the safety hazards posed by 
those who did not speak English. In response to these critiques, the 
safety movement after 1908 took on an educational hue. Universities 
in Illinois, Colorado, Kentucky, and other states offered institutes and 
short courses to train miners; the YMCA and the larger coal com-
panies established night schools so that foreign miners could learn 
English. The Bureau of Mines used motion pictures to instruct miners 
who did not speak English.34 For some, education, with its implication 
that the essence of the safety problem lay in miner deficiencies, served 
essentially as a defense against unwanted state legislation. Unless the 
miners were educated, said Coal, "a code of laws as big as the State 
Capital will be of no service." 35 
During the second decade of the century, this practice of blaming 
the victim was inherent in the Americanization movement, and edu-
cation for safety and education for citizenship became virtually in-
distinguishable. The YMCA began to include instructions for obtaining 
citizenship papers in its miner education manuals; the National Safety 
Council assumed Americanization was essential to progress in safety. 
One operator claimed to see results in the Americanization program 
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administered by his company: "For two or three years we have con-
ducted classes, and have specialized on a class in Americanization 
or naturalization. Our effort there has been to cause all these men 
to want to be good Americans, to instill in them a desire for citi-
zenship, and that has worked out very well .... We try to teach the 
words and danger signs and the things they need most when they get 
into the mine. That has done a good deal to reduce our accident ratio 
among the men who don't speak English." 36 Neither of the bureau 
directors in this decade was opposed to a blend of Americanization 
and education. In I 9 I o, in response to a suggestion by John Mitchell 
that Miners' Circulars be printed in languages other than English, 
Holmes said: "As this would be a step in the line of good citizenship, 
all representatives of the Government naturally would prefer to en-
courage the miners to read English. . . . There is no possibility of 
making a good citizen out of a dead miner." Almost ten years later, 
supporting a federal bill "to promote the education of native illiter-
ates," Manning emphasized that the bill would not only save miners 
from injury and death, but would, in addition, make them good Amer-
ican citizens. "My plea, therefore," he concluded in a lengthy memo-
randum on the foreign-born in the mining industry, "is that such a 
measure as the proposed Americanization bill will not only save hu-
man life and suffering in the mining industry, but will also be of great 
economic benefit to the stat [sic], the industry, and the men; it will 
make loyal American citizens out of men who through their ignorance 
remain aliens; and it will nip in the bud such movements as Bolshevism, 
etc." 37 Manning's exhortations received a sympathetic hearing from 
those who shared the bureau director's fears of industrial unrest. 
"Every good citizen," wrote Iowa Senator Albert Cummins, "must 
favor some such legislation as you are proposing. There is nothing 
more important than the education of these people in our efforts to 
secure peace, order and efficiency in the industrial world." 38 At this 
date the Americanization movement had the support of much of or-
ganized labor, including the United Mine Workers,39 but while indus-
trial safety continued to benefit from Americanization throughout the 
first two decades of the century, by I920 the movement to make 
"good citizens" of immigrants was much less an educational device 
than a tool for social control. 
Another solution to the problem of miner carelessness was "disci-
pline," a word used to excess in the literature of the time and one 
harboring a variety of approaches to and analyses of mine safety. In 
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a general sense, discipline meant compliance by mine workers with 
state mining laws and state and company regulations; it was an end 
product, synonymous with enforcement of the law. Beyond this gen-
eralized goal, however, discipline embodied two concepts of responsi-
bility: that of the miner who, unsupervised most of the time, had to 
make responsible decisions about safety; and that of the miner who 
could make such decisions only if he were subject to strict supervision. 
The former recognized the individually responsible miner as the key 
element in the safety matrix; those who held this view of discipline 
believed that the miner must be encouraged to internalize the values 
of safety and act on them. This would likely be accomplished through 
education, but other tactics, like prosecution and dismissal, were also 
permissible.40 In contrast, the supervision side of discipline presented 
the miner as the object upon which more basic elements-the mine 
officials and inspectors-would operate; here discipline was a func-
tion of management and bureaucracy rather than labor. Implemen-
tation meant more inspectors, more regular inspection, and particularly 
more supervision at the working face, either by mine foremen or some 
new breed of face boss. Europe served as a somewhat mythical model 
for these efforts. "In European countries," noted the bureau's Ed-
ward W. Parker in a plea for "military discipline," "operations are 
under strict police surveillance." 41 Interestingly, in view of the indus-
try's emphasis on the troublesome immigrant, the foreigner was often 
characterized as more amenable to discipline than the native American 
miner. American workmen were too independent, too intolerant of 
restraint to be receptive to disciplinary measures; foreigners were more 
willing to work systematically and under close supervision. The non-
English-speaking miner, wrote Illinois labor commissioner David Ross, 
"responds more quickly to discipline [because] a part of his home edu-
cation has been to respect the orders of those in authority, and he will 
do without question what he is directed to do." 42 
Certification-the licensing of mine officials and miners by the gov-
ernment-was the miner answer to the problems of employee inex-
perience, carelessness, and incompetence. This effort to insure that 
mine employees were competent to their tasks was embodied in legis-
lation passed as early as the 1870s. In this early legislation, however, 
the employer, rather than an independent board, was the judge of 
competency. In the I8gos Illinois, among other states, began to de-
termine competency of mine officials-fire bosses and mine managers, 
for example-through a state board of examiners. Miners applauded 
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the passage of such legislation insofar as it contributed to safer mines, 
but before 1900 certification was applied only to mine officials; miners 
were not included. Five years later, coal-producing states such as 
Ohio, West Virginia, Kentucky, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Kansas had 
no certification of any kind. Although miners continued to support 
examination or certification of mine officials, their major concern after 
1900 was certification of their own numbers. The Special Committee 
on Legislation of the United Mine Workers argued in 1905 that the 
fellow servant defense then commonly upheld by the courts was in-
consistent with selection of the labor force solely by the employer.43 
The central goal of the miner and his union in supporting certifica-
tion was increased safety. To some extent certification was seen as a 
substitute for the failure of inspectors to enforce and of mine bosses 
to heed the mining law. Under these conditions, argued the United 
Mine Workers Journal, explosions could only be prevented by an 
apprentice system, under which the applicant would serve a term of 
years under a practical miner and then take an examination. Oc-
casionally miner arguments spoke the language of professionalization, 
albeit mixed with the fundamental safety argument: "No man is al-
lowed to practice law or administer medicine unless he is declared 
competent by a proper tribunal. . . . Why should not the same rule 
apply to mining? If the law can protect people from quacks and petti-
foggers why should not the mine workers be protected from the igno-
rance of their fellows?" 44 Operator fears to the contrary, worker 
control of labor markets appears to have been a minor motive in 
labor's support of miner certification. 
John Mitchell believed fundamentally that inadequate legislation 
and law enforcement more than miner incompetency were the essence 
of the safety issue, yet it was he who took up the leadership of the 
competency crusade. In I 906 he presented to the UMW A National 
Convention, for passage by the states, a bill providing for certificates 
of competency for all miners and the creation in each county in each 
state of a miners' examining board, to consist of three miners ap-
pointed by a circuit judge. This board was to grant a certificate of 
competency to a miner with two years' practical experience as a coal 
miner and with the ability to answer at least twelve questions in the 
English language. In what was essentially a drive for uniform com-
petency laws, Mitchell had the support of the national miner organi-
zation and its leaders, including Van Amberg Bittner, John Walker, 
and T. L. Lewis.45 National safety organizations not controlled by the 
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miners did not support miner certification. The Mine Inspectors' In-
stitute, which might have been expected to favor miner certification 
and to press for its uniform application in the states, did not see fit to 
discuss the issue, an omission even more obvious when viewed against 
a background of MilA advocacy of certification of all mine officials. 
Oddly enough, Joseph A. Holmes and the Industrial Workers of the 
World held similar conceptions of the appropriate place of certifica-
tion: a limited examination would precede the real education process, 
to be carried out in a mining school.46 
Operators were divided and ambivalent. Sympathetic to the general 
principle behind the legislation, they typically feared, and with some 
justification, that certification, if administered by miners as Mitchell 
and others suggested, would give labor control of the supply of work-
ers.47 Registering these apprehensions, Coal warned that certification 
laws would confer great political and industrial power on the mine 
workers' unions: "There will be a howl when certificated miners can-
not be obtained to work [the mines]." 48 To operator Justus Collins, 
passage of a certification law would force employment of certified 
miners and lead directly to union dominance in West Virginia. In 
Pennsylvania, operators successfully opposed a certification law for 
the bituminous region which would have required at least two years' 
mining experience in order to qualify for mining coal at the face. 
Miner-controlled examination boards were, in fact, in an ideal po-
sition to prevent the importation of scabs during a strike in a unionized 
district, to curtail the labor supply in order to provide steadier em-
ployment for established miners and raise payment rates, and even 
to unionize previously unorganized areas. The anthracite miner cer-
tification law was used during the 1900 and 1902 strikes to deter 
importation of scab labor. A number of trade journals, nonetheless, 
recognized the legitimate benefits to be derived from miner certifica-
tion. It would save lives and property, protect the miner from cheap 
foreign labor, and, perhaps most important, relieve operators from 
responsibility for hiring incompetent miners. But the divisions among 
operators militated against an effective certification campaign, and of 
the major coal-mining states, only Illinois and Indiana had effective 
legislation. Ohio and Montana maintained examination in word only, 
since the mine boss functioned as the examination board. As of 1915, 
West Virginia, the Pennsylvania bituminous region, and other, less im-
portant coal-mining areas had no provisions for miner examination and 
certification. 49 Even where enacted, certification did not immediately 
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fulfill miner expectations. In Illinois positions on the examination 
boards became political plums, and there and in the Pennsylvania 
anthracite region, certificates of competency were sold and granted in 
exchange for votes. Insofar as certification requirements were sup-
posed to protect the miner from non-English-speaking foreign labor, 
they largely failed; immigrants were known to have passed the lan-
guage requirements with interpreters or through friends. 50 
The activity of the United Mine Workers in behalf of certification 
was only one of numerous ways in which the union promoted safety 
in the coal mines. Nationally the UMWA was influential in creating the 
Bureau of Mines in I9IO, in securing its appropriations, and in ob-
taining the rescue and experiment stations in 19I5. It accomplished 
these goals with only the most perfunctory aid from the parent organi-
zation, the American Federation of Labor, whose priorities emphasized 
eight-hour legislation, amendments to the Sherman Antitrust Act, and 
opposition to the injunction and convict labor. The cooperative safety 
activities of the mine workers, particularly in conjunction with the 
Bureau of Mines, were substantial, and after 1905 the union's mouth-
piece, the United Mine Workers Journal, devoted a good deal of space 
-both in its regular columns and on its editorial page-to the political 
and technical aspects of coal-mining safety and to the more general 
problem of industrial safety.51 In the states, the miners' union urged 
selective support of political candidates, pressed for enforcement of 
existing safety laws, and was responsible for the formulation and 
passage of much new legislation. The tools available to the union as 
collective bargaining agent for the miners-the contract and the strike 
-were also used to pursue safety objectives, but neither was fully 
exploited and each was occasionally used to achieve objectives inimical 
to safety. And with the exception of the years from 1905 through 
1910, the union understandably emphasized organization and mem-
bership and made safety a minor and peripheral issue. 
The United Mine Workers inherited these priorities from its pre-
decessors, for the goals of membership and recognition dominated the 
early organizational efforts in the bituminous fields, where in every 
case safety was a secondary objective. The first major bituminous 
union, the American Miners' Association, was organized in West Belle-
ville, Illinois, in I 86 I; throughout its seven-year existence, the asso-
ciation was absorbed with questions of wages and methods of weighing 
coal. It nonetheless laid the groundwork for safety legislation in the 
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1870s through the support of political candidates who favored the 
miners' legislative demands. Local unions persisted from the demise 
of the American Miners' Association in 1868 until 1873, the date of 
the formation of the Miners' National Association from Illinois, Ohio, 
and Pennsylvania local groups. Its constitution, like those of other 
miner unions, listed safety and health as organizational objectives, but 
the union was too preoccupied with maintenance of the organization 
through the depression to pursue seriously the safety issue. Local or-
ganizations again held the field from 1876 to 1885, when leading 
unionists from Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, 
Iowa, and Kansas organized the National Federation of Miners and 
Mine Laborers. Although concerned primarily with ventures in na-
tional collective bargaining (setting wage rates) and conflict with 
Knights of Labor National Trades Assembly 135, the union did recom-
mend political action to obtain stronger safety legislation, particularly 
in the area of child labor. Resolution of the complex labor conflict 
began in 1888, when the National Federation and a portion of the 
Knights of Labor National Trades Assembly 135 merged as the Na-
tional Progressive Union, and was completed in 1890, when the re-
mainder of Trades Association 135 joined the National Progressive 
Union to form the United Mine Workers of America. 52 
To the UMWA, faced with roughly the same problems and obstacles 
as the earlier unions-maintenance of membership, recognition of the 
union, opposition of employers, low wages, and countless unfair labor 
conditions, safety was a peripheral concern. The issue took a back 
seat to attempts to abolish company stores and the screen coal system 
and to obtain checkweighmen, weekly paychecks, and compensation 
for dead work. The establishment in 1898 of the Joint Conference in 
much of the central competitive field did not solve the union's prob-
lems, for membership in 1898 was only about 32,000, up from 9,700 
the year before. The end of overt opposition to the union in much of 
that field, however, enabled the UMWA to increase its membership to 
more than 250,000 by 1904. Although the union continued to be faced 
with troublesome unorganized districts (West Virginia and Alabama, 
for example), the organizing successes of the previous years, coupled 
with the tum of safety conditions from bad to worse and the strong 
leadership of John Mitchell, enabled the mine workers to devote a 
proportionately greater share of their energies to safety, producing 
something approximating a miner campaign for coal-mining safety in 
the years from 1905 to 1911.53 At the 1908 annual convention of 
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miners in Pennsylvania's District 2, Pittsburgh region organizer Ed-
ward McKay captured the new interest in safety as he asked the 
delegates to resist the introduction of dangerous machinery and to re-
evaluate the importance of working conditions. "We have more to 
think of in our conventions," he said, "than the mere settlement of 
wage scales." 54 Across the coalfields, union miners responded to simi-
lar pleas with major political efforts, particularly in the states. The 
upper echelon of the union hierarchy was the slowest to move on the 
safety issue. At the March 1909 meeting of the union's National Exec-
utive Board, for example, the rash of recent disasters was not on the 
agenda, members preferring to discuss possible amendments to the 
Sherman Act, an Alabama strike, and appeals of union locals for 
financial aid. At the peak of national interest in coal-mining safety, one 
member of the executive board admitted the board had paid little 
attention to participation on a committee designed to prepare com-
pensation and safety legislation; another cautioned the organization 
not to "remain dormant as we have in the past." 55 T. L. Lewis's 1910 
presidential address couched the same ambivalence. Although Lewis 
mentioned the Bureau of Mines and the Cherry disaster, organizational 
struggles dominated his presentation. 56 
The end of the UMW A flirtation with safety was signaled by new 
organization and membership difficulties. Between 1905 and 1911, 
union membership actually decreased by some 8,ooo. The situation 
became critical in 1912 when operators in the only organized region 
of West Virginia refused to renew the contract on the agreed basis. 
Union attention was drawn to this and other unorganized areas. A 
series of important strikes and what president John P. White called 
"well organized conspiracies within our own ranks to destroy the 
organization" in Districts 2 (central Pennsylvania), 5 (Pittsburgh), 
and 10 (part of Ohio) absorbed union energies in 1912.57 Although 
the union did not completely eschew legislative activity, safety was 
eclipsed as the mine workers worried about convict labor, Taylorism, 
the injunction, and long hours. The four years after 1911 were dif-
ficult ones for the UMWA, with unemployment (particularly in the fall 
and winter of 1914) a threat to union stability. "Because of the un-
favorable industrial conditions which prevailed during the past two 
years," said White at the 19 1 6 convention, "the strength and efficiency 
of our organization have been severely tested and the ~genuity and 
ability of those in charge of the affairs of the organization have been 
tried as never before." Mother Jones echoed White. "This administra-
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tion," she said, referring to struggles in West Virginia and Colorado, 
"has had more fights on its hands, more to go up against than any 
administration you have had since you were organized." 58 Under 
these pressures, and faced with fewer and less severe disasters than 
in the preceding ten years, interest in safety, at least in the national 
conventions, declined considerably after 1912. Safety received only a 
few stylized comments from the president in his annual report and an 
address (generally routine) by the director of the Bureau of Mines. 
The war, while stimulating organization, only added to the issues con-
sidered more important than safety, and in 1918, for the first time 
since 1900, the president's report to the convention contained nothing 
about safety, the subject having been relegated to the union vice presi-
dent. The United Mine Workers Journal muzzled its powerful safety 
voice and responded instead to the urgent call of David Lloyd George, 
then British minister of munitions: "Coal means life for us and death 
for our foes. Steam means coal, rifles mean coal, shells are filled with 
coal, the explosive inside them is coal, and coal carries them right onto 
the battleship to help our men. Coal is everything to us and we want 
more of it to win the victory." 59 The union demand for nationalization 
of the coal mines in these years was based not on considerations of 
safety but on a desire to curb the waste of resources which the mine 
workers saw as a concomitant of the competitive system.60 
Following a 1938 mine-safety conference of operators, miners, and 
public officials, E. A. Holbrook, then dean of the University of Pitts-
burgh School of Engineering and School of Mines, wrote to John B. 
Andrews of the American Association for Labor Legislation. The 
conference, Holbrook said, "brought out what I have long felt-that 
neither the mine operators nor the mine workers as organized bodies, 
know much about mine safety. After all, qne cannot bargain collec-
tively with mine safety." 61 Whether or not one could bargain collec-
tively over mine safety, it was never done on any grand scale. Certainly 
the potential was there. Oklahoma's chief inspector, Peter Hanraty, 
suggested that safety was an appropriate subject for miners' meetings 
and for their contract negotiations with operators. From 1898, how-
ever, when collective bargaining was firmly established through most 
of the central competitive field, through 1930, the Interstate Joint 
Agreements were silent on safety issues. While some of the interstate 
contract provisions may have had indirect effects on mine safety (by 
stimulating production, for example), neither the original contract of 
January 28, 1898, nor its successors contained any mention of safety. 
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In presenting their bargaining position to the 1912 Joint Conference, 
the miners argued that machinery, electricity, and the use of oil and 
gas as fuel had increased the dangers in the mines. But instead of using 
the contract to decrease the dangers, the miners used the dangers to 
justify a series of demands with a heavy economic content.62 
Most contract provisions with relevance for safety were inserted at 
the district (or state) conference. Typically the district contract defined 
some of the duties and rights of the operators. Operators were often 
required to keep on hand sufficient first-aid supplies, to furnish powder 
for blasting and props for roof timbering, to construct air courses 
which would assure proper or legal ventilation at the working face, 
and to provide shields for machinery. Occasionally a specific pro-
vision required the operator to go beyond state laws, as in Wyoming 
where the 1909 contract called for twice-weekly sprinkling of dusty 
roads and entries. Operator rights included the right to designate the 
kind and quality of explosives. In Illinois miners argued for a clause 
in the contract which would make the mine examiner (fire boss) a 
representative of the miners rather than of the operator. They suc-
ceeded in this and in incorporating into the 1904 contract a provision 
for discharge or transfer of an examiner found, after adjudication, to be 
incompetent.63 For his part, the miner was bound, under most district 
contracts, to timber properly and otherwise care for his working place 
and to shoot the coal "correctly." The 1906 Illinois agreement was 
most explicit: "The United Mine Workers of Illinois shall continue 
to assume all responsibility heretofore resting upon them for the care 
of the working places and the proper character and placing of the 
blasting shots." 64 Some contracts required the miner to modify mining 
machines in order to make them safe for transporting. And they almost 
invariably included actions which the operator could take if the miner, 
through failure to carry out his contractual obligations, posed a safety 
problem. The Kanawha District contract, for example, provided that 
"any miner will be subjected to discipline who, from ignorance, care-
lessness, or any other cause, fails to properly mine, shoot and load 
coal." 65 Failure to timber the working place properly was almost al-
ways an offense for which the miner could be discharged. Illinois 
miners objected to a similar but tougher clause in the District 12 con-
tract which, they said, allowed the employer to fire an employee for 
failure to live up to the state mining law, but which "leaves the other 
parties unbound to carry out the laws of the state except as good 
citizens." 66 
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Shot-firing, a controversial issue, was the subject of numerous dis-
trict contract provisions. One contract required that shot-firers' wages 
be paid by the operators, another that they be paid by the miners. The 
1903 Indiana bituminous contract established a commission of one 
miner, one operator, and one public representative to determine if 
shot-firers were necessary in individual mines and relieved the Indiana 
operators of legal responsibility for shot-firers at work in their mines. 
In Kansas the contract provided for shooting off the solid, a mining 
method prohibited by state law. Disputes over shot-firing were a regu-
lar feature of negotiations in Illinois, where in 1904 the miners came 
to the bargaining table asking that shot-firers be employed in mines 
which were unusually gaseous, not properly ventilated, or where blast-
ing was done on the solid. The operators responded predictably. "If 
a man is not good enough to fire his own shots," said Richard New-
same, "he is not good enough to go into a coal mine .... all the oper-
ators are asking is that their coal shall be mined in a workmanlike 
manner, and then we will have no explosions from shots." 67 These 
simplistic arguments indicate that the shot-firing question, while os-
tensibly one of safety, was a matter of controversy in Illinois and 
other districts primarily because of the expense involved in hiring 
personnel to fire the shots. 
To adjudicate grievances and disputes arising out of the contract 
provisions, the contracts clarified existing arrangements and estab-
lished new procedures and institutions. Contracts typically defined 
the province of the pit committee, an elected group of miner repre-
sentatives which negotiated with the mine foreman or pit boss at the 
second stage of the grievance procedure and which, according to one 
operator, "has always contended that the miner was right and the pit 
boss was wrong." 68 But if the contract institutionalized the pit com-
mittee, it also circumscribed its functions. The I 904 Illinois agree-
ment, for example, prohibited the pit committee from traveling around 
the mine unless called to do so by the pit boss (an operator represen-
tative) or a miner. Miners argued that since they were required to 
sign the reports of the mine examiner, they should be entitled to ac-
company him on his rounds. Another agreement prohibited the pit 
committee from taking up grievances during working hours and in-
sisted that "the Mine Committee shall have no other authority what-
ever" outside of the adjustment of disputes. "It is understood," read 
this agreement, "that no Mine Committee or employee has the right 
under this agreement to stop work to adjust any grievance or call a 
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strike at any mine under any circumstances whatever." 69 The object 
of these restrictions was to prevent the committee members from as-
suming management functions and from carrying on union activities 
(particularly from calling a strike) while in the mine. Although evi-
dence on the performance of this informal mechanism is limited, ap-
parently the best of the pit committees actively worked to correct 
unsafe conditions. 70 
Analyses of the disputes under contract in all formal stages of the 
adjudication process in the anthracite, Illinois, and southwestern coal-
fields reveal that miners seldom used the formal grievance mechanism 
to complain of-or to attempt to remedy-conditions within the mine. 
The grievance system was most often used by miners attempting to 
obtain compensation for time lost waiting for mine cars and mine cages 
to transport them into, out of, or around the mine. Miner discharge 
was another frequent subject of adjudication, though within this broad 
category lay some cases related directly and indirectly to safety. Appeal 
procedures were used by miners discharged for violations of safety 
provisions in the contract, and by miners discharged (according to the 
miners) for complaining about unsafe conditions. Miners were more 
likely to employ the grievance mechanism to secure the reinstatement 
of workers dismissed for safety violations than to protest an unsafe 
condition. 71 
No matter how elaborate, the contract grievance mechanism could 
not successfully deal with every dispute arising under it. When estab-
lished procedures broke down, the result often was a strike or walkout. 
Before and after the firm establishment of collective bargaining in 
I 898, the causes of strikes reflected the fundamentally economic 
values of the union and its membership. Wage reductions were the 
central issue in an I 897 strike in the central competitive field which 
involved I5o,ooo men in five states and resulted in the calling of 
the Interstate Joint Conference. Asked by the 1900 Industrial Com-
mission for his opinion of the causes of strikes, W. C. Pearce, secretary-
treasurer of the UMWA, said: "The principal causes which lead to 
strikes, of a national character at least, are either to prevent a reduction 
of wages or demands for an increased wage." Pearce went on to sug-
gest that safe working conditions-particularly adequate supplies of air 
and timber-were important to the miner but that conditions in this 
area had improved so much that "strikes from these causes very seldom 
occur now." 72 
Safety often appeared as an auxiliary issue in a strike carried on for 
134 Coal-Mining Safety in the Progressive Period 
more basic reasons. Such was the case in the Anthracite Strike of 
1902, for here hazardous working conditions appeared not as one of 
the four basic miner demands, but as justification for the miner call 
for a 20 percent wage increase. "The rate of wages in the anthracite 
coal fields," claimed the miners, "is insufficient to compensate the mine 
workers in view of the dangerous character of the occupation." 73 One 
of the first anthracite unions, the Workingmen's Benevolent Asso-
ciation, used precisely the same argument in 1868. In a 1910-19II 
strike in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, safety was at most an 
underlying grievance of the miners. Major demands were the familiar, 
largely economic ones-wages, checkweighmen, eight-hour day, rec-
ognition. Similar conditions forced the miners to strike in Colorado in 
1903 and 1913-1914, although in each of those strikes safety was an 
issue and in 1903 the miner demand for an adequate supply of pure 
air constituted, officially at least, one of the five major grievances. 74 
Miners occasionally struck for safety reasons alone. Ohio miners 
walked out of a mine because they thought the wall between their 
mine and the adjacent one, which was flooded, was unsafe; in Denning, 
Arkansas, workers were out for nine months in a successful attempt 
to get the Western Coal and Mining Company to employ shot-firers; 
insufficient ventilation caused the miners and the shot-firers in an 
Indiana mine to go out on strike in 1908; and on several occasions 
Illinois miners refused to work when they discovered unsafe cages or 
gaseous mine air.75 The union hierarchy carefully maintained the right 
to strike or suspend operations where life or health was endangered. 
"The trade unions," wrote John Mitchell in 1903, "must continue by 
agitation and education, by appeals to legislatures, and, if necessary, 
by strikes, to enable good and compel bad employers to do everything 
within their power to lengthen the life and maintain the health of 
their workers." 76 In 1910 Edwin Perry, secretary of the UMWA National 
Executive Board, stated his belief that the grievance machinery was 
preferable to the strike unless the health or lives of the miners were 
at stake. Usually this right went uncontested, but stoppages provoked 
some operators to protest. At the Interstate Joint Conference in 1908, 
operator John H. Jones of Pennsylvania posed the problem in these 
terms: "If, on account of some accident over which the management 
of the mines has no control, some miner without consulting the mine 
management, without taking the question up with the management at 
all, and asking for another place to work in the mines, rises up and 
says to the others, 'Let's go home'; that is not unionism, that is radi-
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calism; and the man that does that is an enemy to union." 77 One can 
appreciate Jones's anxieties without acknowledging the problem as a 
serious one. Safety walkouts were always brief, seldom lasting more 
than a few days, and they were hardly a regular feature of labor re-
lations in the coalfields. In the major strikes, safety was more a means 
than an end-a device that miners used to elicit public sympathy for 
their cause and to rationalize and secure the economic demands which, 
with recognition itself, were the essence of coal unionism in these 
years. 
It is hardly necessary to state that miners would not, and did not, 
strike purposely to perpetuate or to initiate unsafe conditions. None-
theless, miner strikes initiated in ignorance or for reasons of economics 
sometimes had the effect of producing such conditions. Strikes to secure 
payment by run-of-mine were common and, if successful, increased 
mine hazards. Ignorance was the major stimulus behind a 1916 walk-
out of 2o,ooo Linton, Indiana, miners to protest the introduction of 
Edison electric safety lamps. The miners claimed that their old open 
lamps burned out small accumulations of gas and made the mines 
safer; in fact the gas in Indiana mines was at that time approaching a 
level dangerous for open lamps. The problem was sufficiently serious 
to elicit considerable attention from the Bureau of Mines. 78 
The revolt of Pittsburgh miners against certain permissible explo-
sives is illustrative of the influence of economics on union policy. Al-
though permissible explosives were first used in the United States in 
1901, their use was not actively promoted by any organization until 
1908, when the Geological Survey began testing explosives and pub-
lishing a list of permissibles. Government experts were excited about 
the possibility of reducing accidents. Clarence Hall, in charge of ex-
plosives testing for the Bureau of Mines, was convinced that the sub-
stitution of permissibles for black blasting powder would result in a 
considerable improvement in underground working conditions. By 
1915 increased use of permissibles had reduced the percentage of 
deaths caused by mine explosions. 79 Opposition to permissible explo-
sives was not unusual among miners, who in 1910 and 1911 besieged 
UMW A national conventions with resolutions opposing their forced 
use. In 1909 Ohio miners contested a bill in the state legislature which 
would have prohibited the use of black powder, their objections based 
on the projected cost of the new explosives. Trouble began in District 
5 when the Pennsylvania chief inspector ordered the use of safety ex-
plosives as tested by the United States government. Almost at once, 
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strikes broke out in areas where particular explosives-Masurite and 
Carbonite-had been selected by the operators. The miners argued, 
probably accurately, that several of the explosives rated permissible 
shattered the coal to a greater extent than did black powder or some 
other permissibles. District 5 president Francis Feehan calculated the · 
anticipated earnings reduction at five to ten cents per ton of coal 
mined. Among the other reasons for the walkouts were miner claims 
that the explosives produced a nauseous smoke and the generally 
higher purchase price of the permissibles. 80 The solutions proposed by 
the miners were not unreasonable. Some locals demanded that miners 
be paid for the excess slack produced, others that entire mines be 
placed on the run-of-mine basis, still others that general tonnage rates 
be raised to make up for the difference. There were no demands for a 
return to black powder. District officers, however, in spite of substan-
tial evidence to the contrary, denied that these or any other permissible 
explosives could contribute to safer mining conditions, claimed that 
coal dust was not an explosive agent, and refused to acquiesce in an 
investigation of the problem by a committee of the National Executive 
Board. The board, in fact, heard a report from three of its mem-
bers who claimed that the "grievances would have been amicably ad-
justed had not President Feehan broke off negotiations." 81 "President 
Feehan," noted the United Mine Workers Journal in its repudiation of 
the actions of District 5, "does not reflect the intelligence of the craft 
and sets himself in opposition to facts that have been demonstrated 
time and time again." 82 Pittsburgh region operators relished this op-
portunity to cast themselves in a leadership role in the safety move-
ment and the miners as hypocrites. "For years," said the Coal Trade 
Bulletin, "the miners have made complaints long and loud against the 
danger of the mines, urging on the legislature, the state authorities and 
the mining department the necessity of lessening the danger in the pits. 
Now, when these authorities find a way to decrease the danger, and 
attempt to put it in force, the first ones to raise a 'howl' are these self-
same miners. And this in the face of a demonstration-practical in 
that it was made in a mine under working conditions-that the per-
missible explosives produced more lump coal at a less cost and with 
a smaller quantity of explosives than could be accomplished if black 
powder had been used." 83 As distorted a picture of the safety move-
ment as this attack presented, it contained an important element of 
truth; the Pittsburgh episode had revealed extraordinary ignorance of 
elementary coal-mining safety on the part of district officials and 
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clearly demonstrated the overriding importance of mining rates to 
union membership. Illinois ope~ators failed to solve the mine-run 
problem but avoided a similar confrontation by agreeing in the con-
tract to furnish permissibles at the same relative cost as black powder.84 
As in the Pittsburgh district, miners in most parts of the nation 
strongly supported the mine-run system of payment. They regularly 
demanded payment by mine-run in their encounters with operators at 
the interstate and district levels, and their demands were met through 
the contract and state legislation. A number of areas came under mine-
run through the I 898 Interstate Joint Agreement, and by I 9 I o Illinois, 
Indiana, Kansas, Arkansas, and the Kanawha field of West Virginia 
were under some form of mine-run payment system. Ohio adopted 
mine-run in I9I3 and parts of Tennessee and Kentucky had rejected 
the screen-coal system by I920. Mine-run payment was a high priority 
miner demand for several reasons. Miners suspected that under the 
screen-coal system some operators employed fraudulent screens and 
denied workers their legitimate wages. Aside from fraud, miners knew 
that the screening method of payment provided the operators with a 
marketable slack, free of charge. In addition, the spread of permissible 
explosives after I908 made it increasingly difficult for miners to shoot 
lump coal. 
The rapid transition to mine-run had significant consequences for 
safety. Under the screen-coal system miners were encouraged to pro-
duce large lumps of coal rather than slack; as a result, they took care 
to undercut and otherwise prepare the coal before placing their shots. 
Such preparations allowed the miner to shoot the coal with relatively 
small quantities of powder. With miners paid for all the coal they 
produced-lump or slack-the normal restraints on the miner were 
removed, and time-consuming undercutting of the coal was often by-
passed in favor of shooting without any undercutting, a process known 
as shooting off the solid or solid-shooting. The pick, formerly the stock 
in trade of the miner, was partially replaced by larger charges of ex-
plosives. Although most systems of payment under mine-run called 
for higher rates for lump than for slack, miners often chose to maxi-
mize their earnings by blasting huge quantities of slack rather than 
smaller quantities of lump coaJ.85 
To this explosion-conscious generation, the crux of the mine-safety 
problem was the relationship between mine-run, solid-shooting, and 
blown-out shots. Operators tended to tie solid-shooting directly to 
mine-run. Indiana's P. H. Penna, a UMWA official turned operator, said 
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in 1906 that "the enormous loss of life is the legitimate outcome of 
the mine-run system." "We have never heard tell in our state," he as-
serted, "of blown-out shots and windy shots, of mines being blown up 
and men killed until the mine-run system became operative." 86 Like 
other operators, Penna suggested remedying the situation through a 
return to the screen-coal basis, a solution also advocated by the Ameri-
can Mining Congress. Other solutions that appeared feasible to indi-
vidual operators included prohibition, by individual companies, of 
shooting off the solid; increased supervision of miners at the working 
face; and criminal penalties for solid-shooting.87 
In the face of operator objections, miners nationwide came to the 
defense of the mine-run system. Fully aware of the dangers of solid-
shooting, they rejected the operator assumption that the shooting 
method was inalterably tied to the payment method. The answer, they 
said, was not to return to a corrupt (at the very least, corruptible) 
screen-coal payment system, but to employ professionals to fire shots 
in the mine. Shot-firing legislation became popular following the May 
I, 1900, disaster at the Winter Quarters mine in Utah, and by 1906 
was in effect in Missouri, Iowa, Kansas, Illinois, and Indiana. Mitchell 
of the miners' union expressed the hope that shot-firing legislation 
would become widespread; it is, he said, "the only measure" by which 
loss of life due to explosions can be "reduced materially." 88 In In-
diana miners at one point resolved to sign no contract with the opera-
tors until "a well drilled force of shot firers shall be employed." 89 In 
Illinois the struggle over shot-firing was particularly acute. Operators 
called the proposed shot-firing law of 1905 "vicious" and claimed the 
costs of employing shot-firers would price Illinois coal out of national 
markets. It was not long before the Illinois shot-firing controversy de-
generated, like so many similar events, into petty squabbles involving 
a few cents per ton of coal mined. Essentially, operators wanted the 
system which would be least likely to increase their cost of production; 
the miners wanted the one which would be most likely to increase 
their wages. In the process operators ignored the obvious failures of 
the screen-coal system, and miners paid no heed to the destructive 
characteristics of the mine-run system and refused to acknowledge the 
serious hazards faced by professional shot-firers.90 
If the contract was not used as effectively as it might have been, if 
through ignorance or economic need miners and union leaders failed to 
confront the safety issue head-on with the strike, and occasionally 
rationalized an inaccurate notion of mine safety, still the sum total 
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of union actions was unquestionably in favor of safer coal mines. Or-
ganized miners had their representatives in state and national capitals, 
on pit committees, and at every other stage of the grievance procedure; 
their unity gave them a voice in politics and a voice at the mine, in-
cluding some freedom from being discharged for complaining about 
dangerous conditions. Although the individual miner may have con-
tributed to the mine-safety problem, the union sanctioned enforce-
ment of the mining laws, reporting violations to mine officials and 
inspectors, discouraged workers from riding on loaded cars and motor 
trips and from disobeying mine rules, and interjected miner influence 
into the appointment process for inspectors. "If it was not for the 
trade unions," announced Ohio inspector D. H. Sullivan to the an-
nual convention of the MilA, "the mining laws of my state ... would 
not be properly enforced." 91 That organization was a prerequisite to 
mine safety was an article of faith with the United Mine Workers Jour-
nal, whose editors seldom lost the opportunity to contrast conditions 
in organized and unorganized areas. When the Ziegler mine at Ziegler, 
Illinois, exploded, the Journal found it "curious that the only unor-
ganized mine in Illinois has had two explosions in recent years, while 
in all the others that are organized there has been no such dire calamity 
happen." 92 The same charge was brought even more directly follow-
ing explosions at Eccles, West Virginia, and Dawson, New Mexico. 
Available statistics indicate that, at the very least, the miner in a 
state completely organized by the union was more likely to stay alive 
than one mining coal in an unorganized state. In I907 there were 2.47 
men killed per one thousand employed in the thoroughly organized 
states; 5.07 per one thousand in the partially organized states; and 
9·49 in the states without organization.93 There was no small element 
of wisdom in the suggestion of the Journal that in more than half the 
cases, the verdict of the coroner's jury should be "Death was due to 
lack of organization."94 
CHAPTER 
5 
The Operator as Victim 
. , 
bm GREEDY, insensitive, vindictive operator was one of the 
day's most common characterizations, usually an indulgence of miners 
but a conception which also had wider appeal. Following the Cherry 
disaster, UMWA officials charged that mine officials had closed the 
shafts prematurely, "without regard to the lives of the miners," solely 
for the purpose of salvaging and protecting mine property.1 Three 
hundred lives, added socialist Adolph Germer, "have been snuffed out 
through capitalist greed." 2 A similar picture of the coal operator 
emerges from "The Draped Charter," a poem authored by an Indiana 
miner: 
Our charter is draped; there is great lamentation 
There's widows and orphans, the morgue and the bier; 
With fiendish glee and with grim exultation, 
Death rode through the mine in a chariot of fire. 
How great was the crime and how needless the slaughter-
The call of the dollar-black and bloody the deed; 
It caused the heart-breaking of mother and daughter 
This dividend-making, this profit and greed.3 
Organizer Mother Jones told this story: 
I was talking with a miner's wife one day when we heard a distant 
thud. She ran to the door of the shack. Men were running and scream-
ing. Other doors flung open. Women rushed out, drying their hands 
on their aprons. 
An explosion! 
Whose husband was killed? Whose children were fatherless? 
"My God, how many mules have been killed!" was the first excla-
mation of the superintendent. 
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Dead men were brought to the surface and laid on the ground. But 
more men came to take their places. But mules-new mules-had 
to be bought. They cost the company money. But human life is cheap, 
far cheaper than are mules.4 
Incidents and opinions of lesser drama but perhaps better authority 
also abound. A reveali.llg exchange took place in 1909 at a legislative 
committee hearing in Pennsylvania to which operators and miners 
had been called to give their views on a major proposal for reform of 
the safety laws. Speaking for the miners of UMWA District 2, president 
Patrick Gilday recommended passage of the bill in question, though 
it had, he said, already been compromised by "commercialism," and 
he concluded his statement to the committee with some comments on 
miners' asthma. When he had finished, the first operator to respond 
said, "I have never met a miner with asthma." 5 Mixed as they are, 
the state inspectors' reports contain similar observations. James Blick, 
retiring from Pennsylvania's Seventh District after twenty years as an 
inspector, noted in his final report the substantial cooperation he had 
received from mine operators. "There are others," he continued, "both 
operators and officials, holding responsible positions, who always take 
a delight in evading the mining law, and neglecting their duties as far 
as possible, especially in matters relative to health and safety. Their 
actions would seem to indicate that their humane principles are very 
limited." 6 
Descriptively, this kind of evidence confirms what we already knew: 
that large numbers of coal operators and their hired officials did not 
do everything possible to make the mines safe; that they resisted en-
forcement of state mining laws and were consistently a conservative 
influence in the state legislatures; that they often spoke and acted in 
a manner that could reasonably be described as callous. Analytically, 
however, the insensitive and greedy operator is not a concept of much 
utility. It neither adequately clarifies why many operators were not 
sufficiently committed to safety, nor does it explain the operators who 
apparently had some substantial interest in safety except by implicitly 
endowing them with high morality and good character. The concept 
does not account for the substantial operator interest in establishing 
and funding a bureau of mines, in federal experiment and rescue sta-
tions and cars, or in the campaign for uniform state legislation, and it 
ignores the cooperation between operators and miners on numerous 
state commissions charged with developing mine-safety legislation 
agreeable to labor and capital. 
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Although no one model can encompass the behavior of thousands 
of individual operators, only an economic model of behavior makes 
sense of most of the data. According to this model, coal-mine operators 
were economic men, strongly influenced-even in their attitudes 
toward safety-by considerations of profit and loss. Within this frame-
work, an operator might be receptive or hostile to safety, but he would 
make each decision on the basis of the anticipated effect it would have 
on his economic condition-on the physical property of his or the cor-
poration's mine, future earnings, his own livelihood. Operator re-
sponses to a number of safety stimuli-workmen's compensation, 
schedule rating, the unions, public pressure-were conditioned largely 
by economics. 
An economic model of behavior has a peculiar relevance to bi-
tuminous coal because of that industry's unique structural and per-
formance characteristics: a low level of concentration; thousands of 
small firms; chronic excess capacity; minimal profits.7 Coal-industry 
economics placed enormous pressures on operators to hold down 
costs, especially for labor but even for items, like safety, which repre-
sented a relatively small share of total costs. As a whole, coal operators 
were neither greedy nor motivated by any particular desire to oppress 
labor by depriving it of safe working conditions; in an important sense 
they were the victims, captives of an industrial structure and system 
which treated natural and human resources with equal disdain. Fear-
ful of losing ground in the competitive struggle, operators opposed 
state legislation and administrative regulation, made much of the 
expense incident to safety legislation, and were reluctant to under-
take experimental mine-safety work requiring heavy financial com-
mitments.8 From their business perspective, however, operators saw 
that only by transcending the states through national action would 
safety and competition be made compatible, and they turned to na-
tional solutions-to the Bureau of Mines and uniformity-to solve the 
problem of interstate competition. 
An economic model illuminates different aspects of the safety at-
titudes of West Virginia operators A. B. Fleming and Justus Collins. 
A former governor of West Virginia whose coal holdings included the 
Clarksburg Fuel Company, the Pittsburgh and Fairmont Fuel Com-
pany, and the Southern Coal and Transportation Company, Fleming 
presents the classic case of the big operator turned cautious reformer. 
When the explosion in his Monongah mines, by reputation among the 
safest in the nation, touched off new enthusiasm for mine-safety re-
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form, Fleming and his fellow operators reacted well within the norms 
of the economic model. Fearful that an aroused state legislature might 
enact costly legislation, they shifted the focus of the reform movement 
to the national government. Fleming was Joseph A. Holmes's strong-
est ally in the campaign to establish coal-mining safety securely in the 
Geological Survey and the Bureau of Mines. "The Fairmont Coal 
Company," wrote Holmes to Fleming in a handwritten note in 1909, 
"has shown an admirable desire to cooperate with us in everything 
looking to the betterment of the coal mining industry." 9 Cooperation, 
however, did not extend to every aspect of mine safety. Understandably 
chagrined at the public-relations impact of explosions (for any num-
ber of reasons, including the economic), Fleming did his best to 
minimize publicity in this area. Upon receiving a copy of Fleming's ad-
dress to the West Virginia Board of Trade, the secretary of the West 
Virginia Mining Association, Neil Robinson, wrote him that he was 
"really quite glad that you decided to omit references to the mining 
fatalities which have clouded the coal industry in the past." 10 Even 
after Monongah, Fleming's own properties were in violation of West 
Virginia safety regulations. Passed February 22, 1907, Section 25 
of the state mining law called for the adoption, distribution, and pub-
lication by the management of special rules for the government and 
operation of its mines. Fleming, in a letter to George T. Watson, 
manager of his Consolidation Coal Company, noted that Consolida-
tion had not adopted the special rules required by the mining law. 
Some individuals and the company itself, he said, could be charged 
with a misdemeanor and fined or imprisoned. Fleming continued: 
I don't think there is much likelihood of anyone being indicted or 
fined, and I only call this to your attention incidentally; but in the 
event we should have some serious accident at one of these mines 
and if it should turn out, as it necessarily would, that no special rules 
had ever been adopted as required by the foregoing section, it seems 
to me that the company and the officers of the company, as well, 
might get in very serious trouble; it is very possible that the company 
itself would be liable in damages, without regard to what caused the 
accident. It is also possible that the officers of the company, in the 
event some one or more persons should be killed, might be held liable 
for manslaughter. 
In addition to this, there is the further possibility that the State 
Mine Inspectors might close up those mines until such special rules 
are adopted and promulgated. 
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Fleming, at least in this letter, did not demand of Watson that the 
regulations be fulfilled; and if he did imply that some attempt to satis-
fy the law be made, the grounds were not that lives would be saved, 
but rather that the company would be liable for damages, its officers 
liable for manslaughter, and the mine forced to discontinue produc-
tion. 11 Although this incident indicates the insufficiency of the eco-
nomic model and the complex nature of Fleming's safety posture, it 
also reveals the primacy of Fleming's interest in production and the 
corporation. 
Justus Collins presided over a much smaller empire, but his safety 
views were filtered through business values to an even greater degree. 
Unlike Fleming, who saw the explosions of 1907 and 1908 at least 
partially as problems in need of scientific solutions, Collins viewed 
them in the context of the attempts of the United Mine Workers to 
unionize the state. The explosions, he concluded, were "caused inten-
tionally. Any man could slip in three or four hundred pounds of high 
percentage dynamite and by applying a long fyse [sic] to it could set 
it off and be out of danger himself before the explosion occurred." 
Once the union had caused the explosion, Collins continued in a letter 
to private detective T. L. Felts, asking him to investigate the problem, 
the mine workers could go to the West Virginia legislature and re-
quest "drastic legislation against the coal operators and mine owners, 
and the union with all their following, and the demagogues throughout 
the State, would like to see all kinds of legislation enacted which will 
practically put the operators out of business." 12 Collins wrote in a 
similar vein to owner Isaac T. Mann of the Lick Branch mine, the site 
of two recent explosions. "You will observe," he said, "with what 
wonderful regularity they occur about the time the West Virginia leg-
islature goes in session, and with what vigor and insistence the labor 
union lobby and all the labor union politicians insist upon Iiscensed 
[sic] miners, the prohibition of other labor than that of citizens of the 
State and all other kinds of fool things, basing all their claims [on the 
argument] that the ignorant laborer working in our mines is the cause 
of explosions and consequent loss of lives." 13 
Seven years brought no change in Collins's attitude toward the 
union. He could still write that "we should drive the Union out of the 
State from one end to the other, as far as the coal fields are con-
cerned."14 But a change had occurred in his attitude toward coal-mine 
explosions. He had absorbed the "new" scientific information indicat-
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ing that dust explosions took place, and with greater frequency in cold 
weather than warm; cold weather, not the meeting of the state legis-
lature, signaled the period of danger in the mines. In I9II Collins 
wrote to his superintendent: "You should watch your No. 2 mine with 
great care and see that no dust is allowed to be made under any cir-
cumstances. No expense should be spared to keep the dust down and 
avoid the danger of an explosion .... If we should have an explosion 
at this time, on top of all our other troubles, we had about as well 
give up the fight." 15 Collins wanted the explosion problem solved not 
only because a solution would prevent "drastic" legislation, but also 
because his mining operation was in financial difficulty and could not 
withstand the burdens of a destructive explosion. Other correspon-
dence indicates that Collins wanted his employees to have an adequate 
insurance system, that he took safety into consideration when con-
templating the wisdom of speeding up a particular mining process, and 
that he was receptive to the criticisms of the state mine inspector. 
George Wolfe, general manager of Collins's Winding Gulf Company, 
could, evidently with impunity, write to Collins that he had stopped 
work in a particular section of the mine following an inspection, "as 
we do not care to take any chances in matters of this kind even through 
[sic] it curtails our tonnage for a few weeks," and Wolfe had sufficient 
confidence in Collins that he could only months later commit the 
company to a $3,000 expense for ventilation without consulting the 
owner. Collins did not in any way resist Wolfe's plan to put the mines 
of the Winding Gulf Colliery Company "in first class shape." Though 
he did not participate in the national campaign for the Bureau of 
Mines, Collins's commitment to safety-especially considering his 
hostility to unionization-appears to have been every bit as great as 
that of the more vocal Fleming. The greater subtlety of Fleming's 
politics should not obscure the essential similarities: both were busi-
nessmen, concerned with profit and production, accepting safety if it 
meant direct or indirect gain, rejecting safety in its more costly forms-
especially state legislation.16 
If one assumes that employer opposition to unionization was pri-
marily economic in impulse, the economic model also accounts for 
the use of safety as an anti-union device. Hoping to allay worker dis-
content and undercut the union movement through various forms of 
welfare, employers provided housing, medical facilities, schools, rec-
reation, and safer working conditions. Thus company safety work was 
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often part of a larger welfare movement motivated not by selfless 
humanitarianism but by the desire to beat the unions at their own 
game.17 The most common form of anti-union paternalism in the coal-
mining industry was the employee representation plan, placed into 
operation where recognition of the union had been refused. The first 
such plan was established in the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company 
mines of John D. Rockefeller following the Colorado coal strike of 
1913, and the model soon was adopted by other large companies, 
among them the Davis Coal and Coke Company of West Virginia and 
the Pacific Coast Coal Company of Washington. Under the Colorado 
plan, the company's twenty mines were divided into four districts. 
The employees of each district selected three of their number to serve 
on a joint committee on safety and accidents with three employees 
selected by the management. The joint committee could bring to a 
company official (starting with the superintendent) any matter per-
taining to safety in the mines. Employees with grievances over safety 
could relay them through the joint committee which, with the company 
mine inspector, inspected the mines three times a year.18 Historians of 
employee representation plans have found the reality less encouraging 
than the theory. Employees were reluctant to register their grievances 
with company foremen or superintendents for fear of being discharged; 
miners were highly critical of their representatives and claimed they 
did not fairly represent them.19 That safety was a secondary consid-
eration in such plans was made explicit by one Pennsylvania company 
official. "When government regulation of Coal Mining had to come in 
Western Penna.," he said, "we did our best to place it on a parental 
basis instead of a police basis desired by trade union demagogues 
[sic]." 20 
United States Steel Corporation, in the forefront of the movement 
to extirpate unions, also employed the most advanced safety measures 
and systems in its coal-mining subsidiaries. One contemporary who 
was close to all phases of the safety movement described the work of 
United States Steel's H. C. Frick Coal and Coke Company in terms 
which reveal the fruits of paternalism: "Many of this company's pre-
cautions against accidents are not prescribed by law, but are subject 
entirely of the company's own initiation and adoption. It has, in fact, 
anticipated every legal measure laid down by state or national govern-
ment for mine safety." 21 The Frick Company also shares responsibility 
for the slogan "Safety First," having employed its predecessor, "Safe-
ty the First Consideration," in a 1907 safety campaign.22 
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United States Steel's interest in safety was also consistent with the 
company's size. The larger coal companies, with their superior financial 
resources and greater overhead, were usually the ones to institute em-
ployee representation and other programs of more exclusively safety 
content. Only the larger companies could consider placing telephones 
in the mines; finance their own scientific investigations of safety prob-
lems; send men to Europe to study modem methods of conservation 
and accident prevention, as the H. C. Frick Company did; or publish 
safety literature in several languages.23 They were usually more ag-
gressive in adopting permissible explosives and special sprinkling cars 
for the control of coal dust and in establishing company safety pro-
grams. "Go where you will among mining operations to-day," said 
H. M. Wilson to the first session of the National Safety Council, "and 
if the company is big enough you will find a safety organization." 24 
When the Ohio Mining Commission suggested a costly system of safety 
foremen, one journal reported favorable reaction only from the large 
Pocahontas Company. The others, said Coal Age, are "not so eco-
nomically favored." 25 In Arkansas, the small operators formed the 
core of opposition to shot-firing legislation, claiming it would put 
them out of business. Mine inspectors generally agreed that the larger 
companies used more specialized safety methods and more advanced 
safety materials than did the smaller companies and that they were 
less likely to evade the mining laws. "The greatest trouble we have," 
noted a Colorado inspector, "is with the small fellows." 26 
The association of safety and economics was reinforced during the 
Progressive years by the efficiency movement, as increasing numbers 
of businessmen came to equate safety with economy and with corporate 
and national efficiency. This tendency ran deepest within the National 
Safety Council, a businessman's organization, where H. J. Bell of the 
Chicago and Northwestern Railroad announced that "Safety is ef-
ficiency, and every time a man is injured so that he has to give up his 
duties for a time a new man has to be put in his place and the whole 
work is disorganized. . .. I think every foreman is interested in pro-
duction, and if he is interested in production he is interested in ef-
ficiency, and, first of all, a foreman must be interested in Safety." 27 
The efficiency theme took on added importance with the entrance of 
the United States into the European war; David Van Schaack, council 
president, called on his organization to promote "our national effi-
ciency" by "saving thousands of men and women each year from ac-
cidental death and maiming." 28 The safety movement, said Ferd C. 
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Schwedtman of the National Association of Manufacturers, "is not 
only a humane movement, it is also a business proposition, a question 
of efficiency .... in making cripples of our workmen, ... we are wast-
ing from four to five times as much energy and money as it would cost 
to prevent them." 29 In coal mining, the operator commitment to safety 
as efficiency was less than complete, though there was a good deal of 
lip service to the concept and some genuine recognition of how costly 
mine disasters could be. The economic cost of mine fires was par-
ticularly well known to operators, and the Bureau of Mines was 
created partly to prevent this burning of corporate assets. The defen-
sive nature of the operator approach to the efficiency question is in-
dicated in this statement by a Pennsylvania operator: "I don't know 
why there always seems to be such an insinuation against that word 
'economy,' as though mine operators considered economy before 
safety. Now, it was not considered in that light at all. Many of the 
big mine operators of to-day look on the words 'economy' and 'safety' 
as being synonymous terms." 30 
Between 1910 and 1920 operators came increasingly to view safety 
as a reform movement which made economic sense, and the basic rea-
son was workmen's compensation legislation. Under the system of 
employers' liability, which was dominant well into the twentieth cen-
tury, employers could avail themselves of three defenses under com-
mon law: fellow servant, assumption of risk, and contributory 
negligence. Although the fellow servant and assumption of risk doc-
trines were modified by state courts and legislatures in numerous states 
during the 1890s and early 1900s, few of those injured or killed-by 
one estimate 12 percent of the total-were compensated. The Ohio 
agency of the Aetna Insurance Company paid only 6 percent of its 
claims for injury and death from 1903 to 1910.31 The historian of the 
Iowa system concluded that it did little or nothing to reduce the num-
ber of work accidents.32 John Mitchell called the legal defenses avail-
able to the employer "decayed relics of the so-called wisdom of the 
law." 33 After 1900 a revolution took place in systems of compensa-
tion for industrial accidents. The first effective compensation act was 
a federal one, passed in May 1908 for the benefit of men injured or 
killed while working in hazardous occupations in service to the United 
States government. Montana's act of 1909 was the first to affect coal 
miners explicitly. The big boom came in 19II, when twenty-three 
states enacted some kind of compensation legislation or created com-
missions to study the problem. While none of these early laws made 
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provtston for compensation of occupational diseases, most of the 
statutes, using a phrase borrowed from the British compensation acts, 
provided compensation for "personal injury by accident arising out 
of and in the course of employment," and those of eight states, includ-
ing Illinois and Ohio, granted additional compensation or additional 
rights of action "for injuries caused by the employer's violation of the 
safety acts or by his personal gross negligence or deliberate intention 
to cause the injury." 34 Among the organizations lending strong sup-
port to the campaign for workmen's compensation were the National 
Civic Federation (after I909), the United Mine Workers (after I9IO), 
and the American Mining Congress (after I 9 I I). By I 920 every state 
but six, all in the South, had some kind of workmen's compensation.35 
Although the motives for coal-operator support of compensation 
legislation are obscure, they no doubt were not much different from 
those of the rest of the business class: the prospect of eliminating con-
flict with labor engendered by litigation over industrial injury, the 
attraction of rationalizing and making predictable the costs of acci-
dents, the gradual erosion of the legal protections under employers' 
liability, and the fear of labor radicalism.36 If, however, accident pre-
vention were considered only a residual benefit of compensation leg-
islation, the system apparently resulted in safer working conditions. 
Statistics are too poor, and relevant factors too many, to allow any 
precise estimate of the impact of workmen's compensation on accident 
prevention, but contemporaries considered the system effective. "Com-
pensation undeniably is followed by prevention," John Mitchell stated 
flatly. Workmen's compensation laws, added Carter Goodrich, "have 
done something toward 'making props cheaper than men.' " 37 
Workmen's compensation functioned through private companies or 
state agencies, some states, like Ohio, making it difficult for private 
firms to operate within their domains. The Associated Companies was 
a private organization that served companies located in some eight 
states, including Illinois, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky, which 
had compensation legislation encouraging private insurance, and it 
offers an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of workmen's com-
pensation on a geographically limited but fairly extensive scale. 
Formed in I9I5 and I9I6 under the auspices of the Travelers Insur-
ance Company, Hartford, Connecticut, Associated consisted of ten 
stock insurance companies united in a cooperative agreement designed 
to spread the risks of coal mining and "to furnish the final answer to 
the claim that coal mining risks with their large collective hazards 
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cannot be distributed by means of stock insurance." From the be-
ginning, Associated sought close relationships with federal mine-
safety experts, calling on the Bureau of Mines to provide an impartial 
chief inspector for the organization. Although there was some dis-
agreement within the bureau about the requisite qualifications for 
such a position, Associated ultimately selected H. M. Wilson for his 
superior administrative ability.38 
Associated's distinctive contribution to accident insurance was 
schedule rating, a particular kind of merit rating which involved the 
comparison of actual conditions in a particular mine with perfect con-
ditions in a standard mine in a limited, relevant, geographical area. 
The system was designed to reward, through lower premiums, opera-
tors who conformed to the safety standards established by Associated. 
The primary bottleneck in the system was the determination of the 
requirements of a safe mine within a particular state, and in adopting 
a set of safety standards the Associated Companies made use of the 
work of organizations such as the National Fire Protection Associa-
tion and the Underwriters' Laboratories. Naturally, however, the most 
important source of information for standards was the Bureau of 
Mines.39 The cooperative relationship between the Associated Com-
panies and the bureau was a close one, in spite of its informality. 
Bureau officials heartily approved of risk classification, confident it 
would contribute to adoption of advanced safety appliances. George 
Rice, chief of the bureau's Mining Division, was well aware of the 
influential role the bureau would play in the formation of standards 
and stood firmly behind the Associated's efforts. The inspections of the 
Associated Companies, he wrote, would provide the bureau with "a 
far more effective agency than ... the casual visits of the state inspec-
tors, because there would be a money influence at stake behind the 
insurance inspector's reports." 40 The first standards of the Associated 
Companies were actually prepared in consultation with the bureau 
and state mining officials. James E. Roderick, chief of the Department 
of Mines in Pennsylvania, was particularly hopeful. "If you can suc-
ceed in forcing compliance with these rules," he said, "you will ac-
complish what the Department of Mines has tried to accomplish for 
years, but without complete success." The addition of the Associated 
inspectors to the state's staff would, claimed Roderick, produce a sub-
stantial reduction in mine casualties.41 
Under the system in its final form, each state was rated as to "cause" 
of fatality, the total adding up to 100 percent. "Safety Organiza-
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tion" and "Safety Measures" each comprised 20 percent of the total, 
with the remaining 6o percent allotted to technical causes, such as 
accidents from electricity, coal dust (5 percent), falls of roof, and 
haulage. Each of these groupings-no matter how small a percentage 
of the total-was subdivided into one hundred points. An operator 
who had done everything possible to prevent a coal-dust explosion, 
then, would receive one hundred points for that particular category, 
which would amount to 5 percent of his total score. Although the 
standards included broad, general statements (superintendents should 
encourage mine safety), each category was standardized to some ex-
tent, for example, by fixing the ratio of foremen and shot-firers to 
total employees and by defining the contents of a good safety organi-
zation. The system was an obvious attempt to objectify inspection.42 
Operator response to the Associated program was immediate and 
positive in those states, like Kentucky and Pennsylvania, which re-
quired mining companies to maintain compensation insurance. In 
Kentucky the compensation law had not been in effect ten days be-
fore operators were pressuring the Bureau of Mines to provide addi-
tional rescue and first-aid training facilities. The company's standards, 
said Wilson, had encouraged Kentucky operators to earn the reduction 
in premium which would result from having their men trained in first 
aid.43 The bureau had already spent considerable sums on rescue and 
first-aid work in Kentucky, expenditures, it reminded Wilson, which 
had aroused no particular enthusiasm among Kentucky operators. 
The prospect of the bureau providing additional facilities, moreover, 
came into direct conflict with the bureau's desire to see operators un-
dertake their own training. George Rice saw Wilson's plan as im-
practical, noting "it would merely relieve the operators of expense" 
and speculating that Wilson had put too high a premium on rescue 
stations when fixing his insurance rates. Two years later bureau of-
ficials were still worried that the stimulus of the Associated Companies 
would produce a demand for more first-aid facilities than the bureau 
could provide. 44 
In Pennsylvania the Associated Companies was able to induce op-
erators to establish three cooperative rescue and training stations with 
their own funds. Wilson projected the cost of the stations and esti-
mated the premium rates, and Pennsylvania mine owners responded 
quickly. Wilson's company also encouraged the formation of mine-
rescue and first-aid organizations, and Associated insurance inspec-
tions prompted companies to establish safety committees and to em-
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ploy additional superintendents. Difficulties arose in Kansas, where 
intransigent operators only slowly improved their mines; in Ohio, 
where statutes made private insurance an impossibility; and in regions 
where operators felt Associated standards were particularly inappro-
priate.45 In general, however, the Associated experience indicates that 
coal operators would respond to appropriate statutory and financial 
stimuli. 
Associated worked its limited good in an industry that remained 
tragically disorganized, "too poor to fight, too cowardly or too virtuous 
to steal," as an operator attorney had eloquently stated.46 "As we all 
realize," wrote the empathetic Holmes to his friend Fleming, "as 
anxious as the operators in this country are to do everything pos-
sible for safety and for clean mining, it is impossible for many of 
them to carry out such plans because of the exceedingly low prices of 
coal at the mines." 47 Fully convinced that excessive competition lay 
at the heart of the industry's problems, coal operators between 1890 
and 1920 searched long and hard for mechanisms which would miti-
gate its impact. To equalize costs of production and distribution over 
competitive areas, they sought uniform state legislation, uniform con-
ditions under the interstate agreement, and even some forms of na-
tional legislation; they tried fixing prices and selling through common 
sales agencies; and when these attempts at cooperation were rebuffed 
by the Justice Department, operators turned to corporate consolida-
tion and ultimately to national politics. In November 1909 Illinois, 
Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania operators called on President Wil-
liam Taft to secure his approval of changes in the antitrust laws which 
would permit the coal operators, as Holmes phrased it, "to 'get to-
gether' and arrange for a price on bituminous coal at the mine, such as 
would render possible mining with less loss of life and waste of coal." 
The president, however, reportedly "could see no escape from a con-
tinuance of the present system of vigorous competition." "This only 
confirms our fear," Holmes wrote Mitchell, "that he does not realize 
what this system is, nor what it is doing for the coal miner and for our 
coal resources." 48 Operators held out hope that Woodrow Wilson's 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) would sanction basic structural re-
adjustments in the industry, but here, too, they were to be disappointed, 
as the FTC refused to exercise prior approval over trade agreements 
and passively acquiesced only in weak statistical associations. 
Lacking political support to counter its inherent centrifugal tenden-
cies, the coal industry was consistently frustrated in its organizational 
OPERATOR AS VICTIM 153 
efforts. Although the earliest coal associations date back at least to 
the I87os, the first ones of importance developed in the I89os. The 
Illinois Coal Operators' Association was formed in I 897 to deal with 
competitive conditions affecting the whole state and to negotiate with 
the union; the Indiana Operators Association was organized in I900, 
the Southwestern Interstate Coal Operators Association in I903. In 
I 9 I 6 there were more than twenty local, state, and regional associa-
tions of operators, and in I925 there were more than forty. Whether 
located in union or nonunion coalfields, these associations usually had 
increased safety as one of their goals. One of the constitutional objec-
tives of the Smokeless Coal Operators' Association, for example, was 
to provide "the best, safest and most approved means for mining of 
coal and the safeguarding of miners and others employees engaged in 
such pursuits." 49 Some, like the Smokeless Coal Operators' Associa-
tion and the Illinois Coal Operators' Association, engaged in the poli-
tics of safety in state and national capitals, while others, like the 
regional Coal Mining Institute of America, were concerned with 
safety only in its technical aspects.50 Local, state, and regional as-
sociations, however, could neither deal effectively with the basic 
problem of competition in a national market nor work productively 
toward the goal of uniform state legislation. Solutions in these areas 
required a national association of operators. Impetus for such an or-
ganization came from Illinois, the state which had earlier separated 
from the joint conference but which now found its competitive posi-
tion eroding under the banner of individualism. Illinois, said Chicago's 
Black Diamond, "was pleading for some united action that would 
bring a harmonious result in the various states. She wanted to end 
the practice of the miners of dividing the operators into groups and 
whipping them piecemeal." 51 Not long after negotiations began in 
I909, it became clear that not all operators saw Illinois's suggestion 
as benign. A. B. Fleming expressed the viewpoint of most West Vir-
ginia operators. "It seems to me," he said, "that it would be impossible 
for our West Virginia Association to become a member unless we in-
tend to 'unionize' and recognize the United Mine Workers, as I sup-
pose all will do who join the National Association." When Ohio and 
Pittsburgh region operators also proved unwilling, the movement col-
lapsed, and the American Federation of Coal Operators remained a 
regional association. 52 
The failure to create a viable national association vitiated a possi-
ble source of national reform and a possible lever for elimination of 
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destructive competition. Organizationally, it also served to shift op-
erator interest in safety into national organizations with more com-
prehensive memberships-the American Mine Safety Association, the 
National Safety Council, and the American Mining Congress. As the 
coal-mine operators' national political arm, the American Mining 
Congress (see Chapter 2) was the most crucial organization and the 
most disappointing. After I9IO it reverted to its traditional emphasis 
on metal mining and played a major role in the Bureau of Mines's new 
western orientation. More rewarding was operator involvement in the 
American Mine Safety Association (AMSA), a first-aid and rescue or-
ganization established in I9I2. The National Safety Council (Nsc), 
which absorbed the AMSA and its functions in I9I5, also originated in 
I9I2, the brainchild of Lew R. Palmer, chairman of the Safety Com-
mittee of the Association of Iron and Steel Electrical Engineers. The 
original sixteen-member organizing committee included Holmes and 
Wilson of the Bureau of Mines. For most of the years before I920, 
coal operators maintained a strong position within the Mining Sec-
tion of the council, but after I 9 I 5 the relative unimportance of coal 
mining in the Nsc's structure produced dissatisfaction. Operators also 
were concerned with the expense of council activities and hoped to 
see a mine-safety association which would derive its financial support 
not from corporations but from dues paid by individual operators and 
miners. Plans for such an organization were under way in late I9I9.53 
That coal operators, presiding over the nation's most deadly occupa-
tion, had to participate in the safety movement as members of organi-
zations dominated by other industries and pursuing disparate interests, 
was symptomatic of the coal industry's organizational malaise. That 
malaise was in tum only a reflection of the industry's atomistic struc-
ture, a condition that permeated its every aspect, safety included. Sure-
ly coal mining would have been a killer under any industrial system, 
but industry economics insured that operators would view safety not 
as efficiency, but as an expense to be avoided. "In the matter of acci-
dents," wrote John Mitchell, "it not infrequently happens that an 
ounce of prevention costs more than a pound of cure." 54 
CHAPTER 
6 
Coal-Mining Safety and 
the Progressive Period 
RicHARD HoFSTADTER's Age of Reform is perhaps best known 
for its attempt to link Progressive reform to a status revolution-the 
Progressives were "victims of an upheaval in status," seeking change 
less to remedy social conditions than to satisfy personal needs.1 Be-
neath this interpretation lies a descriptive analysis of the Progressive 
years which is of even greater importance: 
Curiously, the Progressive revolt--even when we have made allow-
ance for the brief panic of 1907 and the downward turn in business in 
1913-took place almost entirely during a period of sustained and 
general prosperity. The middle class, most of which had been con-
tent to accept the conservative leadership of Hanna and McKinley 
during the period of crisis in the mid-nineties, rallied to the support 
of Progressive leaders in both parties during the period of well-being 
that followed. This fact is a challenge to the historian. Why did the 
middle classes undergo this remarkable awakening at all, and why 
during this period of general prosperity in which most of them seem 
to have shared? What was the place of economic discontents in the 
Progressive movement? To what extent did reform originate in other 
considerations?2 
Aside from the implication that reform impulses logically arise from 
personal deprivation, Hofstadter makes the key point: there was 
nothing fundamentally wrong with the nation. The muckrakers "were 
working at a time of widespread prosperity, and their chief appeal was 
not to desperate social needs but to mass sentiments of responsibility, 
indignation, and guilt. Hardly anyone intended that these sentiments 
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should result in action drastic enough to transform American society. 
In truth, that society was getting along reasonably well." 3 
Having argued that the society was fundamentally healthy, Hof-
stadter was led to seek an explanation for reform within the reformer 
rather than within the society. The result-a status interpretation of re-
form-has recently been subjected to scrutiny from the viewpoint of 
the modern social sciences. In an important article, historian David 
Thelen has argued that Hofstadter's status approach could not be con-
firmed through reference to sociology and psychology. Thelen calls 
for a return to history and chronology and emphasizes the 1893-1897 
depression, which "vividly dramatized the failures of industrialism," 
as the critical reform-producing event. The depression, according to 
Thelen, created "a clear sense of priorities," generating support for 
tax reform and attacks on various forms of "corporate arrogance." 4 
Applied to coal-mining safety, Thelen's chronology would seem un-
revealing. The states remodeled their mine-safety legislation in the 
1890s and again after 1905, but there was nothing resembling an in-
dustrial safety movement until 1907. Still, Thelen has turned us in 
the right direction, away from the subconscious and personal motiva-
tions of reformers and toward an appreciation of historical conditions 
as a critical ingredient in the reform impulse. 
This was not, in short, a society that was "getting along reasonably 
well." In fact, as Henry Adams so vividly suggested,5 it was a society 
dangerously out of control, or which conceived of itself in those terms. 
Thelen emphasizes the critical consumer issues-unsafe railway cross-
ings, air and water pollution, political corruption-but Americans 
were also suffering in their producer roles. Hofstadter's sanguine com-
mentaries stand in peculiar contrast to the society reflected in its 
industrial accident picture. Coal mining may have been the most dead-
ly of American industries, but substandard conditions existed almost 
everywhere, as technology outstripped private and governmental con-
trols. Train-wreck coverage was a standard feature in the magazines 
of the day. In the iron and steel industry, a 300-day worker had close 
to a one-in-four chance of death or disability. Monongah was only the 
quintessence of what B. 0. Flower's Arena termed "the deep-seated 
dry-rot which permeates a large part of the corporation business of 
our time." 6 Accidents are hardly an incidental feature of industrial 
life; they indicate, perhaps more clearly than any other single measure, 
the extent to which a society is willing to sacrifice human life or is 
incapable of preventing human sacrifice though it may desire to do 
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so. As of I907, American society suffered from both maladies: it was 
at once at the apex of its brutality and possessed of an inflexible and 
unwieldy federal system which proved a major obstacle in the reform 
movement to come. The statistics for accidents and fatalities suggest 
that in I907 American culture placed a greater value-relative to 
human life-on production and distribution than at any other time 
in its history. It was this emphasis, as yet little influenced by the "New 
Competition," which created Monongah. 
The industrial-accident problem produced a broad-based reform 
movement, grounded in the industries that were among the first to 
feel the effects of economic growth-coal, railroading, iron and steel, 
agricultural machinery. International Harvester, United States Steel, 
the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad, and the H. C. Frick Coke 
Company all initiated safety programs in I907 or soon thereafter. The 
steel industry was the scene of a particularly effective safety effort, 
made possible by the industry's structural characteristics (large units, 
restricted competition) and promoted by an aggressive group of en-
gineers and by a management aware of the value of paternalism. 
Founded in I907, the Association of Iron and Steel Electrical Engi-
neers urged safety measures on the industry and was responsible for 
the establishment in I 9 I 3 of the National Council for Industrial Safety 
(later renamed the National Safety Council) .7 "Probably in no other 
industry," concluded the Bureau of Mines in an annual report, "have 
the results of the intensive campaign of accident reduction been more 
energetic and costly, than in steel-producing establishments." 8 
Interest in industrial safety yielded a congeries of safety organiza-
tions and institutions. The first national safety exhibition took place 
at the Museum of Natural History in New York in I907, under the 
auspices of the American Institute of Social Science, and led to the 
incorporation, under I9II New York State law, of the American Mu-
seum of Safety, which was intended primarily to educate employers 
and employees. The American Mine Safety Association and the Joseph 
A. Holmes Safety Association were concerned less with public interest 
in safety than with the relationship between safety and the production 
process. The former was essentially a first-aid and rescue group; the 
latter, formed from representatives of large national groups upon 
Holmes's death, was dedicated to stimulating mine safety through 
financial awards for contributions in the field. The Safety First Fed-
eration of America was founded in I9I5 to coordinate the work of 
local public safety bodies in the fields of fire prevention and transpor-
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tation. The industrial accident situation also co-opted a share of the 
energies of organizations with a variety of reform interests. The 
American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL) dealt with such 
issues as occupational disease, enforcement of labor laws, limitation 
of working hours for women, industrial hygiene, uniform accident 
statistics and reporting, and workmen's compensation. A broad-based 
reform group whose membership included John Mitchell, Jane Ad-
dams, and Samuel Gompers, the AALL focused on mining safety in 
1911.9 The National Civic Federation (NCF), founded in I900 as a 
tripartite (business, labor, public) agency to facilitate cooperation and 
agreement between labor and business, confronted the safety question 
indirectly, through support of workmen's compensation legislation, 
and directly, by its advocacy of a federal mining bureau. The organiza-
tion also maintained a Committee on Prevention of Mining Accidents, 
including Mitchell among its members. Nonetheless, safety was not a 
major concern of the NCF and its identification with business forced 
Mitchell's resignation in I 9 I I .10 Still another organization attentive to 
industrial accidents was the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, which committed its entire annual meeting in I9II to the 
hazards of modem industry.H The extent of government involvement 
in the safety movement is indicated in Safety First Week, held in Feb-
ruary I916 and sponsored by nine bureaus (including the Public 
Health Service, the Steamboat Inspection Service, the Bureau of Medi-
cine and Survey of the Navy, and the Bureau of Mines) whose ac-
tivities were primarily in the service of protection of life and property .12 
The industrial-safety movement was related to Progressive concern 
for resource conservation. The problem resides in separating the genu-
ine intellectual ties between safety and conservation from rhetorical 
or incidental ones. Expressions of some relationship between the two 
were common enough. Minnesota Governor Adolph 0. Eberhardt ex-
pressed the general idea in I 9 I o, when he argued that plant and animal 
diseases, sanitation and health inspection of homes and schools, and 
railroad, mine, and factory accidents all came properly within the 
scope of conservation. 13 Charles Van Hise held similar views. "The 
conservation of man," he said, "is one of the main purposes of gov-
ernment, of remedial legislation, of innumerable organizations, phil-
anthropic and otherwise. The science of medicine, political economy, 
politics, and sociology are largely directed to that end." 14 The Na-
tional Conservation Congress devoted its I9I2 annual meeting to hu-
man resource conservation, and, with the approach of world conflict, 
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numerous safety experts associated human resource conservation with 
the nation's manpower needs. "Safety First! Everywhere, that warning 
halts, that lesson guides, the inspiration stirs," said Edson S. Lott, 
president of the United States Casualty Company, in 1915: 
And now, in this second year of the world war, the President of the 
United States halts and guides and stirs us all with a paraphrase, finer 
in sentiment, nobler in inspiration. Said he, the other day: America 
first! America first! And, if perchance America must, too, some time 
fight, we shall want men-strong men, sound men, contented men. 
Shall we not help to conserve these future fighters now? What if, 
through our safety campaign, we can now reduce the workers killed 
or maimed each year by 10, nay 15 per cent! For the nation's welfare, 
let us make it five, yes, ten points more. This is our part in pre-
paredness. For against the future need, Safety First and America first 
go hand in hand.15 
The facile analogy between the two variants of conservation expressed 
a close relationship: human and resource conservation were separate 
aspects of the far-reaching Progressive concern with efficiency. For an 
important segment of the industrial-safety movement, human con-
servation was a means, not an end. Just as the Progressive conser-
vation movement was less concerned with democratizing ownership 
of scarce resources than with efficient resource use, so too was the 
interest in human resources strongly (perhaps even primarily) influ-
enced by concepts of efficiency.16 According to Samuel Haber in Ef-
ficiency and Uplift, Progressives used the word efficiency in four ways: 
first, to depict a personal characteristic, related to a person's efficiency 
and effectiveness; second, to describe the energy input-output ratio of 
a machine; third, to denote the making of money (commercial effici-
ency); and fourth, to signify "a relationship between men. Efficiency 
meant social harmony and the leadership of the 'competent'" (social 
efficiency) . Of the four, commercial efficiency and social efficiency 
were central to the movement for safety in the coal mines. 
Commercial efficiency involved, on its most basic level, the appli-
cation of specific processes to businesses in order to increase profits. 
Thus firms who found safety an efficiency concept, who saw in it profit 
possibilities, might institute safety programs, support safety legislation, 
or lend their support to the campaign for a bureau of mines. Safety 
engineer George Fonda of Bethlehem Steel perfectly illustrated the 
spirit of those who saw safety as efficiency. Having calculated the 
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savings to be obtained from requiring employees to wear safety gog-
gles, Fonda added: "Is it not true that 'Safety First' in many, many 
cases is synonymous with Efficiency Engineering?" 17 The attitudes of 
A. B. Fleming and Justus Collins, the impact of workmen's compen-
sation legislation, and the operator response to the merit-rating pro-
gram of the Associated Companies-all are indicative of the place of 
commercial efficiency in coal-mining safety. 
But if commercial efficiency can claim much of the credit for busi-
ness interest and participation in coal-mining safety reform, it must 
also shoulder some substantial portion of the blame for the move-
ment's limited achievements. Commercial efficiency was a two-edged 
sword which more often cut against safety than for it. Because of the 
competitive structure of the industry and the marginal performance 
of many of its firms, commercial efficiency most often meant cost-
cutting, trimmed expenditures for wages and safety. Its effectiveness 
as a device for the conservation of human resources was also seriously 
impaired by an unfortunate chronological coincidence: the industrial-
safety movement began and reached its peak at a time when labor was 
plentiful and, in an economic sense, hardly in need of conservation. 
Unlike grazing land or timber, labor was not a disappearing resource.18 
Although unionization and licensing had begun to restrict the labor 
supply in the coal industry, there is no indication that operators were 
suffering from any general inability to secure workers. Until 1914, 
unrestricted European immigration insured an adequate supply of 
new immigrants to work the mines. The restricted flow of immigrants 
after 1914 resulted in a rhetorical connection between human conser-
vation and manpower needs, but there is no evidence of a reinvigorated 
industrial-safety movement. 
Mine workers were not only of no particular value economically; 
they were also of declining usefulness culturally, and this, too, must 
have limited the ability of the coal-mining safety movement to attract 
support and maintain enthusiasm. Again, a historical coincidence may 
lie at the center of the problem: the industrial-safety movement cor-
responded almost perfectly with a resurgence in American nativism 
and racism. At the same time that blacks and eastern and southern 
Europeans were replacing Scots, Welsh, English, and Irish as the 
dominant elements in the coal-mining work force, the new mining 
population was increasingly viewed with resentment and alarm: the 
new immigrants threatened American institutions of self-government, 
national strength, and unity, brought with them violence and disre-
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spect for law, and, in the South, threatened to disrupt the racial status 
quo. The hostility with which these blacks and new immigrants were 
viewed by the American public-including the AF of L, politicians of 
the major parties, intellectuals and scientists-made unlikely a sus-
tained social justice movement in their behalf and increased the in-
tensity of ideas of social efficiency, harmony, and control within the 
industrial-safety movement.19 The essence of social efficiency was the 
desire to eliminate sources of friction within the society and to re-
duce the frequency of undesirable labor actions-particularly strikes, 
unionization, and independent political activity. To achieve these 
goals, Progressive businessmen instituted private welfare programs in 
their plants and mines. These programs, incorporating safety, educa-
tion, and recreation, formed what was known as the industrial better-
ment movement. The place of safety in the movement was explained 
by National Safety Council president David Van Schaack: "There can 
be no doubt of the great value of safety work, both in itself and in 
the stimulus which it inevitably gives to other branches of industrial 
betterment. . . . It points the way unfailingly to other fields of social 
well-being. It contributes to individual happiness, to the better under-
standing of man by man, to [the] spirit of fellowship." 20 Efforts to sta-
bilize the business climate and to eliminate disruptive dissimilarities in 
society (e.g., those caused by the new immigration) also conditioned 
parts of the industrial betterment movement. If not totally grounded 
in cynical calculation, the movement was not an altruistic venture 
either. Its major impetus came not from the church but from the cor-
poration; its major advocates were those who felt uncomfortable in 
the presence of the masses. As in parallel reform movements in pro-
hibition and education, in coal-mining safety social service was a 
means to the end of social efficiency.21 
The high value placed on order, stability, social integration, and 
cohesion at certain points in American history has been central to a 
number of recent studies. For the Jacksonian period, the works of 
David J. Rothman on asylums, Michael B. Katz on education, and 
Ronald G. Walters on abolitionism emphasize the critical place of 
social control in three areas of mid nineteenth-century reform.22 Less 
work has been done on this theme for the years I890 to I920, but 
there is enough information to indicate that the Progressive years were 
a time of great anxiety, of obsessive fear of social disorder and dislo-
cation. David Musto has recently pointed out the close association 
between Progressive narcotic reform and prejudice against Chinese, 
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Negroes, and aliens; Joel Spring has emphasized social unity as the 
central goal in educational reform; Michael Lesy's free-form Wiscon-
sin Death Trip argues that conditions of life in American small towns 
and countryside created intense anxiety, high rates of insanity and 
suicide, and tendencies to obsessive-compulsive or paranoid person-
ality types. Further evidence of a general cultural insecurity can be 
found in the growing literature on race and nativism.23 
This perspective of fear and anxiety must have considerably en-
hanced the significance of mine explosions, train wrecks, and other 
signs of industrial decay. Americans might now be moved to consider 
if their system of production had not advanced beyond their ability to 
control it. The confluence of social anxiety and nativism had particular 
significance for the content of the coal-mining safety movement, since 
the industry was increasingly populated by Italians, Slavs, and Poles-
the very ethnic groups which the society held responsible for some of 
its difficulties. As a result, the coal-mining safety movement was biased 
in its analysis of and prescriptions for the safety problem, casting the 
new immigrant miner in the central role-as the agent of disaster 
rather than its victim. The result was an unfortunate focus on the 
miner as the key human factor in accidents and fatalities, a viewpoint 
that led the safety movement to an excessive emphasis on remedying 
defects in the miner's educational background and cultural heritage. 
Even here the possibility of progress was cynically regarded by those 
observers who believed the problem to be essentially racial, requiring 
long-term evolutionary change. The widespread use of the word disci-
pline to describe a solution to the problem of mine accidents is perhaps 
the best indication that mine accidents and fatalities were believed to 
be caused by an absence of such discipline, by the absence of order 
and control. Unfortunately this analysis, too, was thrown back on the 
miner, for discipline usually meant that the worker, through education, 
was expected to internalize mine-safety values. In general, because 
the mine-safety question was culturally defined, a number of promis-
ing areas, such as technology, supervision, and precise legal liability, 
were not adequately explored.24 
Despite this undeniable bias, Progressives, whether operators, 
miners, inspectors, scientists, or humanitarians, maintained an es-
sentially modem problem-solving orientation. Operator Glenn W. 
Traer expressed the Progressive conception of reform as an ongoing, 
indeterminate process when asked if he thought coal-mining safety 
required a permanent bureau. "Yes I do," he said. "The education on 
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this subject will never be complete." 25 Coal-mining safety, like other 
Progressive reforms, was a process rather than an essence, a way of do-
ing things as much as a final result. To staff their bureaus, Progressives 
relied on professionals-experts in administration, science, engineer-
ing, and statistics. This expertism was particularly relevant to coal-
mining safety, where the problems to be solved required sophisticated 
analysis and where the temptations to view industrial accident pre-
vention in moralistic terms were so great. The following comments by 
the United Mine Workers Journal (whether serious or ironic) indicate 
the pervasiveness of expertism in the Progressive period: "It is good-by, 
Tuberculosis. The statistician is at work on its corpse. If an abundance 
of complicated figures, compiled by the expert statistician will not kill 
off the white plague then all hope is gone." 26 Joseph A. Holmes, the 
administrator-scientist, almost a jack-of-all-trades in this era of spe-
cialization, presided over an organization of other administrators 
(Van Manning), scientists (George Rice), engineers (Clarence Hall), 
and statisticians (Albert Fay). The particular importance of engineer-
ing to the safety field was reflected in the new profession of safety 
engineering. F. E. Morris opened his address to the National Safety 
Council with "We of this profession-and it is a profession .... " 27 
Like a number of Progressive reform movements-in child labor, 
workmen's compensation, and pure food and drugs, for example-the 
movement for coal-mining safety on the national level contained a 
strong element of humanitarian Progressivism. Particularly in its early 
stages, the movement was buoyed by muckrakers, socialists, and pub-
licists, groups whose interest in national reform-usually meaning a 
bureau or a department of mines-could not be measured in financial 
terms. This type of Progressive, as historian Russel Nye has written, 
wished to use the state positively, "to promote and protect the public 
social and economic welfare." 28 Socialist Victor L. Berger expressed 
the intensity of feeling of humanitarian Progressivism: "Men and 
women are killed in factories, on railroads and in mines because hu-
man life counts for less than do the products of labor. Under our 
civilization the dollar is of more importance than the man." 29 The 
Pittsburgh Survey also belonged to this brand of Progressivism, which 
was aided by the public nature of the mine fire and the mine explosion. 
Monongah and Cherry were more than disasters, they were national 
events, facilitators of emotional involvement in the cause of mine 
safety. The Cherry disaster, for example, pulled Graham Taylor and 
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his Survey magazine into the safety movement.30 Surprisingly, how-
ever, no liberal reform group emerged to shape this emotional po-
tential and present it politically. Coal-mining safety had no equivalent 
of the National Child Labor Committee, the American Association for 
Labor Legislation, or the Social Reform Club, a circumstance that left 
labor to carry the banner of social justice in the reform process.31 
The United Mine Workers, the mainstay of Progressive interest in 
safety in the states, also received the backing of urban immigrant law-
makers. In Illinois this meant support from Chicago's new immigrant 
groups for coal-mining safety legislation which would benefit miners 
downstate. "This is all the more significant," writes historian John D. 
Buenker, "since there was little self-interest involved here for Chicago 
lawmakers. Their support has to be attributed to a general sympathy 
for other disadvantaged groups and a belief in the principle of safety 
and welfare legislation." 32 Buenker's attempt to link coal-mining safety 
legislation with J. Joseph Huthmacher's urban lower-class interpreta-
tion of Progressivism deserves a skeptical appraisal, largely because it 
ignores important characteristics of the politics of mine safety. In Illi-
nois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia, safety legislation was not 
solely or even primarily the product of traditional interest group poli-
tics, with urban immigrants joining labor to combat business influence. 
Instead, political differences were initially compromised by commis-
sions of operators, miners, and public (usually chief inspectors) repre-
sentatives. When the results of compromise were presented to the 
legislature, they were not controversial and, in fact, not essentially 
political. Placed in this context, the pro-safety votes of urban immi-
grant representatives become not so much an active element in the 
political process as a predictable reaction to a compromise which had 
already taken place. 33 
Implicit in the Huthmacher-Buenker scheme is a weakness common 
to most political history: a tendency to see government as a passive 
rather than an active element in reform. Recognition of the centrality 
of bureaucratic reform is particularly vital in areas such as safety, 
where legislation was complex and technical and expert counsel cor-
respondingly compelling. In the states, chief inspectors usually initiated 
reform activity through criticism of existing law and recommendations 
for revision, participated as "experts" on the commissions which for-
mulated legislation, and employed administrative discretion to fill gaps 
in the resulting legal edifice. Nationally, Joseph A. Holmes's role in 
the creation and modification of the Bureau of Mines is sufficient evi-
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dence of the critical importance of bureaucracy. The head of the 
Technologic Branch of the Geological Survey succeeded because, as a 
bureaucrat, he possessed essential knowledge of the little-known tech-
nical problems of mine safety and because, as a bureaucrat, he was 
able to gain influence in Congress. In his hands, first the Technologic 
Branch and then the Bureau of Mines not only participated in politics 
as interest groups but also reached out to miners, operators, inspectors, 
and conservationists, motivating some, educating others, monitoring 
and coordinating and (when possible) controlling the political process. 
Although Holmes had more than his share of energy and political 
savvy, the role of activist bureaucrat was less his personal creation than 
a phenomenon of a centralized, technical society. Dr. Harvey W. Wiley, 
chief of the Bureau of Chemistry, had preceded Holmes with parallel 
efforts in behalf of federal pure-food and drug legislation.34 It is time 
for greater recognition that government bureaucrats create as well as 
administer, and that entrepreneurship may exist as well within a public 
agency as within a private firm. 35 
In contrast to the very limited interest in the historic relationship 
between bureaucracy and reform, in the past fifteen years scholars 
have produced a considerable body of literature dealing with business-
men and reform. Although historians writing in this vein recognize 
the existence of humanitarian Progressivism, they have, in general, 
argued that Progressivism was much more than an altruistic quest for 
social justice and much less than a great liberal triumph over con-
servative opposition. Progressivism was, they say, also (James Wein-
stein) and primarily (Gabriel Kolka) a successful attempt by the 
business community to use the governmental machinery, particularly 
the national machinery, to achieve its own ends. "In the current cen-
tury," according to Weinstein, "particularly on the federal level, few 
reforms were enacted without the tacit approval, if not the guidance, 
of the large corporate interests." 36 With some logic, most of the work 
of these scholars has emphasized the business/corporate role in eco-
nomic regulation. Kolka, for example, has concentrated on the efforts 
of corporations to achieve stability in their economic affairs, to elimi-
nate the chaos resulting from excessive competition and undependable 
governmental intervention. In this view, federal regulation and Pro-
gressivism were not "a counterpoise to the power of private business," 
nor "the complaint of the unorganized against the consequences of or-
ganization," two expressions used by Richard Hofstadter.37 The rail-
roads, threatened by the localism of labor and the farm, initiated "a 
166 Coal-Mining Safety in the Progressive Period 
movement to establish stability and control within the railroad industry 
so that railroads could prosper without the fearful consequences of 
cutthroat competition." Business supported federal regulation in the 
railroad industry and in other fields as a bulwark "against state regula-
tions that were either haphazard or, what is more important, far more 
responsible to more radical, genuinely progressive local communities" 
than national regulation. "National progressivism," states Kolka, "be-
comes the defense of business against the democratic ferment that was 
nascent in the states." 38 Other scholars have shown businessmen tak-
ing reform positions vis-a-vis the Iowa dairy industry, the federal 
antitrust laws, and World War I mobilization.39 Robert Wiebe has pro-
duced an influential variant of this interpretation, arguing that although 
some businessmen supported most efforts at economic reform and 
regulation, "an examination of businessmen's reactions to the Progres-
sive movement indicates that far from forming a cohesive group they 
differed widely over the proper solution to America's problems and 
expended a large portion of their energies in internal conflicts."40 
Though the business approach to social and political reform has 
been explored less systematically and less explicitly, some contributions 
stand out. Weinstein and Hays have convincingly demonstrated that 
urban businessmen, concerned with the inefficiencies and democratic, 
decentralized characteristics of city government, pressed for elimina-
tion of ward representation and for new manager and commission 
systems of administration.41 Of the Progressive social reforms, work-
men's compensation has attracted the most attention and produced 
the most disagreement among historians. Weinstein and Roy Lubove 
have provided the major reinterpretation. Although both argue that 
workmen's compensation was a business reform, Weinstein, approach-
ing the subject largely from the perspective of the National Civic Fed-
eration, has emphasized business desires for social cohesion, while 
Lubove sees "concrete, material advantages" as central to the business 
viewpoint. Robert Wesser presents the more traditional case of a 
divided business community, largely opposed to workmen's compen-
sation, in his analysis of the campaign for workmen's compensation 
in New York State.42 Here Wesser's emphasis is similar to that of 
Wiebe who, while acknowledging the influence of businessmen in 
economic reform, minimizes their interest in social reform. "Social 
insurance laws were an anathema," states Wiebe. "The only important 
contribution which businessmen made to the social welfare movement 
came as a by-product of their zeal for civic improvement." 43 The 
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work of Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., and James H. Timberlake, historians, 
respectively, of the pure-food and drug and prohibition movements, 
lies in an intermediate position: businessmen were influential but not 
central to these reforms. 44 
The coal-mining safety movement was only one small facet of Pro-
gressive reform, hardly the basis for accepting one view of business/ 
political relationships in the Progressive period and rejecting another. 
Yet any comprehensive evaluation of Progressive politics must at least 
take account of several major aspects of the politics of safety. Coal-
mining safety was, above all, a business reform. For all the complexi-
ties and nuances of national politics, the Bureau of Mines, the major 
Progressive innovation in mine safety, would not have been es-
tablished without the cooperation of coal and metal mine operators in 
the American Mining Congress. Holmes was a masterful organizer and 
a knowledgeable and judicious politician, but he lacked a substantial 
power base outside of the business community. Businessmen were also 
dominant in the frustrated but historically important uniformity cam-
paign. Even in state politics, coal operators in major states demon-
strated a certain flexibility-and the absence of their dominance-by 
agreeing to participate in the work of legislative commissions. In 
short, the emphasis of Gabriel Kolka and James Weinstein on the 
primacy of business in the reform process seems appropriate to the 
Progressive coal-mining safety movement. 
This is not to say that Robert Wiebe's model of business disunity 
can be entirely dismissed; it must, however, be applied selectively. 
During the campaign the coal operators were able not only to unite 
among themselves but to cooperate with metal mine operators. Applied 
to the period from late 1907 through 1910, the Wiebe model seems 
particularly inappropriate. Once the bureau had been created, how-
ever, mining-industry unity proved evanescent; metal mine operators 
withdrew from the short-lived alliance of convenience and pursued 
their own interests in moving the Bureau of Mines into metal-mining 
areas. Divisions within the coal industry were also in part responsible 
for the very limited achievements in uniformity and standardization.45 
The history of coal-mining safety reform also casts doubt on the 
assumption-which I suspect is widely held-that the relationship 
between business and government is essentially a function of the type 
of reform (i.e., economic or social) under consideration. This classifi-
cation seems particularly dubious when applied to workmen's com-
pensation and industrial safety. In each case reforms were designed 
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to provide industry with the same kinds of services it might obtain 
from clearly economic measures like the Bureau of Corporations and 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)-stability, predictability, and 
security.46 Obviously, the FTC held potential which the Bureau of 
Mines and uniform safety and workmen's compensation legislation did 
not; but that should not obscure the analogous purposes behind eco-
nomic and social reform. 
The analogy might be extended one step further, from ends to means, 
from the goals of stability, predictability, and security to the process, 
centralization. How does one explain the emphasis of the coal-mining 
safety movement on various national solutions? Why did industrial 
safety reform follow railroad, banking, and antitrust regulation in 
seeking a national focus of activity? In The Search for Order, Robert 
Wiebe has provided an overview of the problem. In the nineteenth 
century, states Wiebe, America was composed of "island communi-
ties"-small towns, parts of cities, villages; dispersed, separated, and 
relatively isolated. Around and within these island communities, the 
forces of nationalization, industrialization, mechanization, and urbani-
zation were dramatically changing the society, yet to most people these 
themes "meant only dislocation and bewilderment. America in the 
late nineteenth century was a society without a core. It lacked those 
national centers of authority and information which might have given 
order to such swift changes." Most nineteenth-century organizations 
were collections of local associations, "designed partly to re-create and 
partly to protect a sense of community among its members." Nine-
teenth-century reform was itself localistic, oriented toward the states, 
and expressing, through antimonopoly, basic desires or community 
self-determination. "In no sense," states Wiebe, "did the reformers ex-
pect to realize their program by ... constructing a huge apparatus of 
centralized direction." 
The primary agent of change was a new middle class, numerically 
large in the cities and including professionals and specialists in busi-
ness, labor, and agriculture, a class determined to transcend local ties 
and to replace or augment them with occupational connections beyond 
their immediate locales. "Consciousness of unique skills and function," 
states Wiebe, "characterized all members of the class. They demon-
strated it by ... an eagerness to join others like themselves in a craft 
union, professional organization, trade association, or agricultural co-
operative." Much of Progressivism was the substance and result of the 
aspirations and achievements of this middle class, seeking an outlet 
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for their talents and trying to "locate themselves within a national sys-
tem." This class was both cause and effect, created by and creators of 
the new national industrial system and the national apparatus estab-
lished after 1900 to service and regulate that system.47 Samuel P. Hays 
described the same process in Conservation and the Gospel of Effi-
ciency though, as the title of the book would indicate, Hays locates 
the critical determinants of change within technical rather than social 
frameworks. He states: 
These new forms of organization tended to shift the location of 
decision-making away from the grass roots, the smaller contexts of 
life, to the larger networks of human interaction. This upward shift 
can be seen in many specific types of development . . . [in] the up-
ward shift in regulation of economic life from the state to the federal 
regulatory agency. These upward shifts did not arise out of new po-
litical theories or the inherent logic of a proper distribution of gov-
ernmental powers, but rather from the fact that those who fashioned 
the new patterns of system and functional organizations sought a 
framework of decision-making consistent in scope and applicability 
with the scope of affairs they wished to control. ... New contexts of 
human life had arisen, giving rise to new contexts of conditions to be 
controlled. Control now became a more elaborate process, involving 
measurement and prediction, reliance upon the experts who could 
develop and manipulate information, and techniques for shaping the 
course of events to reach predictable outcomes. . . . in each case the 
larger forces of economic life, with a scope far broader than cities, 
regions or states, sought a national, uniform context of action and a 
central point of decision-making which greatly limited the political 
variables to be controlled.48 
The process Hays describes here was at work in almost every area of 
American life. Centralization took place, for example, in the Iowa 
dairy industry, with the consolidation of creameries and the beginnings 
of state inspection; in urban government, as businessmen sought an 
end to the ward system; and in meat packing, where federal regula-
tion was part of the packers' search for foreign markets.49 
In the nineteenth century, coal-mining safety was the concern of 
the counties and the states-island communities in Wiebe's framework 
-which responded to safety problems with legislation which, if not 
adequate, was structurally appropriate in the sense that it roughly 
paralleled the localistic market structure of the industry. By 1890, 
however, coal-mining firms were regularly servicing regional and na-
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tiona! markets. Aided by declining transportation charges, low-cost 
producers, particularly in West Virginia, were selling in Pennsylvania, 
Illinois, Ohio, and Kentucky markets. Labor markets, too, were na-
tional and international, and the coal industry, now seriously affected 
by immigrants who had never mined coal and transients who often 
lacked familiarity with state regulations, found itself governed by 
inadequate state institutions. Well before 1900 bewildering explosions 
had raised questions about the technical conditions of mining-about 
mine gases, coal dust, machinery, humidity, and temperature, for ex-
ample-which clearly transcended the abilities and resources of the 
states as well as their boundaries. 
Between 1895 and 1910, these conditions, and others not related 
to safety, produced significant organizational changes in the coal in-
dustry. The United Mine Workers developed from insignificance into 
the largest union in the nation; the American Mining Congress was 
established and, after a decade as a metal-mining organization, ab-
sorbed the coal operators; the Mine Inspectors' Institute of America 
was born of the Monongah disaster. These organizations, and others 
of lesser importance for safety, were on the one hand examples of 
centralization and, on the other, the agents of centralization in coal-
mining safety. Led by the coal operators, these groups had in common 
the recognition that national problems required national solutions. To 
solve the national problems posed by technology and interstate com-
petition, they created the safety program of the Technologic Branch 
of the Geological Survey and finally the Bureau of Mines. When state 
safety legislation proved incompatible with national markets, the in-
dustry sought to nationalize the federal system through the mechanism 
of uniform state legislation. 5° 
Although there is more than a little danger in emphasizing the 
strength of the centralizing and nationalizing impulses and the extent 
to which the society had been reconstructed by organizational change 
by 1900 or even 1920, historians of organization have not been in-
clined to examine or assess the equally critical forces of localism and 
decentralization. The concept of an organizational "revolution," trace-
able to the publication, in 1953, of Kenneth Boulding's Organiza-
tional Revolution, has been propagated by Hays and Wiebe, the two 
leading theorists of Progressive period organizational developments. 
Each, admittedly, has included within his work an assertion of the 
incomplete character of Progressive period organizational change. Re-
formers, according to Wiebe, "built no more than a loose framework, 
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one malleable enough to serve many purposes ... in the end they con-
structed just an approach to reform, mistaking it for a finished prod-
uct." Hays suggests that "local and parochial social organization" 
remains potent even in the 1970s. Yet neither scholar is much inter-
ested in probing anti-central and anti-national impulses. Their caveats 
are more afterthoughts than essential elements in their history.51 
This is not to deny the existence of organizational change from 
1890 to 1920, nor even the accelerated pace of organizational de-
velopment on the heels of the 1893 depression.52 It is not the facts of 
the matter that are in question, but their meaning. Should the organi-
zational successes of the labor movement after 1895 be considered 
part of an organizational "revolution," though some 90 percent of 
the American work force remained unorganized? If the turn-of-the-
century merger movement, the corporate element in the organizational 
revolution, was of such crucial importance, how does one explain the 
continued business interest in political forms, like the Bureau of 
Corporations and the Federal Trade Commission, which would pre-
sumably satisfy organizational desires? Do the organizational mani-
festations of the coal-mining safety movement-the Bureau of Mines 
and uniformity, in particular-suggest profound change? If we con-
clude that developments in labor, business, and safety were less than 
revolutionary and less than complete, then the focus of historical in-
quiry also shifts. Rather than why was change so extensive, the es-
sential question becomes, why was change so limited? 
From this perspective, the coal-mining safety movement becomes a 
halting and incomplete expression of organizational change. After all, 
the movement produced no national regulatory mine-safety legislation, 
not even a provision for administrative mine-safety regulations ema-
nating from the bureau. Lacking coercive authority, the Bureau of 
Mines could function only as an educational and scientific agency; 
regulatory and inspection functions remained in the states. Uniformity, 
whose promise of centralization seemed so great, proved to be an un-
realistic goal and a timid device for bringing unity and discipline to an 
unruly federal system. A similar pattern exists in the area of child-
labor reform. The national achievements of that movement were the 
Children's Bureau-as powerless as the Bureau of Mines-and two 
national child-labor laws, declared unconstitutional in the United 
States Supreme Court. National action was made difficult by the 
persistent opposition of Southerners-reformers and businessmen 
alike-who did not want federal regulation.53 National workmen's-
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compensation legislation covered very few workers; almost all legis-
lative successes came in the states. Compulsory health insurance, much 
less popular than workmen's compensation, was considered seriously 
only at the state level. Significant national regulation was achieved 
largely in those areas of social reform in which social control was the 
primary stimulus to action. And even in narcotics regulation and pro-
hibition, two outstanding examples of social-control activity, the states 
were the primary locus of reform activity through most of the Progres-
sive period. 54 
In The American Partnership, an influential book among American 
historians, Daniel J. Elazar suggests that a model of dual federalism 
-of rigid separation between state and national governments-is of 
little value in describing the government of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. According to Elazar, the dynamic American society of the 
nineteenth century placed stress on its original federal structure, to the 
point where federalism ceased to be dual (with national and state 
governments operating in separate spheres) and became cooperative 
(with national and state governments working together in almost every 
area of activity). Elazar's framework is an important one, but of 
limited usefulness in analyzing the coal-mining safety movement, a 
field in which cooperative activity existed only at the periphery of the 
reform process. Part of the problem is that cooperative federalism as 
an intergovernmental mechanism was, as Elazar says, the product of 
westward expansion, of a distended, frontier society. Although Elazar 
properly projects cooperative federalism into the twentieth century, 
he fails to acknowledge that the problem of distension and the frontier, 
while not eliminated, had by 1890 been merged with the post-frontier 
conditions of concentration and association. 55 In the nineteenth cen-
tury the central problem of politics had been to unite the American 
people and the states; when that problem approached solution late in 
the century, it was replaced by another: how to reconcile the economic 
unity produced by revolutions in transportation and communications 
with the centrifugal politics of the separate states. To solve that prob-
lem the Progressives turned from the developmental politics of co-
operative federalism to the politics of standardization, uniformity, and 
nationalization. 
Uniformity was an enormously popular approach to reform, one that 
attracted labor leaders and capitalists, Republicans and Democrats, 
radicals and conservatives, and one that played a role in numerous 
aspects of Progressive reform. The origins of uniformity apparently 
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go back to 1857 and New York lawyer David Dudley Field, but there 
was little concerted action in pursuit of uniformity until the American 
Bar Association (ABA) took up the cause in the late 1870s. In I889 
the ABA helped organize the National Conference on Uniform State 
Laws, a group largely concerned with business and legal matters. At 
about the same time, political scientists John W. Burgess and Simon N. 
Patten were employing the opening volumes of the Political Science 
Quarterly and the Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science to indict the state system for its manifest failures. Uni-
formity received a new stimulus and entered a period of new growth 
in 1906, when Secretary of State Elihu Root, speaking before the Penn-
sylvania Society of New York, called for the states to recognize their 
interdependence: "Every State is bound to frame its legislation and 
its administration with reference not only to its own special affairs, 
but with reference to the effect upon all its sister States. . . . If any 
State is maintaining laws which afford opportunity and authority for 
practices condemned by the public sense of the whole country ... that 
State is violating the conditions upon which alone can its power be 
preserved." 56 The next year, Charles A. L. Reed of the University 
of Cincinnati called for the establishment of a council of states to 
formulate standard measures and present them to the states for en-
actment. Reed's idea bore fruit in 1925, with the organization of the 
American Legislators' Association. In the meantime, however, there 
was activity on a number of other fronts. Three organizations-the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the 
National Civic Federation, and the American Association for Labor 
Legislation-were prominent in uniformity campaigns, each with its 
own areas of interest. In addition, dozens of more specialized organi-
zations pressed for uniform legislation in particular fields, including 
taxes, workmen's compensation, compulsory health insurance, divorce, 
drugs, securities, child labor, and conservation. Among the Progressive 
period organizations and groups interested in some form of uniform 
coal-mining safety legislation were the United Mine Workers, the 
Bureau of Mines, the American Mining Congress, the Mine Inspectors' 
Institute, the American Institute of Mining Engineers, and the Amer-
ican Association for Labor Legislation. 57 
Regardless of the specific area involved, uniformity reflected a grow-
ing recognition of the interrelated nature of American economic and 
technical structures; it was intended to serve as a mechanism for deal-
ing with the fundamental problems of interstate competition. Inter-
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state and interregional competition, particularly in cotton processing, 
drove child-labor reformers first in the direction of uniform legislation, 
then toward national legislation. "One of the strongest impressions 
resulting from a study of the [National Child Labor] committee," writes 
Jeremy Felt, "is that of employers and manufacturers pushed into em-
ploying children by costs, competitive pressure, a very human lack of 
imagination, and, of course, by ordinary greed. The exploiter of child 
labor for its own sake seldom existed; in his place stood a man not 
ordinarily given to philosophical worries about the future of the race 
but determined not to give his competitors an inch. The only fair way 
to deal with child labor was through federal legislation." 58 
Workmen's compensation became the subject of a relatively success-
ful uniformity campaign when state legislatures balked at placing their 
own firms at a competitive disadvantage. 59 Elsewhere, competition 
produced a more subtle variation on uniformity, as states tailored 
their reform programs to fit interstate economics. Massachusetts law-
makers, anxious that further additions to the state's advanced social 
and economic legislation would corrode its competitive advantages, 
took a number of conservative positions, opposing a federal commis-
sion which would establish railroad rates, liberalizing the state's in-
corporation policies, resisting new legislation for the protection of 
women and children. 60 Business interests could also seek a competitive 
advantage through reform itself. State railroad regulation came to 
Alabama in part because the state's businessmen found it hard to com-
pete with their counterparts in Georgia, where rates had been held 
down by a commission. A number of businessmen came to favor state 
prohibition legislation for the competitive advantage it would yield 
over businessmen operating in states without this aid to industrial ef-
ficiency; and to advocate national prohibition as an aid in meeting 
competition from abroad. 61 
If, as I argue here, uniformity deserves to be recognized as funda-
mental to Progressivism, then Progressivism itself deserves reevalu-
ation. The prominence of a tactic so patently idealistic, so dependent 
upon interstate cooperation, indicates that Progressivism was pro-
foundly conservative in methodology. The primary political impulse 
of the age was neither the New Nationalism of Theodore Roosevelt 
nor the New Freedom of Woodrow Wilson, but rather an amalgam of 
the two, characterized by the desire to nationalize reform while main-
taining the primacy of the states within the governmental structure. 
COAL-MINING SAFETY 175 
Progressivism only hinted at the nationalism of the New Deal, offering 
but suggestions of the future prominent role of the national govern-
ment, and those primarily in economic regulation. The Progressive 
age was indeed constructing an organizational society, but it was doing 
so cautiously and in its own distinctive way. 
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Bibliographical Note 
MANUSCRIPTS 
Manuscript collections are especially important in constructing the 
national story of mine safety. The "Records of the United States Bu-
reau of Mines," Record Group 70, at the National Records Center, 
Suitland, Maryland, fill some sao boxes for the ten years after I9IO. 
They are organized chronologically, by year, and within each year by 
subject, so that one may cull particular kinds of information quite 
easily. A comprehensive card index of correspondence in the collec-
tion is also available. Although the bureau was not established until 
I9IO, the records contain some materials relevant to the workings of 
the Technologic Branch of the Geological Survey, the bureau's prede-
cessor in mine safety. This is particularly important, since the records 
of the Technologic Branch were destroyed in a fire. There are scat-
tered materials in Record Group 57, "Records of the Geologic Di-
vision of the United States Geological Survey," National Archives. 
The Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress maintains several 
collections of limited importance for this study. The papers of William 
Howard Taft and his secretary of the interior, Richard Achilles Bal-
linger (originals in the University of Washington Library, Seattle), 
were useful largely in interpreting the politics surrounding the appoint-
ment of Joseph A. Holmes as the first permanent bureau chief. The 
diaries of James R. Garfield, secretary of the interior under Theodore 
Roosevelt, and the papers of Gifford Pinch at, chief of the United States 
Forest Service and a close friend of Holmes, contain some information 
on the politics of safety, but the Pinchot papers were especially valu-
able for their insight into Holmes's character. 
The best aggregation of manuscript materials on mine operators and 
safety exists in the West Virginia University Library, at Morgantown. 
Here are the papers of coal operators Justus Collins and Aretas Brooks 
Fleming (a former governor of the state), as well as the records of 
Collins's Winding Gulf Colliery Company. Both operators were active 
correspondents on a variety of issues, and Fleming played a crucial 
role in creating the Bureau of Mines. From the perspective of labor, 
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the John Mitchell collection at the Mullen Library, Catholic Universi-
ty, Washington, D.C., was invaluable, in part because the files of the 
United Mine Workers of America, at UMWA Headquarters, Washing-
ton, D.C., were not open when I was researching (officials did allow 
me to use manuscript minutes of the National Executive Board Meet-
ings which are printed but scattered). The State Letters of the Division 
of Mines, Department of Industrial Relations, State of Ohio, in the 
State Historical Society at Columbus, allow the only inside look (and 
hardly an extensive one) at the bailiwick of a chief mine inspector. 
PERIODICALS 
The dearth of materials for labor make the United Mine Workers 
Journal indispensable. Notable for its powerful editorials, the Journal 
follows major developments in the national and state politics of mine 
safety. The coal industry trade journals reflect regional interests but 
report and comment on events in every coalfield. Among the best are 
Black Diamond (for Illinois), Coal and Coke Operator and its succes-
sor Coal and Coke Operator and Fuel Magazine, Coal Trade Bulletin, 
and Mines and Minerals. Coal Age and Colliery Engineer are more 
oriented toward technology, engineering, and supervision. A number 
of these journals are difficult to find in full runs. Superior collections 
exist at the University of Illinois at Urbana, the Library of Congress, 
and the University of Pittsburgh. 
GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS 
The Congressional Record is important for understanding congres-
sional opposition to the nationalization and bureaucratization of mine 
safety; otherwise, it is historical veneer. To get beneath that veneer, 
hearings and reports of commissions are essential. The most impor-
tant were U.S., Congr~ss, House, Industrial Commission, Report of 
the Industrial Commission on Labor Legislation, 19 vols. ( I900-
I902); U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Mines and Mining, To 
Consider the Question of the Establishment of a Bureau of Mines: 
Hearings before the Committee on Mines and Mining, 6oth Cong., 1st 
sess., 1908; U.S., Congress, Senate, Immigration Commission, Immi-
grants in Industries, Part I: Bituminous Coal Mining, 6Ist Cong., 2d 
sess., 1910, S. Doc. 633. The Annual Reports of the Bureau of Mines 
are basic to reconstructing the history of that agency, although for 
technical information the Bulletins of the bureau and the Geological 
Survey must be consulted. 
Sources for state legislative history are frustratingly thin in content 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 217 
and a burden to use. One can trace the progress of legislation through 
House and Senate journals, but even this is laborious. There is no 
equivalent of the Congressional Record for the states I investigated 
(West Virginia's journals were the most informative). In short, the 
kind of interest group analysis that comes so easily at the national level 
is virtually impossible in the states. I found two special reports to be of 
value: Ohio, Legislature, Report of the Ohio Coal Mining Commission 
to the Governor, Part 2: Prevention of Accidents, 8oth sess., 1913, 
House Joint Resolution 38, printed in Ohio, Senate, Journal, 1914, pp. 
328-33; and West Virginia, Legislature, Report of Hearings before the 
Joint Select Committee of the Legislature of West Virginia: To Investi-
gate the Cause of Mine Explosions within the State and to Recommend 
Remedial Legislation Relating Thereto, Together with the Preliminary 
and Final Reports, 1909, Substitute House Concurrent Resolution and 
House Joint Resolution 19. The Bulletins of the United States Depart-
ment of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, also follow state legislation. 
The Reports of the state mine inspectors fill in some of the gaps in 
the legislative picture and are vital for their insights into administra-
tion. They contain a wide variety of statistical information and are 
crucial for understanding the attitudes of operators, miners, and in-
spectors toward enforcement of the safety laws. The reports for West 
Virginia and Pennsylvania are the most revealing, those for Illinois 
(known as Coal Reports, and issued by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics) the least. 
OTHER PRIMARY MATERIALS 
The published records of organizations are important for a number 
of topics. The American Mining Congress (AMC) Proceedings docu-
ment the interplay between coal and metal mine operators and East 
and West and link coal-mining safety with conservation. The Proceed-
ings of the National Safety Council (organized in 1912 as the First 
Cooperative Safety Congress) describe the relationship of safety to 
engineering and efficiency. The coal-dust controversy and other tech-
nical aspects of mine safety can be traced through the Bulletins and 
Transactions of the American Institute of Mining Engineers and the 
Proceedings of the Coal Mining Institute of America, an eastern re-
gional body. The Illinois Coal Operators' Association published a 
Monthly Bulletin which I found useful for its records of miners and 
mine officials discharged for safety violations. The Proceedings of the 
Mine Inspectors Institute of America, founded in response to the 1907 
Monongah disaster, reveal a factional organization in a continual state 
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of disarray. With the AMC Proceedings and the Uniform Mining Laws 
Conference, 1916, Report (Springfield, Ill., n.d.), they are the basic 
source for my account of the movement for uniform state legislation. 
The union perspective was developed from a variety of materials. 
The records of contract negotiations in Illinois (District 12 of the 
United Mine Workers of America [UMWA]), known as the Joint Con-
ference or the Joint Convention, contain verbatim accounts of negotia-
tions between operator and miner representatives on the safety issue. 
I found the Proceedings of UMWA conventions sketchy, though less so 
at the district than at the national level. The Minutes of the Inter-
national Executive Board of the UMWA, while no less incomplete, are 
more intimate and more revealing of national labor priorities. Crystal 
Eastman's Work-Accidents and the Law (New York, 1910), one of 
the volumes in the Pittsburgh Survey, is a superb independent investi-
gation. 
SECONDARY LITERATURE 
The historiography of the Progressive period is discussed in Chapter 
6. Rather than summarize that analysis here, I shall focus on the lit-
erature that has some relevance to safety. There is no history of the 
safety movement, and one would be hard-pressed to put one together 
from the available studies, some of which are as much primary as 
secondary in nature. They include Lucian W. Chaney and Hugh S. 
Hanna, The Safety Movement in the Iron and Steel Industry, 1907-
1917, U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 
234, no. 18: Industrial Accidents and Hygiene Series, June 1918 
(Washington, D.C., 1918); E. H. Downey, History of Work Accident 
Indemnity in Iowa (Iowa City, 1912); Lucian W. Chaney, "Safety as 
Promoted by Federal Bureaus," Proceedings of the National Safety 
Council 2 ( 1913): 101-7; Dianne Bennett and William Graebner, 
"Safety First: Slogan and Symbol of the Industrial Safety Movement," 
Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 68 (June 1975) :243-
56; Edwin Higgins, "The Safety Movement in the Lake Superior Iron 
Region," Bulletin of the American Institute of Mining Engineers 94 
(Oct. 1914) :2515-30; Lew R. Palmer, "History of the Safety Move-
ment," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci-
ence 123 (Jan. 1926) :9-19. 
The history of mine safety in this period has been treated for certain 
geographical areas. Earl R. Beckner's A History of Labor Legislation 
in Illinois (Chicago, 1929) is outstanding. The History of Legislation 
for the Protection of Coal Miners in Pennsylvania, 1824-1915 (New 
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York, 1942) by Alexander Trachtenberg is limited in imagination. 
The account in Katherine A. Harvey's The Best-Dressed Miners: Life 
and Labor in the Maryland Coal Region, 1835-1910 (Ithaca, N.Y., 
1969) is well done but does not place the subject in a larger context. 
The reader should also be aware of Glenn F. Massay, "Legislators, 
Lobbyists, and Loopholes: Coal Mining Legislation in West Virginia 
1875-1901," West Virginia History 22 (April 1971): 135-70, and 
K. Austin Kerr, "State Regulation of Coal Mines in the Nineteenth 
Century," Paper delivered at the Business History Conference, North-
western University, Feb. 28, 1975, though they deal with an earlier 
period. Neither the United States Bureau of Mines nor the United 
Mine Workers has received adequate historical treatment. We also 
lack a thorough study of coal-industry economics for the Progressive 
years; I have summarized the assumptions about industrial structure 
which underpin the present study in "Great Expectations: The Search 
for Order in Bituminous Coal, 189o-1917," Business History Review 
48 (Spring 1974) :49-72. 
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